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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate a group of Francophone African migrants in 
Cape Town during the decade following the end of the apartheid era. The focus of the 
thesis, however, is on the reasons why French-speaking Africans leave their countries of 
origin, the reasons for coming to South Africa, and finally the reasons why within South 
Africa, they decide to settle in Cape Town, with a particular accent put on the integration 
of these migrants into the local society. The thesis considers legal migrants, students, 
refugees and extra-legals as the four categories of migrants according to theoretical 
frameworks.  
 
A brief overview of selected theories of international migration is considered to provide a 
framework for the Francophone African migration to Cape Town. The theoretical causes 
of Francophone African migration are viewed through both theories on the initiation of 
migration and theories of the perpetuation of migration. Apart from the theoretical 
synopsis, the data on which this study is based are derived from both qualitative and 
quantitative methodological approaches. Alongside secondary sources, a series of 
interviews, based on categories of migrants and gender, were conducted in Cape Town, 
Johannesburg and Pretoria in South Africa; as well as in Libreville in Gabon. In-depth 
interviews and focus-groups aimed at collecting information concerning the three main 
questions of the study.  
 
The reasons for the departure of Francophone Africans from their countries of origin are 
complex and mainly depend on the categories of migrants. As far as legal migrants and 
students are concerned, economic, political, social and academic paralysis, career 
prospects and the desire to pursue studies are the main reasons. As for refugees and extra-
legals, armed conflicts, environmental catastrophes, economic and social deterioration 
and social capital seem to be the main causes. Since 1994, South Africa has claimed a 
strong leadership role on the continent because of its economic and political strengths. 
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Educational infrastructure, the language factor and social capital are also reasons why 
migrants choose South Africa as a host country. The settlement in Cape Town depends 
on various factors, including the consideration of the city as first choice, safety concerns 
in other South African cities, the inability to settle in other cities, particularly 
Johannesburg, and social networks.  
 
French language seems to be a common language identity linking various ethnic groups 
residing in Francophone Africa. However, once migrants have established themselves in 
Cape Town, their ethnic, religious or political identities prevail. The thesis analyses the 
settlement of migrants in Cape Town by pointing out the complexities of migrant life in a 
case study of each category considered.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie tesis het ten doel om ‘n groep Franssprekende Afrika migrante in Kaapstad, in 
die dekade wat direk op die einde van die apartheidsera gevolg het, te ondersoek. Die 
tesis fokus op die redes waarom Franssprekende Afrikane hulle land van oorsprong 
verlaat, die redes waarom hulle na Suid-Afrika kom en, laastens, die redes waarom hulle 
in Suid-Afrika besluit om in Kaapstad te bly –die klem is spesifiek op die integrasie van 
die migrante binne die plaaslike gemeenskap. Na aanleiding van die teoretiese raamwerke 
wat vir die studie oorweeg word, neem die tesis wettige migrante, studente, vlugtelinge 
en onwettige migrante as die vier kategorieë van migrante, in ag.  
 
’n Bondige oorsig van uitgesoekte teorieë vir internasionale migrasie word as raamwerk 
vir die Franssprekende Afrikane se migrasie na Kaapstad oorweeg. Die teoretiese oorsake 
vir Franssprekende Afrikane se migrasie word deur beide die teorieë vir die inisiasie vir 
migrasie en die teorieë vir die bestendiging vir migrasie beoordeel. Naas die teoretiese 
sinopsis, word die data waarop hierdie studie gebaseer is, van beide kwalitatiewe en 
kwantitatiewe metodologiese benaderinge afgelei. Aanvullend tot die sekondêre bronne, 
is daar ook ‘n reeks onderhoude, gebaseer op kategorieë van migrante en geslag, in 
Kaapstad, Johannesburg en Pretoria in Suid-Afrika asook in Libreville in Gabon, gevoer 
–in diepte onderhoude en fokusgroepe met die doel om inligting rakende die drie 
hoofkwessies van die studie in te win.   
 
Die redes vir die emigrasie van Franssprekende Afrikane uit hulle oorsprongsland is 
kompleks en hang grotendeels saam met die kategorieë van migrante. Wat die wettige 
migrante en studente aanbetref is ekonomiese, politieke, sosiale en akademiese 
magteloosheid, loopbaan vooruitsigte en die begeerte vir die nastreef van studies, die 
hoofredes. Vir vlugtelinge en onwettige migrante blyk die hoofoorsake dié van 
gewapende konflik, natuurrampe, ekonomiese en sosiale agteruitgang en sosiale kapitaal 
te wees. Sedert 1994, het Suid-Afrika, weens haar ekonomiese en politieke vermoëns, ’n 
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sterk leierskapsrol op die kontinent uitgeoefen. Opvoedkundige infrastrukture, die 
taalkwessie en sosiale kapitaal is nog redes waarom migrante Suid-Afrika as gasheerland 
uitsonder. Vestiging in Kaapstad hang van verskeie redes af, insluitende die inagneming 
van die stad as eerste keuse, veiligheidsaspekte in ander Suid-Afrikaanse stede en die 
onvermoë om in ander stede gevestig te word. Die klem in hierdie verband rus verral op 
Johannesburg en sosiale netwerke.   
 
Frans as taal skyn ‘n algemene identiteit te wees wat verskeie etniese groepe in 
Franssprekende Afrika met mekaar verbind. Tog, is dit hulle etniese, godsdienstige en 
politieke identiteit wat handhaaf word sodra migrante hulself in Kaapstad gevestig het. 
Die tesis analiseer ook die vestiging van migrante in Kaapstad deur die kompleksiteite 
binne die leeftydsmigrasie van ’n gevallestudie vir elke kategorie in ag te neem.  
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Chapter One 
 
                                                INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
Migration is not a new process. It has been central to the formation of societies all 
over the world. The occupation and development of land began when people started 
moving from one area to settle in another; but with the implementation of the notion 
of the state and the concept of boundaries this movement was identified as 
‘international’. Basically, migration refers to a move by an individual or household 
from one geographical area to another. At the international level, migration takes 
place across borders. Other criteria, such as space, distance and reasons for leaving 
should be taken into consideration, as a single definition of migration cannot be 
applied in all contexts (Mafukidze, 2006: 104).  
 
The movement of people crossing international boundaries has increased considerably 
since the end of World War II. The number of migrants has grown from 75 million to 
120 million between 1965 and 2000 (Stalker, 2000: 6). The expansion of the global 
economy has resulted in the increased movement of people, which has become more 
rapid and their destinations more diversified through tremendous developments in 
transport and communication. Since 1980, the number of migrants has doubled 
worldwide to reach approximately 200 million people. This is comparable to the 
population of Brazil. These movements are occurring within regions as well as from 
one continent to another (CGIM, 2005: 1).  
 
Africa is viewed as a continent with considerable migration, including emigration and 
immigration. The increase of the number of African migrants has grown from 9.4 
million to 16.3 million between 1960 and 2000 (Oucho, 2006: 132). The legacy of 
colonialism influenced the destinations of African migrants for many years, because 
the economic, political, administrative and linguistic ties, as well as transportation 
facilities, caused the migration streams from former colonies to be mainly directed to 
the colonial powers. Therefore, French-speaking Africans went mostly to France or 
Belgium, those from English-speaking countries went to England and, to a lesser 
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extent, the USA, while Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking Africans went to 
Spain and Portugal respectively. However, with the influence of globalisation, 
African migrants have new patterns and have diversified their destinations. 
Nowadays, it is not a surprise to find strong communities of Senegalese in the South 
of Italy or Nigerians in Germany, for instance.  
 
The main characteristics of migration in Africa include a spectrum ranging from 
forced migration to the departure of highly skilled people. Alicea & Toro-Morn 
(2004: xxv), for instance, point to the increase of refugees in Africa. In 1980, only six 
countries located in the eastern and central parts of the continent had to be concerned 
about refugees. In 1985, there were three million refugees throughout Africa. By 
1995, 6.8 million refugees were concentrated in 13 states. Illegal immigration is 
another main pattern of migration in Africa. This undocumented migration includes 
trafficking and smuggling people, especially women and children. Women and girls 
are recruited through networks of agents and exploited as sex workers, while children 
are used as domestic servants in informal sectors, on plantations and often as soldiers 
on battlefields. The proportion of women among international migrants in Africa is 
significant. By 2000 it was estimated that 46.7% of the 16 million international 
migrants in Africa were women (Zlotnik, 2004). The departure of highly qualified 
people and students is also a pattern in African migration. Thousands of qualified 
Africans are running away from the continent because it cannot offer them social and 
professional security. This brain drain is increased by the need for a highly skilled 
labour force in developed countries. Mangolini and Revel (2002) estimate that brain 
drain accounts for a third of African skilled migrants due in particular to the increase 
of 2% in the expatriation of sub-Saharan students annually since 1990. It represents 
14% of the world foreign student population.  
 
Although the patterns of international African migration have changed as far as the 
volume of migrants and the destinations are concerned, the bulk of African migration 
continues to occur within the continent (Castels & Miller, 1998: 125). Indeed, with 53 
independent states, the flows of people crossing the borders of African countries are 
more significant in terms of volume. South Africa has become one of the main 
destinations on the African continent. The flows to South Africa have not only 
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increased since the demise of apartheid, but the origin has also diversified (Akokpari, 
2002; Castels & Miller, 1998; Cross et al, 2006; Crush, 2003; Stalker, 2000).  
 
Since 1994, apart from labourers recruited in neighbouring countries to work on farms 
and mines, South Africa has witnessed the arrival of thousands of people from other 
African countries and it is unlikely that this influx will cease any time soon. The 
arrival of those thousands of people has raised some concerns within South African 
legislative and academic circles. South African migration policy has encountered 
criticism because it is viewed as repulsive (Crush, 2003; Hill, 1998). Seemingly, the 
legislation has shifted from a racial policy to a xenophobic one. The migration policy 
is in fact still considered a legacy of apartheid legislation. The Aliens Control Act of 
1991 has indeed served as a benchmark for the migration legislation tools of the new 
democratic South Africa, although some amendments have been made to adjust South 
African migration policy according to international frameworks and in response to 
developments within the country.  
 
1.2 Why the Francophone African label? 
After World War II, Europe wanted to maintained tight relations with Africa in order 
to build a front force to the USA and the Soviet Union (Mazrui, 2004: 54). The 
Eurafrica project later on gave birth to developments such the Lomé Conventions. 
France, however, built strong relationships with her former colonies by creating in 
1970 an intergovernmental organisation for cooperation the Agence de Cooperation 
Culturelle et Technique (Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation), better 
known as ACCT. Its members also included some Asian and European countries. 
After various reforms, the agency became l’Agence Intergouvernementale de la 
Francophonie (Intergovernmental Agency of Francophonie) in 1985, before 
becoming in 1998, l’ Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (Francophone 
International Organisation), also called OIF. Francophonie refers therefore to the 
community of people and countries using the French language.  
 
Francophone African countries are mostly former French colonies. Bouillon and 
Morris (2001: 19) point out that Francophone African countries are members of the O 
IF and that their governments have adopted French as the official language, whilst 
their populations regularly use French for daily communication. However, one should 
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question whether a country being a member of the OIF is sufficient to consider it 
Francophone. In fact, countries like Equatorial Guinea, Egypt and Cape Verde are 
members of the OIF but in these countries Spanish, Arabic and Portuguese are 
respectively the official languages, and the majority of the population does not use 
French on a daily basis. In these countries, certain elite groups speak French although 
the countries are not former French colonies. Their belonging to the OIF is merely a 
political, economic and cultural ambition to expand France and the Francophone 
community on the continent. These cases are quite different from Morocco and 
Tunisia, which are former French colonies although Arabic, along with French is the 
official language. Another important example to mention is Algeria, a former French 
colony that uses French with Arabic as an official language but which is not a 
member of the OIF 
 
The use of French in twenty-six African countries as the lingua franca in government 
offices, judiciaries, legislatures or academia labels those countries as Francophone. As 
pointed out by Mazrui (2004: 6), this categorisation is enhanced by the degree and the 
nature of the lingo-cultural dependence of their societies. The scale of dependence on 
the French language links those African countries and their various identities. How 
prominent French is when people from those countries migrate, is however an 
important question. 
 
The expansion of French language from Europe to Africa is characterised by the 
official use of this language in the administrative or academic circles. With this 
regard, there are more French-speaking countries in Africa, while Europe has the 
larger number of French-speaking individuals (Mazrui, 2004: 54). The proportion of 
the populations identifying themselves through their local languages rather than 
French is higher in Francophone African countries. In addition, the expansion of 
Americanisation, the computer revolution, the internet and globalisation, all using 
English as the main language, has contributed to the decline of French influence on 
the African continent. The Arabinization in North Africa; the policy of Zairianization 
adopted by Mobutu in Zaire in the 1970s which promoted regional languages such as 
Lingala, Kikongo and Kiswahili; the rise of English in the Great Lakes region since 
the 1990s; and the deep-rooted local languages in West Africa have also diminished 
French influence. 
 5 
Because thousands of ethnic groups exist in Francophone Africa, French seems to be 
the common language identity that links various peoples and communities. Colonial 
and post-colonial inheritances have been the major factors contributing to this 
common linguistic identity. Consequently, people coming from Francophone African 
countries may have a social bond, a sense of shared values and communal identity 
(Garuba, 2001: 8) because of French, despite having different ethnic backgrounds. 
 
This study selected Francophone African migrants as the research sample. How far 
this common linguistic identity remains during the migration processes is one of the 
questions addressed during research.  
 
South Africa has become a popular destination for Francophone Africans despite the 
language barrier and other problems related to their integration. For Francophone 
Africans, South Africa is a new destination for two main reasons. The first reason is 
the opening of the country’s borders to the world after the end of apartheid. The 
second reason is that South Africa represents an alternative to some traditional 
destinations such as France and to a lesser extent Belgium or other African countries 
with relative better economic opportunities, like Cote d’Ivoire or Gabon. The arrival 
of Francophone African migrants has also introduced new sociological and cultural 
features that are sources of curiosity in South Africa. The language certainly 
contributes most to Francophone Africans feeling more like strangers in their new 
environment than do migrants coming from English-speaking countries, such as for 
instance, Nigeria, Ghana or Zambia. 
 
1.3 The questions of the study 
The overall purpose of this study is to provide insights into south-south migration, 
especially between African countries. This study investigates a group of Francophone 
African migrants currently residing in Cape Town with three main questions 
providing a framework for the research. The first question aims to establish the 
reasons why Francophone Africans decide to leave their countries of origin. The 
second concerns their choice of South Africa and the last relates to their choice of 
Cape Town rather than another South African city. The last question furthermore 
opens up an opportunity to gain insights into the lives of Francophone migrants in 
Cape Town. 
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1.4 Categories of migrants considered for the study 
The three main questions have influenced the choice of the categories of the migrants 
considered for this study. To categorise migrants is an advantage in analysing the 
reasons for departure, the choice of destination and the complexities of integration 
and life in the local society. Four categories of migrants are considered for this study 
according to the theoretical framework. In the first place, legally employed migrants 
and migrants seeking to improve their educational and professional qualifications 
probably represent the majority of migrants who have succeeded in obtaining 
permission to enter South Africa. These migrants have most probably left their 
countries voluntarily for essentially economic reasons. On the other hand, refugees 
and extra-legal migrants, the other two categories, have most likely been forced to 
leave their countries of origin for various reasons. The four categories of migrants 
considered for this study are listed as follows:  
 
1.4.1 Legal migrants 
As defined by the IOM (2004: 20), a legal migrant refers to any foreigner who has 
entered the country on a legal basis and remains within the country in accordance to 
his/her right of entry. In order to give a better insight of the lives of Francophone 
African migrants in Cape Town, I have sub-divided legal migrants into two 
categories. On the one hand, there are legal migrant workers who occupy a 
remunerated position in a private or public company. There are professionals such as 
doctors, lecturers, accountants or administrative assistants. On the other hand, some 
legal economic migrants are self-employed and many run their own businesses, 
especially in the informal sector. They are considered as documented migrant workers 
and they and/or the members of their families are authorised to enter, stay and engage 
in a remunerated activity in South Africa.  
 
1.4.2 Students 
Although the International Law of Migration (IOM, 2004) does not list students as 
migrants, I treat students as a category of migrants in this study for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the South African Immigration Act of 2002 acknowledges as migrants, 
anyone who chooses to spend many years in the country. Secondly, according to one 
of the patterns of African migration, some students decide to remain in South Africa 
after completing their studies and therefore become part of the brain drain. 
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Considering students in this study is also acknowledging one of the origins of legal 
migrants in South Africa. The DHA defines international students as non-South 
African persons admitted into South Africa for the specific purpose of following 
courses of study in an accredited institution of higher education (Ramphele, 1999: 8). 
 
Only students registered at the four state universities in Western Cape have been 
considered in this study. 
 
1.4.3 Refugees  
The United Nations High Commission defines a refugee as: 
 
a person who, owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to 
such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (IOM, 
2004: 53). 
 
1.4.4 Extra-legals 
Extra-legals are undocumented or illegal migrants. The International Migration Law 
defines an extra-legal migrant as follows (IOM, 2004: 67): 
 
an alien who enters or stays in a country without the appropriate 
documentation. This include, among others: one (a) who has no legal 
documentation to enter a country but manages to enter clandestinely, (b) who 
enters using fraudulent documentation, (c) who, after entering using legal 
documentation, has stayed beyond the time authorized or otherwise violated 
the terms of entry and remained without authorization. 
 
Asylum seekers (people who have applied for the refugees status and whose decisions 
are still pending), also fall under this category.  
 
1.5 Brief overview of research 
The methodological approach of this study is both descriptive and quantitative. This 
study is based on secondary material, in-depth interviews and focus groups. 
 8 
Interviews were held in Cape Town, Pretoria and Johannesburg in South Africa, and 
in Libreville in Gabon, while focus groups were conducted in Cape Town, 
Johannesburg and Pretoria. The Johannesburg and Pretoria interviews were used to 
draw some comparisons between the two Gauteng cities and Cape Town, and also to 
understand why some migrants are not interested in settling in Cape Town. The 
purpose of conducting interviews in Gabon was to capture the stories and perceptions 
of migrants living in that country in order to establish whether they intend to migrate 
to South Africa and what their expectations are before their arrival in the country. The 
choice of Gabon is also justified because it is a major destination for Francophone 
African migrants. Focus group interviews were initiated in order to obtain information 
which reveals and clarifies a diversity of opinions. Case studies were also undertaken 
to analyse the progression of migration experiences. 
 
The interviews were conducted in French and English. The respondents were found 
through the snowball technique. Different backgrounds, gender, professions, ages, 
marital status and nationalities were taken into consideration.  
 
In addition, in order to give a guesstimate of the number of Francophone African 
migrants in Cape Town, the method described in the appendix was developed and 
applied. 
 
1.6 Overview of migration literature in South Africa  
Many studies on migration to South Africa have been done on the periods before and 
after 1994. Two main research issues dominated before the 1994 period. The first was 
the history of European migration to South Africa and the second was labour 
migration. Among these studies, Brownell (1977) isolates the British component of 
both immigration to and emigration from South Africa based on arrivals from and 
departures to English speaking countries. Bradlow (1978) describes the evolution and 
problems of European immigration into the Union of South Africa. Martin (1986) 
points to networks used by Mauritians to leave their country, to settle and integrate 
into South African society. Mauritian arrival was explicitly a white migration.  
 
Concerning labour migration, Jooma (1991) focuses on the legislative, economic and 
socio-economic obstacles to entering the country, and on strategies used to stabilise 
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migrancy in the mining industry. Allen (1992) explains the necessity, the regions of 
origin and laws made to bring mine workers to South Africa before the end of the 
apartheid era. New labour contracts were introduced to these ends. Tshitereke (1998) 
studies the debate around labour migrant systems before and after the end of 
apartheid. Mc Donald (2000) gives an historical overview of migration to as well as 
within the Southern African region. He addresses the issues of xenophobia, economic 
migration within the region and the development of efficient migration policies. The 
importance of the work done by James (1992) should also be noticed as it focuses on 
the mine labour during the last two decades of the apartheid era (1970-1990). The 
sociological history focuses on social change of African labour in mines as a result of 
the split of state institutions and conflict between the mining groups in the 1980s and 
1990s. The author points out the recruiting channels of African manpower in the 
neighbouring countries, as well as in the former homelands. Urban workers as an 
alternative are also taken into account due to the change of patterns from traditional 
sources. The author also discusses the ascendance of African labour through processes 
of unionisation, the struggle over the mine compounds and the suppression of the 
Color Bar system. 
 
Labour migration after 1994 is also analysed. Crush and James (1995) study the 
complexity of removing and restructuring the visible and the invisible boundaries of 
mine migrancy and the hardship they represent. The post-1994 era has also brought 
into sharp focus the legal position of migrants. Hill (1998) emphasises migration 
policy development and situates these within the context of regional and international 
migration trends. Minaar and Hough (1996) address illegal immigrants, their origins 
and their positive and negative contributions to South Africa. Crush (1998) clarifies 
the link between immigration and human rights through the Aliens Control Act and 
the subsequent provisions for immigration. Majodina (2001) provides a useful 
framework for examining the case of forced migrants and the refugee policy in 
Southern Africa region. Three documents used as main references for this study focus 
on Francophone migrants and on Cape Town as a destination for migrants. The first is 
a paper prepared by Boaden (2002: 3) on migration in the Western Cape and serves as 
“a pilot study which should be followed up by more comprehensive investigation 
where more hard data is collected and the viewpoint of foreigners is obtained 
directly.” The second document is about Francophone migration to South Africa 
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during the 1990s (Bouillon & Morris, 2001), in which the authors have concentrated 
on Johannesburg. The book focuses on the motives behind the departure of African 
migrants from their countries of origin and it describes the economic activities of 
migrants, particularly the street sellers in Johannesburg. The third document is by 
Olaleye (2000), who explains African migrants’ motivations for choosing Cape Town. 
 
The South African Migration Project also provides a range of books and articles on 
migratory movements in the Southern African region. Without being exhaustive, 
some works can be pointed out, including Crush & Williams (2001) on gender, Crush 
and McDonald (2002) on brain drain, Waller (2006) on xenophobia, Cohen (2003) on 
health or Crush and Frayne (2207) on migration and development. Some of these 
works are undertaken in collaboration with other centres of research. 
 
1.7 The outline of the chapters 
The study broadly fits into six chapters that describe the journey of Francophone 
African migrants from their respective countries to Cape Town. Following from the 
introduction (Chapter 1), which sets out the research questions and identifies the 
categories of migrants considered, the chapters are organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the historical and geographical context of Francophone African 
migration. Starting from the early movements of people and a description of 
Francophone Africa, the chapter looks at the traditional destinations of Francophone 
African migrants on both the European and African continents. It then places the 
evolution of the patterns of Francophone African migration in the context of 
globalisation and considers the consequent search for alternatives to the traditional 
destinations. These new destinations include South Africa. The chapter furthermore 
outlines the evolution of migration policy and the discourse on migration in South 
Africa. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the evolution of the theoretical analysis: an overview of the 
theories of international migration which includes theories on the initiation of 
migration and on the perpetuation of migration. Finally the chapter addresses the 
methodology used for this study.  
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Chapter 4 posits the push and pull factors that affect Francophone African migrants. 
The chapter presents the political, economic, socio-cultural, academic and 
environmental situations in Francophone Africa that cause the departure of millions of 
people. The choice of South Africa as destination conforms to numerous criteria, 
including the historical links of some countries with South Africa, as well as the 
political, economic and academic position that the country occupies on the continent. 
The chapter highlights social capital as the other reason for the arrival of migrants. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on Francophone African migrants’ choice of Cape Town, their 
modes of arrival and their living conditions in Cape Town. The chapter also tries to 
locate the arrival of Francophone Africans within the historical flows of migrants to 
Cape Town, which is regarded as a cosmopolitan city. The chapter also considers the 
settlement of migrants and social capital to explain the complexities of Francophone 
African migrants’ lives in Cape Town. 
 
Chapter 6 outlines four migrants’ experiences with a case study from each category. 
The illustration of the four categories is designed to analyse the complexities of the 
life histories of migrants from their departure from their countries of origin to their 
arrival and settlement in the realities of Cape Town, including the overlapping of 
categories. 
 
The conclusion answers the research questions raised in the introduction to this study. 
Lastly, the appendix guesstimates the number of Francophone African in Cape Town 
in 2004/2005. 
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Chapter Two 
 
                            HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to define Francophone Africa according to its historical formation 
and its geographical conception. It intends to understand migration “within the 
context of the political and historical evolution of African societies” (Aina & Baker, 
1995: 89).  
 
The first section considers the historical context, summarising the early migrations in 
the regions that are now Francophone Africa, with the Bantu migration and the slave 
trade as the two main massive population movements during the pre-colonial era. In 
the second section, the historical context justifies the argument that Francophone 
Africa is a legacy of colonialism, starting with the making of Francophone Africa and 
followed by the implementation of the colonial state and the description of the actual 
Francophone Africa.  
 
The third section of the chapter describes the traditional destinations of Francophone 
African migration represented by France in Europe, and Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon 
within the African continent. Throughout that section, particular attention is paid to 
restrictive measures taken by these countries to curb immigration. Finally, the chapter 
ends by considering new trends in Francophone African migration into the globalised 
context, which have pushed Francophone African migrants to view South Africa as a 
new destination. As such, some patterns of migration in the country, the evolution of 
South African migration policy, the discourse on migration in South Africa and a 
presentation of South Africa as a country of emigration are explored.  
 
2.2 Early migrations  
Significant movements of populations in Africa have accompanied the history of the 
continent through the centuries. The large scale of people’s displacement had many 
causes, including the search for better lands. Two of the most important mass 
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migrations in Africa before the arrival of Europeans settlers were mainly linked with 
ecological problems. For example the Peul people in West Africa moved downwards 
due to the progression of the Sahara desert. Even in the tropical rain forest of Central 
Africa, the nature of soil, rainfall patterns, the topography and the availability of 
supplementary food resources could cause the departure of entire villages (Ogot, 
2003: 25).  
 
One of the reasons for the tremendous advancement of Bantu people1 from the 
Central Africa region to the tip of the southern part of the continent could be linked to 
the scarcity of resources available to the increasing populations inhabiting the region 
adjacent to Cameroon and Nigeria. According to Burns, Collins and Ching (1994: 95), 
the Bantu migration started during the second millennium BC and spread over the 
Equatorial forest to end up in the southern tip of the continent. The Bantu migration 
spread in two main directions. Firstly, a stream of people seemed to walk horizontally 
along the Equator towards the east to the Great Lakes region. Then, the movement 
went southward, ending in the southern part of the continent. Secondly, another group 
travelled through the rain forest to the south through what is now Angola and so on. 
According to Fage (1995: 28), the movements of the second group of Bantu people 
through the rainfall were “more slower and more piecemeal” in comparison to the 
advance of the first group, because of the savannah in the Eastern part of the 
continent. Consequently, the Bantu people were already in what is now the KwaZulu-
Natal region in South Africa by 500 CE (Beck, 2000: 16). The establishment of 
powerful kingdoms or chiefdoms, such as the kingdoms of the Kongo in Central 
Africa or the Zulu in Southern Africa, was the consequence of those early large-scale 
migrations. 
 
The African continent has witnessed one of the most painful forced migrations in the 
history of humanity. The discovery of the Americas exacerbated the terrible fate 
suffered by the African continent. The arrival of Christopher Colombus in the “New 
World” in 1492 was followed by the exploitation of its virgin lands and mineral 
                                                 
1
 Bantu is a linguistic classification of languages used by most of the African populations living in of 
the Southern part of the continent. These different languages are believed to have the same root, for 
instance the word ntu, which broadly means human being in singular and becomes bantu in plural 
(Fage, 1995: 21). The Bantu languauges present many similarities between themselves which explains 
their common origin and the spread of Bantu people throughout the Southern part of Africa. 
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resources. Africa was considered the supplier of slave labour for these exploitations 
and Europe became interested in Africa for the sake of America.  
 
The history of forced migration in Africa was however a reality before the arrival of 
European explorers. The institution of slavery was well established in African society 
because victorious chiefs often took prisoners of war as slaves. However, the status of 
slaves in African society was quite different to that under the slave trade, as evident 
from Rotberg’s description of the African context (1965: 135):  
 
…they (slaves) were free to marry, till their own fields, move freely within the 
tribal dominion, and live relatively normal lives among peoples possessing 
institutions … Indigenous society assimilated slaves and allowed them to rise 
to positions of power and influence. 
 
Slavery in Africa however changed when sub-Saharan societies began to trade with 
Arabic people. Among the trade products, slaves were included who were sold into 
the Middle East, Asia and the southern part of Europe. Nevertheless, slaves were not 
the main products of the trans-Sahara trade because “a horse was worth fifteen or 
twenty Africans” (Rotberg, 1965: 134). It was the colonisation of America that made 
slaves the main feature in the triangular intercontinental trade. The trans-Atlantic 
slave trade was singular not only because of its characteristic aspect of forced 
migration over three centuries, but also because of “its sheer size, its geographical 
extent and its economics” (Ogot, 2003: 39).  
 
One could argue that the slave trade was unintentionally brought to America by the 
Portuguese who used Africans to work on the plantations of the Canaries and 
Ferdinand Po islands, and as servants in Lisbon and other Portuguese cities. The idea 
of importing Africans to work in America was pursued when the indigenous 
inhabitants of the “New World” died by the thousands under the appalling working 
conditions and new illnesses brought by Europeans. Initially monopolised by Spain, 
the slave trade attracted all European colonial powers such as Great Britain, Holland 
and France because it was a lucrative economic activity. The exploitation of America 
was firstly based on precious metals, before the share of agricultural products such as 
tobacco, rum, and particularly sugar, increased. The trans-Atlantic trade was 
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organised around “shipping goods from Africa and the Americas, slaves from Africa 
to the Americas and agricultural products and precious metals from the Americas to 
Western Europe” (Ogot, 2003: 45). 
 
The exact number of slaves from Africa remains unknown because there are not exact 
records of the number of slaves who were taken to America and to a lesser extent 
Europe. The records at the different destinations do not take into account the number 
of slaves killed during the trip across the Atlantic Ocean or during the capture 
process. The records at the ports of arrival differ from one source to another. 
According to Coquery-Vidrovitch (1988: 19), 11.7 millions Africans were deported to 
America between 1450 and 1900. The same source indicates that three and half 
million Africans were traded as slaves in the trans-Saharan trade. The compilations of 
the number of slaves made up by Avanten, and considered by Ogot (2003: 43), 
mention that 22 million Africans were deported to America, North Africa, Asia and 
Europe between 1500 and 1890. Rotberg (1965: 152) puts the figures higher when he 
concludes that “25 million African slaves were deported to America before 1888. This 
number excludes 10 million Africans who died during the voyage to America another 
10 million who were exported to Asia and the Arab world.” 
 
The arrival of Europeans and the colonisation of the continent destroyed the previous 
patterns of African migrations. People’s movements were dictated by the expectations 
of the colonial rulers. Even after the independence of African countries, the patterns 
of African migration in general, and Francophone African migration in particular, 
were determined by the legacy of colonialism and its aftermath, decolonisation. 
 
2.3 Description of Francophone Africa 
Francophone Africa is a heterogeneous group of countries of which the most 
important shared characteristic is their use of French as an administrative, corporative 
and academic language. Francophone Africa was brought into existence with the 
European conquest. This historical overview thus aims to give a broader 
understanding of the group of countries studied by looking at the making of 
Francophone Africa and the colonial state. It furthermore outlines the construction 
and evolution of African countries with reference to the arrival of explorers and 
concluding with the Berlin Conference.  
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2.3.1 The making of Francophone Africa 
According to Manning (1988: 8), Francophone Africa was the outcome of the 
fatherhood of Europe and the motherhood of the African continent. The expansion of 
European colonial desires gave birth to a new civilisation in some parts of the African 
continent. After the first period of exploration that lasted almost four centuries and 
reached every corner of the continent, the competition was intense for the conquest of 
as much territory as possible to provide raw materials that the European industry 
desperately needed. Soon the spheres of influence controlled by each European 
colonial power were likely to collide. Freund (1998: 82) gives an example of the 
competition for the acquisition of territories in Africa. The penetration of the Italian 
explorer Savorgnan de Brazza on behalf of France from the Gabonese coast 
threatened Belgian interests in Congo. Brazza signed a treaty with a paramount local 
chief, which led to the creation, among other realisations, of Brazzaville, the capital of 
Congo. French expansion was set to cross the Congo River. According to Fieldhouse 
(1982: 304) these sporadic expansions of the French colonial possessions were 
unplanned and the possessions did not have unity of character of function at the 
beginning. Thus, “the characteristic pattern of the scramble began to emerge” 
(Fieldhouse, 1982: 304). At the time, Britain, France and to a lesser extent Portugal 
were the major European colonial powers. But the colonial enterprise was a concern 
of all the major dominant powers in Europe. Even Germany, which became involved 
in the colonial enterprise later, succeeded in establishing its domination in Togo, 
Cameroon, South-West Africa and Tanganyika (Freund, 1998: 84).  
 
For the interest of all colonial powers, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck invited 
14 colonial states, including the United States of America, to settle a political and 
therefore economic partition of Africa during the conference held in Berlin from 15 
November 1884 to 26 February 1885. This decision about the scramble for Africa was 
to distinguish and establish clearly the spheres of influence of each of the colonial 
powers over their protectorates and colonies in Africa. The outcome of the 
negotiations was the drawing of the boundaries of territories in a room in Germany far 
from Africa without taking into consideration the realities of the myriad of traditional 
monarchies, chiefdoms and various other types of political and social organisations in 
Africa. However, one should ask whether it was indeed possible at that time for 
European diplomats and statesmen to even concede that they might have counterparts 
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in Africa; whose populations they considered as not fully human and requiring their 
civilizing influence. Indeed, many Europeans viewed Africa as follows (Manning, 
1988: 24): 
 
Some colonisers saw themselves as saviours of their fellow humans in Africa. 
They offered spiritual salvation through Christianity, or social salvation 
through Western education and capitalist enterprise. Other Europeans saw 
themselves as superior beings. They passed judgment on African civilisation 
and found it to be morally inferior, economically backward, and incapable of 
achieving equality with Western civilisation. Most Europeans in the late 
nineteenth century spoke of Africans as children and therefore as people 
without maturity and without history. 
 
The Berlin Conference, as shown by Fieldhouse (1982: 213), attempted to clarify 
future claims on the continent. A turning point for European colonial expansion, it 
was agreed that claims on the coastal territories required effective occupations. The 
result later enforced by treaties and armed conquests was that Britain and France took 
the most important slices of the cake in the scramble for Africa because of the leading 
role they played in the nineteenth century expansion and partition at the Berlin 
Conference. As far as France is concerned, its expansion on the continent was defined 
by its intention “for military, financial and jingoistic reasons, to build a continuous 
block of territory from Algeria to the Congo and eastwards across the Sudan the 
French equivalent of Rhodes’ Cape to Cairo dream” (Fieldhouse, 1982: 223). Its 
dominance was acknowledged over most of West Africa, particularly from Mauritania 
westward to Chad and from Algeria in the north to Ivory Coast in the south, including 
the actual Morocco, Senegal, Guinea, Burkina-Faso, Benin and Niger. France was 
also rewarded with other territories in the central part of the continent: Cameroon, 
Gabon, Congo and the Central African Republic. France thus extended its colonial 
possession by two millions square miles (Meredith, 2005: 2). The Belgians acquired a 
vast territory that became the Congo and which was at first the private property of 
King Leopold II. Among other decisions taken during the conference, the participants 
came to an agreement that the Niger and the Congo Rivers were free for shipping 
traffic and an international prohibition of the slave trade was signed.  
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The demarcation of the spheres of colonial powers on the continent was one of the 
first major upheavals in the change of the destiny of Africa and its inhabitants. As 
described by Meredith (2005:1), people were grouped into areas defined by geometric 
lines, lines of latitude and longitude and other straight lines or arcs of circles. 
Consequently, the Bakongo, for instance, were partitioned between the French Congo, 
the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese colony of Angola. Thus, populations with 
different histories, cultures, languages and beliefs were forced to live in the same 
territories and people with the same background were separated. Sharing the same 
area also forced those populations to accommodate the characteristics of the colonial 
power, including the language. Indeed, as described in Mafukidze (2006: 109), the 
successive periods of occupation and colonisation introduced and enhanced European 
languages and strengthened relations between colonial powers and their colonies, 
resulting in today’s African countries being linked to each other on the one hand and 
to the colonial power on the other. This is expressed by Lusophone, Anglophone or 
Francophone connections. 
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Map 1: Colonial Africa 
 
 
Source: www.wikipedia.org 
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2.3.2 The colonial state 
After the acknowledgement of its acquisitions, France grouped those territories into 
two vast federations in West and Central Africa called AOF (Afrique Occidentale 
Française, French Western Africa) and AEF (Afrique Equatoriale Française, French 
Equatorial Africa). The two federations were ruled into the same type of organisation. 
As shown by Fieldhouse (1982: 306), the French colonial administration was liberal 
in theory, but centralised and authoritarian in practise. The administrative concepts 
were the outcome of the merger of French political experience and the legal legacy. 
Colonial administrative policies were dictated by the principles of liberty of the 
enlightenment period and the centralised and autocratic administration of the Ancien 
Regime whilst at the same time being subject to the legal tools of the Roman law and 
the Napoleonic codes. The colonial administration showed the impress of precise 
legal thinking and passion for symmetry, with the intention to apply uniform 
administrative patterns to diverse colonial possessions.  
 
The French Republic was one and indivisible in theory. Colonies were therefore 
integrated parts of the republic. This integration of colonies within the Metropolis was 
defined through three models (Fieldhouse, 1982: 308). The first model was 
assimilation, which Roberts (cited by Fieldhouse, 1982: 308) defines as “that system 
which tends to efface all differences between the colonies and the motherland, and 
which views the colonies simply as a prolongation of the mother-country beyond the 
seas.” It was viewed as a full adoption by the colonies of the Metropolis’s ways of 
government, laws and culture. Assujetissement was the second model, which 
highlighted a genuine subordination of colonies, inherited from the Ancien Regime. 
However, its implementation failed and the colonial administration shifted later on to 
association, the third model. Through the last model, colonies were still seen as 
inferior, but were supposed to retain something of their identity and were to be 
administrated rationally. It was a question of modelling colonies following the French 
example, with a clear intention of incorporating them at a later stage into the 
Metropolis. The implementation of the administrative policies drew a line between the 
Metropolis and the colonies, with a highly concentrated centre of power in France and 
diverse and poor colonial peripheries with no real autonomy. After several 
developments, the colonies were run under the tutelage of a full Colonial Ministry 
created in 1894 (Fieldhouse, 1982: 310). 
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As far as economy is concerned, from 1898 the exploitation of the colonies was 
mandated to private companies through a concessionary system, within which private 
companies were given the monopoly of the exploitation of raw materials and trade for 
a certain number of years (Manning, 1988: 47). In return, the companies paid taxes 
and were asked to build infrastructure such as ports, roads or railways in order to 
facilitate the exportation of the resources exploited. If the private companies did well 
by fulfilling the first part of their mandate, the second part was, however, far from 
being accomplished. Most of those companies were individual or familial affairs 
which did not have the necessary resources to fulfil the requirements. Manning (1988: 
47) points out that concessionary companies such as the Upper Congo Company and 
the Upper Ogowe Company in the actual Congo and Gabon respectively succeeded in 
making profits through a system of pillage. The indigenous population paid heavily 
for these shortcomings by being forced to work under inhuman conditions wherever 
their services were required.  
 
As pointed out by Rossantaga-Rignault (2000: 18), one of the features of the 
economic and demographic underdevelopment of the actual Francophone African 
countries is due to that exploitation of indigenous populations. With the decline of the 
rubber trade in the 1920s, the concessionary system came to an end and was 
abandoned when the government started making higher revenues with competitive 
commerce. Private merchants increased the revenues and the volume of exportation. 
As described by Manning (1988: 48), the private merchants were mainly immigrants 
from Lebanon, Syria, Greece and Portugal, who settled in small towns and almost 
monopolised wholesale and retail commerce. They constituted an intermediary class 
between French administrators and the indigenous populations. The government also 
implemented a new system to exploit the colonies through forced cultivation, also 
known as the système de l’indigénat.  
 
Following the failure of the concessionaires companies, the système de l’indigénat 
was in place from 1910 to 1946. The system was a segregationist partition of the 
colonial society into two groups. The first group was French citizens. They were 
white people and a small African elite which was granted citizenship. The second 
group was made up of the indigenous populations who enjoyed few rights or none at 
all, and who were subject to many constraints and obligations. The indigenous 
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population was ruled by both the traditional justice and the colonial administration, 
but the abuses were similar to those of the period of concessionaires companies. The 
three main pillars required from the indigenous population of the sytème de 
l’indegénat were free services, forced work and the poll tax.  
 
France took complete advantage of that immense labour and military force, even 
though not qualified and specialised, when thousand of Africans from the colonies 
fought for France during World War II and the first wars of colonial liberation as in 
Indochina. On their return from the worldwide conflict, the soldiers were among those 
who demanded changes to the situation of the indigenous population. The answer of 
the colonial power was to organise a conference in Brazzaville in 1944, during which 
the Metropolis simply explained the new form of organisation which would bring a 
kind of political life to the colonies without really transforming the fate of the 
populations. The African colonies were gathered into an organisation called Union 
Française, which saw the creation of assemblies to which African representatives 
were designated through elections. It was from that political elite that France chose 
leaders of African countries when they became independent, and the colonial power 
accommodated the colonial states in the conversion to the newly African independent 
states. 
 
The achievement of independence by Francophone African countries, mainly in 1960, 
did not mean severing relations with the colonial power. Instead, after 1960 the 
French colonial enterprise continued under a different guise better known as neo-
colonialism. Throughout both the colonial and post-colonial periods, French African 
possessions that later became Francophone African countries have served as providers 
of labour. However, other types of migration, including illegal migration, developed 
along with labour migration.  
 
2.4 Some traditional destinations of Francophone African migration 
For many years, the flow of African migration in general and the Francophone 
African one in particular has been determined by the types of relations existing 
between the sending and receiving countries. The movement of people has been 
sustained by the links between the former rulers and their colonies. Consequently, it 
appears as no surprise that English-speaking Africans from countries such as Nigeria, 
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Ghana, or Kenya mostly move to the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent to the 
United States of America. Similarly, people from Angola or Equatorial Guinea prefer 
to go to Portugal and Spain respectively. Likewise, Francophone Africans have 
considered France to be their first choice destination outside the continent, which has 
been reinforced by political, economic, linguistic and transportation links between 
France and its former colonies. In the beginning, the massive arrivals of Africans in 
France could be justified by the labour needs of the Metropolis.  
 
Over the years, Francophone African migration has also been directed towards 
countries on the continent that have enjoyed relative economic stability. Two 
countries in particular, Côte d’Ivoire in West Africa and Gabon in the central part of 
the continent, have distinguished themselves from others, particularly in the number 
of foreigners in comparison to the total population. 
 
2.4.1 Francophone African migration to France 
This section gives an overview of the successive Francophone African migrations to 
France. The western and northern parts of the continent are analysed as the two main 
provider regions. This section also outlines the evolution of coercive measures taken 
by France and the European Union to curb immigration, especially from Africa. 
 
2.4.1.1 The migration of North Africans to France 
The history of migration in modern France is determined by three main factors: “slow 
growth, the pattern and the timing of industrialization, and political changes 
associated with the rise of republicanism and colonialism” (Hollifield, 1994: 145), 
which saw France being labelled as a country of immigrants, particularly between 
1890 and 1940. One could argue that the geographic proximity of the Northern 
African region and France over the years facilitated the migration of Northern 
Africans to France, but it is difficult to pinpoint when the crossing of the 
Mediterranean Sea started. However, the French colonial adventure in North Africa 
and its implementation in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia definitely increased the 
flows. The streams of large-scale North African migration to France started in the 
nineteenth century with the arrival of Algerians after the release of the first order 
authorising Algerians to enter in France in May 1876, following their participation in 
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the Franco-German war. But it was during the twentieth century that the numbers 
increased.  
 
In 1912, there were some 5 000 Algerians in Marseilles and some 7 000 Moroccans in 
Bordeaux (Dumont, Durand & Mariner 2002). Before World War I, there were some 
30 000 North Africans in France. The bulk of the early Algerian migrants to France 
were from the Kabylia region in the north of the country where people from a network 
of several villages habitually went to work on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. 
During World War I, more migrants were required to compensate for the shortage of 
the labour force in the Metropolis and some migrants were even enrolled by force in 
army. A total of 132 000 North Africans found themselves in France, either as factory 
workers to replace French nationals who went to fight in the war or to become 
soldiers themselves. After the war many of those migrants decided to settle in France, 
especially in port cities, such as Le Havre, Marseilles, Bordeaux and Dunkerque, and 
in some industrial regions where there were more jobs. 
 
However, with the economic crisis which followed the conflict, the North African 
migrants were among the first victims as their standard of living dropped 
dramatically. As a result, the number of migrants returning to their regions of origin 
was more than the number of the migrants arriving in France. French authorities also 
intensified the control of the North Africans entering the country. The departures from 
and returns to the Maghreb region of thousands of North Africans were slowed down 
but not completely stopped by the Second World War, before being reactivated when 
the conflict ended.  
 
After the conflict and its aftermath of reconstruction, more North Africans arrived in 
France. The Northern Francophone African migration was enhanced by the 
differences in wages and standard of living between the two regions. The Northern 
Francophone migration to France was also determined by the economic growth, or the 
Trente Glorieuses (a thirty glorious years from the end of the Second World war to 
the beginning of the 1970s characterised by economic growth and low 
unemployment), in all Western European and North American countries. These 
countries not only needed to increase their labour force to sustain the economic 
growth, but were also seen as favourite destinations for thousands of people who 
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wanted to benefit from the success of that economic growth. The third reason for the 
vast increase in the number of North Francophone Africans arriving in the Metropolis 
was the desire expressed by French authorities to boost the population of the country 
following the enormous loss of life during the war (Hollifield, 1999: 60). Like other 
Western countries involved in the Second World War, France was in desperate need 
of a massive and cheap labour force. The country launched the policy of “migration of 
recruitment”. This general trend in most of Western European countries was viewed 
as a temporary measure because European policy-makers did not question the 
capability of their countries “to regulate migration inflows nor did they foresee the 
possibility that foreign workers would stay” (Garson, 1992: 81). The state therefore 
set up the Office National d’ Immigration (National Immigration Office, ONI) in 
charge of implementing annual recruitment plans and administrating these 
recruitments. Despite the open door policy towards workers who were willing to 
integrate into French society, the newcomers were in reality still not considered fully 
a part of the host society and were labelled as travailleurs immigrants ou permanents 
(immigrants permanents or workers) (Hollifield, 1999: 61).  
 
The Northern African colonial possessions were regarded as the main region for the 
supply of a massive labour force able to solve the three issues underlying the launch 
of the policy of “migration of recruitment”. Algeria was the main provider, as pointed 
out by Boubakri (2004) - in the 1950s, more than 90% of Northern Francophone 
African migrants in France were Algerians. Contrary to the first period of massive 
departures of Algerians to France in the early 1900s when migrants were from the 
Kabylia region, from 1947 onwards the regions of departure from Algeria as well as 
the destinations in France were more diversified. Migrants also came from regions 
like the departments of Oran in the west, Constantine in the east and the southern 
regions of the colony. Migrants settled in the northern part of France, while the 
settlement in the industrial areas was reinforced. Overall, the Northern Francophone 
African migrants were working class and mostly involved in sectors such as 
construction, building, hydroelectricity or the automobile industries.  
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With the end of the Algerian colonial war and the country’s independence in 19622 
which followed the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 migration between 
the new Northern Francophone African countries and the former Metropolis was 
regulated through agreements concluded between the French government and its 
Moroccan and Tunisian counterparts in 1963, and with the Algerian government a 
year later. The ONI even opened offices in Casablanca and Tunis to coordinate the 
recruitment of migrant workers. 
 
From the end of the Second World War the number of Northern Francophone African 
migrants to France has never ceased to increase. For instance, the number of arrivals 
of Algerians to France, according to the ONI, increased from 74 000 between 1947 
and 1953 to 211 000 between 1954 and 1962, whilst the numbers of returns to 
Maghreb decreased from 561 000 to 350 000 between those two years (Dumont, 
Durand & Mariner, 2002). Another source (Castels & Miller, 1998: 73) reveals that in 
1970 the tally of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians living in France was 600 000, 
140 000 and 90 000 respectively.  
 
The economic stringency due to the oil crisis, at the beginning of the 1970s, gave the 
French authorities, like elsewhere in Western European countries, an opportunity to 
stop the policy of labour recruitment. From that point, immigration was portrayed in 
official statements as a liability, not an asset, and immigrants became guests rather 
than settlers (Hollifield, 1994: 155). The decision, however, did not stop the migration 
of Northern Africans to France, even though it was undertaken outside the agreement 
framework concluded between the sending countries and France. From that point on, 
Northern Francophone African migration entered into a new era dominated by three 
new features: regular migration for reunification of families, seasonal migration of 
workers and irregular migration.  
 
After the end of the Algerian war, French authorities allowed the arrival of the 
relatives of Algerians workers in order to put them into a familial context or to have 
                                                 
2
 With the signature of the Evian Agreements, which ended the civil war in Algeria and brought 
independence for the country, the status of Algerians like for other citizens from former French 
colonies did not change, as they were able to move freely between France and their countries of origin. 
According to Hollifield (1994: 155) this status of Africans, along with high demand of labour as well 
as goods and services were the major reasons behind the sustainabilty of the flows of Africans to 
France during the Trente Glorieuses. 
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the possibility to start one. With the end of the Trente Glorieueses, the number of 
women and children in the flow of migrants increased considerably. Approximately 
an annual average of 12 400 Moroccans moved to France between 1972 and 1990 in 
the context of familial reunification (Cagiano de Azevedo, 1994). North Africans 
encouraged this type of migration because the workers were able to benefit from 
familial allocations, which in some cases were more important than their salaries. 
However, the arrival of workers’ relatives brought about another aspect of familial 
migration. Many fake marriages were arranged to allow unauthorised people to move 
to France. This lucrative activity extended to migrants claiming that children from 
other families were theirs to help them further their studies or find a job in France. 
 
As the number of regular migrants decreased, following the decision taken by the 
French authorities, seasonal and temporal movements of workers were required in 
some sectors of the economy such as agriculture and construction. According to 
Cagiano de Azevedo (1994), an annual average of 12 600 Moroccans migrated 
seasonally to France between 1972 and 1981 before the average dropped to 4 000 in 
the 1990s.  
 
Irregular migration was also intensified with the decline of the regular flow of the 
labour force. Irregular movements to France started in the 1920s when French 
employers in the Metropolis recruited, with the benediction of administrative officials, 
Algerian workers outside the regulated channels. In the 1970s, irregular, cheap and 
docile workers were needed to sustain black market in France. Irregular flow 
increased with the degradation of the standard of living in the sending countries. 
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   Figure 1: Evolution of Northern Francophone African migrants to France,  
                    1994-2002 
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Source: http//:www.ined.fr/population-en-chiffres/france.htm 
 
The massive North Francophone African migration to France finds its roots into the 
French colonial enterprise. The requirements of a cheap labour force obliged the 
colonial state to recruit from its possessions. Along with the northern part of the 
continent, Western Africa became the second main region to supply workers to the 
Metropolis. 
 
2.4.1.2 The migration of sub-Saharan Africans to France 
South of the of Sahara recruitment of labour force mainly occurred in the western part 
of the continent, particularly in the region of the three frontiers, better known as the 
Valley of the Senegalese River. However, recruitments from the Valley of the 
Senegalese River were less important than from Northern Africa in terms of numbers. 
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The region straddles three countries between Mali, Senegal and Mauritania and the 
Senegalese River crosses it. A feature of the region is its ethnic, cultural and 
economic homogeneity. 
 
The Madingues and the Haal Poular are the main ethnic family groups. These major 
ethnic groups are dominated by the Soninké for the Madingues and the Toucouleurs 
for the Haal Poular. These communities are essentially traditionalists and rely heavily 
on their environment because the economic and educative infrastructures of the three 
countries are poorly developed in the region (Lanly, 1998). Therefore, the populations 
are strongly linked to their local and traditional societies, in which the position into 
the social stratum is mainly defined according to the age, sex and importance of the 
family of origin. The society is patriarchal and hierarchical. At the top, there is a chief 
who is assisted in his duties by a council of notables to harmonise the social life and 
to serve as a link between the administrative authorities and the populations. The 
descendants of the founders of the village are those who make up the nobility. The 
other groups of the social hierarchy are the caste of professions, such as the smiths 
and griots (poets, praise singers and/or musicians). Women and young people are 
situated below the above groups. At the bottom of the social hierarchy, there are 
slaves.  
 
Economic activities are based on agriculture and stock breeding, which are practised 
on two types of land. There are clanic lands mainly located in the arable areas close to 
the river. These clanic lands are under the authority of the chief of the village. There 
are also free lands where individual initiatives are conducted. However, these 
economic activities are put under serious threat due to the ecological disadvantages of 
that Sahel region.3 
 
Like the Northern African region, large-scale Western African migration to France is 
characterised by two periods. The first period started after the Second World War 
with the massive recruitments of a cheap labour force. The second period is the era of 
restrictive measures, following the drop in economic growth at the beginning of the 
                                                 
3
 Sahel literally means border of the Sahara Desert, which advances year after year and reduces the 
arable lands. Apart from the advancement of the desert, the region also suffers from poor quality of 
arable lands and droughts brought by the Senegalese River. This obliges people to move in search of 
better lands.  
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1970s. The different movements of people from the Valley of the Senegalese River 
had at first been from rural area to another rural area.  
 
The departures from the Valley of the Senegalese River started before the colonial 
period mainly because of trading exchanges. However, it was during the colonial era 
that the flows increased considerably, particularly under the influence of the 
penetration of the monetary economy with its constraints, including the payment of 
taxes. Traditional social and economic life was then destroyed, because the population 
was obliged to look for remunerated jobs, for instance on the extensive colonial 
plantations of cash crops, in order to get money and to pay taxes, particularly the 
pressurised impôt de capitation (head taxes). In the beginning, those movements were 
seasonal and regional, and they were mainly directed to the peanut plantations in 
Senegal. Those short-term labour flows were known as navetanat (Garson, 1992: 82). 
In the 1950s, the peanut sector entered into a crisis which has not been resolved since. 
The seasonal migrants were among the first to suffer the consequences of that crisis 
when the recruitments diminished. This left the migrants no choice but to look for 
jobs elsewhere because they had to pay taxes and satisfy other needs, such as medical 
expenses, educational fees and marriage requirements.  
 
At the same time, moving outside the Valley had become a way to change their 
position in the traditional hierarchy, especially for those at the bottom of the stratum. 
For socially disadvantaged groups such as young people, women and slaves, 
migrating meant acquiring goods, money and guaranteed respect in society. France’s 
policy of recruiting a labour force at the end of the Second World War gave an 
opportunity to many Western Africans to find jobs in the Metropolis and to change 
their social status in their regions of origin. It is during that epoch that Senegal started 
its process of being categorised as a country of emigration (Fall, 2003: 4). 
 
During the Second World War thousands of people from the region and other parts of 
the French African colonial empire were enrolled into the French army and they were 
known as Tirailleurs Sénégalais (the Senegalese Rifles). At the end of the conflict, 
many of those Tirailleurs Sénégalais decided to settle in France. Migrant 
communities then established networks between the host and the receiving regions. 
Further arrivals from the Senegalese Valley used these networks to move to France. 
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As described by Lanly (1998), many of these first migrant communities were made up 
of Soninké. Many of them settled in Paris and in other cities such as Rouen and Le 
Havre where they were used as dustmen.  
 
Over the years social capital has grown to become a formidable network within which 
not only people, but also money, information and goods have been transferred from 
the host regions to the area of origin with which migrants have kept strong ties. 
Departures are made possible through channels that start with the selection of 
candidates, followed by the arrival of migrants in France, who in turn send back 
goods, money and information for the development of their regions of origin and for 
further departures.  
 
Daum (1995: 16) points out that the selection of candidates in villages for departure 
sometimes occurs without the family’s knowledge of the chosen candidates. The 
Soninké for instance have developed a social capital called noria (Lanly, 1998). 
Within that network, migration occurs according to the community objectives. Indeed, 
migration is a continual activity that the family controls because its entire survival 
depends on it. The family ensures that a younger brother replaces a migrant who 
returns home, even sometimes by taking the same job in the host region. From the 
amount of money that the migrant sends back home, a part is kept to prepare the 
journey of his/her substitute. Therefore, it is guaranteed that the migrant will evolve 
within the network and will behave according to the family’s objectives by fulfilling 
his/her responsibilities towards the family. The family’s control over the migrant is 
facilitated by the social conditions of living in France where in many cities migrants 
are grouped in specific areas called foyers des travailleurs (workers heart); where the 
family often has a representative. In some foyers des travailleurs, a replica of the 
traditional hierarchy has been established. 
 
With the end of migrations of recruitment at the start of the 1970s, the zones of 
departure of the sub-Saharan migration were diversified and the movements became 
more spontaneous and irregular. Apart from the valley of the Senegalese River, which 
did not ceased to provide candidates for migration, other regions also increased their 
number of migrants and strongly challenged the Valley of the Senegalese River in 
numbers. Fall (2003: 1) shows that the south of Mali and the centre-west of Senegal 
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were involved, as were as regions like the Côte d’Ivoire in Western Africa, 
Cameroon, Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Central Africa. In some 
of these regions, the methods of departure differed from those used in the Valley of 
the Senegalese River.  
 
According to Fall (2003: 5), migrants sometimes use the informal sector as a way to 
move abroad. One of the illustrations of this new form of organisation can be seen in 
Senegal. The Sandaga market has become a platform for the movements abroad of 
people along with goods and money. Sandaga is the one of largest markets in Dakar, 
the Senegalese capital. The market has kept its original identity as one of the best 
places for food and textile trading. Over the last decade of the twentieth century, the 
market grew to become one of the most prosperous places in Dakar. Sandaga has also 
become the best place for selling electronic appliances and other imported goods 
bought in America, Asia and Europe and resold in Dakar. Most of the successful 
traders at the Sandaga market are from the Baol region. The expressions baol baol or 
modou modou have been associated with the traders. These expressions are also 
associated with the candidates for migration. Those traders and potential migrants 
keep close ties with Baol their region of origin, particularly with its capital Touba. 
The city is also the spiritual capital of the Mourides Brotherhood, which has 
thousands of Africans members abroad.  
 
The profits generated around the world by the Mourides are sent back to Touba, 
which has become one of the fastest growing cities in the country. The Mourides have 
managed to use their worldwide contacts in the service of local development. They 
are entrepreneurial people who have succeeded in establishing a worldwide trading 
network with the Sandaga market as one of the cores of the distribution of goods. The 
Mourides are well established from New York to Hong Kong, from Marseilles to 
Sicily. Their success in recent years is a consequence of their ability to import goods 
with the help of their global network, which are then sold at the Sandaga market at 
prices that are lower than at other markets in the city, country or region.  
 
Many of the sellers at the Sandaga market work within a well-structured organisation 
which coordinates activities in the market and facilitates the departure of some sellers 
abroad if they fulfil the requirements. However, the Sandaga market is only an 
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element of the whole organisation of the Mourides Brotherhood, which is highly 
regarded as one of the key factors in Western African migration. The movement has 
successfully shifted its activity from the dominance of the peanut trade during the 
colonial era and the early years following independence to a worldwide network 
sustained by money, trade and migration by using religion as the key factor (Bouillon 
& Morris, 2001: 51).  
 
Along with labour, trade and irregular migrations, France has also hosted thousands of 
African students and political exiles. During the colonial period, African students 
went to the Metropolis because there were no tertiary institutions in the colonial 
territories. Independence was followed by the opening of universities in most of the 
newly independent countries. The continued departure of African students was 
justified by the needs for postgraduate degrees. Over the years, the flows of African 
students had merely become a way to escape the paralysis of tertiary education in 
most Francophone African countries. As far as political exiles are concerned, they 
escaped from dictatorial regimes encountered in most African countries, particularly 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and found refuge in France where they were able to freely 
express their opinions.  
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Figure 2: Evolution of some sub-Saharan Francophone African migrants to 
France, 1994-2002 
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Source: http//:www.ined.fr/population-en-chiffres/france.htm 
 
The evolution of the numbers and the nature of Francophone African migrants to 
France has been determined by various migration policies that have changed from an 
open door attitude towards a migrant labour force to more restrictive measures as 
dictated by the overall economic situation.  
 
2.4.1.3 Mechanisms of control of immigration in France and Europe 
With the end of the migrations of recruitment, Africans encountered many obstacles 
to entering France. The status of undocumented migrants already living in France is 
yet another concern in that country, referred to as the regularisation of the so-called 
sans-papiers (without papers). The sans-papiers are a heterogeneous group of 
foreigners in France composed of over-stayers, rejected asylum seekers and 
undocumented entrants. They do not have legal status and consequently they do not 
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benefit from education social services support, despite the fact that some of them have 
been in the country for many years and some have been paying taxes. Along with the 
regularisation of the sans-papiers, migration in France is also characterised by the 
integration of those who have been granted French citizenship. In France, citizenship 
is supposed to guarantee equality, fraternity and liberty, as inscribed by the French 
Republic. Within that concept, all citizens are assimilated and therefore become 
merely French, which is more than simply being French citizens because they 
abandon their previous cultures and traditions to endorse the French civilisation. But, 
it appears that French citizens of foreign origin do not actually have the same 
advantages and equal treatment that French nationals have.  
 
The policy towards migration has become one of the main issues on the political 
agenda of successive governments in France since labour recruitment migration 
stopped. Basically, the common opinion is that by stopping immigration to France in 
particular and to Western countries in general, the problem of unemployment will be 
resolved because of the number of jobs available in each country. The reason for 
stopping immigration to France from Africa in particular could be regarded as one of 
the solutions to the xenophobic and racial tendencies among the French public 
(Hollifield, 1999: 62). The mechanisms of immigration to France have been 
consolidated since 1974 with the end of the migrations of recruitment. Prior to 1974, 
an African was allowed to enter into France with an identification document and a 
medical certificate. By 1975, residence and work documents were required before 
being able to enter. The need for residence permits and visas followed thereafter in 
1981 and 1985 respectively (Fall, 2003: 6-7). These measures have been enforced by 
a number of laws from time to time as events and the discourse on immigration 
shifted. The following laws and measures are among other decisions taken to illustrate 
the policy on immigration in France over the years: 
 
1978: A mechanism of voluntary and forced returns is set up for the foreign labour 
force. North Africans are particularly concerned about the measure. 
 
1980: “Bonnet Law” to prevent clandestine immigration. Conditions to enter France 
become stricter: an unofficial entry is considered reason for expulsion. 
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1984: Creation of the card of residence. A clear connection is made between the right 
of residence and an obligation of occupying a job. 
1986: “Pasqua Law” diminished the types of foreigners eligible for the card of 
residence. 
 
1991: Restrictive measures for granting the certificate of residence, a prerequisite for 
foreigners entering France. 
 
1992: Reform of the code of nationality, particularly the prolongation by two years as 
the time necessary for a foreigner to acquire French citizenship following his/her 
marriage to a French national. In addition, children of Algerians born before 1962 do 
not automatically acquire French citizenship. 
 
1992: “Pasqua Law”: The card of residence is refused or withdrawn from polygamous 
foreigners and their spouses. In certain cases, the measure is applied to refugees. 
 
1994: A specific office for controlling immigration and to combat clandestine 
employment is set up. It is called DICCILEC. 
 
-1996: “Debré Law” reinforced the judicial detention of undocumented foreigners; it 
also reinforced the power of the judiciary police at the borders and the power of 
mayors to confer certificates of residence. The law also outlined the regularisation of 
the sans-papiers. 
 
1998: A decree is published and sent to the prefects for organising the return of the 
non-regularised sans-papiers.  
 
The integration of France into the European Union obliged the country to harmonise 
its migration policy with some countries on the European continent. The creation of 
the European Union was justified by the possibility of implementing an area where 
the free movements of goods, services, capital and people could be a reality. Yet, in 
the 1980s, a debate arose about whether the “free movement of people” should apply 
to European Union nationals only, with the possibility of each member country 
keeping its internal border checks, or whether it should apply to everyone, with a 
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single external border serving as check. During those years, European Union nationals 
could travel from one country to another by showing their passport or ID documents, 
with few countries requiring a valid visa (Gellatt, 2005). The hurdles represented by 
border posts throughout the Union disrupted traffic and trade, causing delays and 
costs to both businesses and visitors.  
 
The failure to come to an agreement pushed some countries to create a territory 
without internal borders. On 14 June 1985, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands signed the Schengen Convention aboard the ship Princesse 
Marie-Astrid on the Moselle River near the town of Schengen in Luxembourg. The 
convention was signed to make way for the creation of the Schengen area or 
Schengenland, abolishing border checkpoints within this area for the nationals of the 
countries concerned and co-ordinating external borders controls.  
 
In 1995, the Schengen Treaty, signed on 19 June 1990, came into effect with the 
implementation of the Schengen Agreement. Previously ratified by some countries of 
the Union, such as Italy on 27 November 1990, Portugal and Spain on 25 June 1992, 
Greece on 6 November 1992 and Austria on 28 April 1995, the treaty created a single 
external border and immigration control was conducted according to common rules. 
Border checks between countries involved in the process were removed (Massey and 
Taylor, 2004: 288). Meanwhile, the conditions for entering into the Schengenland for 
a short stay (not exceeding three months) were standarised by the establishment of a 
uniform Schengen visa. The signatories also agreed to share information through the 
Schengen Information System on police cooperation and judicial matters related to 
immigration to combat cross-border drug related crime. 
 
As pointed out by Bourdouvalis (1997: 272), the Schengen Agreement is one of the 
first results of the intra-EU policy dialogue on the harmonisation of immigration 
controls in Europe. The Schengen Agreement enables persons with valid documents 
entry into the Union via a specific country according to his/her type of visa (transit or 
stay). The potential immigrants must not be considered a threat to public policy, 
national security or international relations of signatory countries. Moreover, potential 
migrants must prove that they have sufficient means of subsistence to support 
themselves during their stay and to return to their countries of origin once their 
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sojourn ends. They must also justify the purpose of their visit as well as the conditions 
of the stay. Finally, migrants must have travel insurance that covers any expenses for 
repatriation or emergency medical treatment occurring during their stay.  
 
The inclusion of more members and the emergence of new challenges obliged the 
European Union to update its administrative tools concerning the movements of 
people into the Union, which could be considered as Schengen II and Schengen III 
(Gelatt, 2005). A guideline was released in 2001 as the Schengen Information System 
II, with more data, including fingerprints and photographs. The guideline, which 
could be operational by 2007, is viewed as a step forward for a better provision of 
information to officials such as customs, police or border officials. Furthermore, 
France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria agreed 
in May 2005 to more cooperation to combat and prevent terrorism and crime, 
including combating illegal migration. The signatories intend to share national 
databanks to store DNA information, fingerprints and vehicle identification for known 
or suspected criminals. The aims are to establish immigration liaison officers to 
advise countries on any new information in the field of illegal immigration and offer 
advice on recognising fraudulent documents. It also requires joint action on the 
repatriation of illegal migrants, including joint expulsion flights. 
 
2.4.2 The migration of Francophone Africans on the continent 
While the flows of Francophone Africans to France increased over the years since the 
implementation of policies of labour force recruitment by the French authorities, the 
horizontal migration between Francophone African countries has also been significant 
(Castels and Miller, 1998: 125). Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon have distinguished 
themselves as the main hosts of African migrants in both Western and Central Africa 
respectively (Black, 2004; Stalker, 1994; The United Nations, 2004). Senegalese, who 
represent one of the largest groups of migrants on the continent, were the most 
numerous Francophone Africans (100 000 and 15 000 in 1998) in Cote d’Ivoire and 
Gabon respectively (Fall, 2003: 15). The two “Eldorados” (Fall, 2003: 9) have 
attracted migrants because of their relatively strong economic performance during the 
two and half decades since the 1970s, but the patterns of migration in those countries 
were already established by the colonial enterprise.  
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2.4.2.1 Francophone African migration to Côte d’Ivoire 
Although Côte d’Ivoire was a quite remarkable success story some years ago, 
especially compared to other countries in the region, it finds itself in a precarious 
economic and social situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. From the 
date of its independence on 7 August 1960, Côte d’Ivoire was ruled under a single-
party system, the PDCI-RDA4 led by Felix Houphouet-Boigny. He died three years 
after the multipartite system was reintroduced in the country in 1990. To his credit, 
Houphouet-Boigny, although the leader of a dictatorial regime, is remembered as a 
preacher of peace on the continent and the driving force behind the economic success 
of Côte d’Ivoire, also called the miracle ivoirien (Ivorian miracle) (Nugent, 2004: 
186). The Ivorian economy is based on the production and the exportation of coffee 
and cocoa, the country is the largest producer of cocoa in the world. 
 
His successor, Henri Konan Bédié plunged the country into a political, social and 
religious crisis after the implementation of the concept of Ivoirité, a nationalist notion 
that pretends to claim the Ivorian national identity. In reality, the concept was 
introduced into the Ivorian legislation to keep his political rival, Alassane Dramane 
Ouattara, out of the race for the presidency. Ouattara is suspected of having 
Burkinabè origins. Since then, the country has been divided into two parts, with the 
North suspected of backing Ouattara, who in return is accused of supporting the 
rebellion financially (Lamin, 2005: 16). Neither the takeover of General Robert Geui 
nor Laurent Gbagbo’s presidency after a controversial election ended the crisis. 
Instead, several rebel groups under the name Forces Nouvelles (New Forces)5 have 
perpetuated the partition of the country after the failure of a coup d’etat in 2000 
(Nugent, 2004: 479). The South is under the authority of the central government and 
the North under the influence of the rebels that the Gbagbo government suspects of 
                                                 
4
 PDCI stands for Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire). 
Originally, the party was part of an unofficial group of African parties under the African Democratic 
Rally (RDA). One of the aims of the RDA was the total political and economic independence of Africa. 
The PDCI considered itself the representative of the RDA in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
5
 New Forces is a political and military alliance of three groups. These groups are the Mouvement 
Patriotique de Cote d’Ivoire - MPCI - (Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire), the Mouvement de la 
Justice et de la Paix – MJP (Movement for Justice and Peace) and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien 
du Grand Ouest – MPIGO (Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West). These movements have 
decided to harmonise their forces to combat the Gbagbo’s regime although their different political and 
military agendas. The MPCI is mostly made up of soldiers and politicians who claimed to have been 
discriminated under the Gbagbo’s regime. One of them, Guillaume Soro, is the political figure of the 
New Forces. The two other movements are mostly based in the north-western part of the country. 
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being backed by Burkina Faso. The political and social crisis has further weakened 
the country’s economy which had started to show signs of decline in the middle of the 
1980s. 
 
As a result, thousands of African migrants have escaped from Côte d’Ivoire, fearing 
persecution because they are blamed for the crisis. More than other migrants, the 
Burkinabè are the most targeted. The return of the Burkinabè to their country of origin 
has thus changed the patterns of migration to Côte d’Ivoire established during the 
colonial period. 
 
As pointed out by Adepoju (2005: 1), West Africa was historically viewed as an 
economic unit within which the trade of goods and services, as well as the movement 
of people, flowed freely. However, colonial regimes launched recruitments drives, 
contract and forced labour legislation, and agreements that controlled the movement 
of the regional labour force from the WASAT6 to build roads and work in mines and 
plantations, particularly in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.  
 
The flows of thousands of Burkinabè migrants to Côte d’Ivoire over the years have 
been one of the major patterns of migration in West Africa (Smith & Todaro, 2003: 
94). Konseiga (2005) provides excellent insights into the history of the Voltaic7 
migration to Côte d’Ivoire. Originally, in the first half of the twentieth century, 
Voltaic migrants preferred to go to Ghana because working conditions and wages 
were better there than in Côte d’Ivoire. Besides, the Voltaic wanted to escape the 
restrictive French colonial policies and to work in Ghana, which was under British 
rule. Plantations in Côte d’Ivoire were experiencing serious labour shortages. After 
the French colonial administration took full control of the colony of Upper Volta, it 
accelerated and regulated the flows of workers to Côte d’Ivoire. In reality, Upper 
Volta was a supplier of workers for cash crop plantations in Côte d’Ivoire due to the 
failure to implement developmental economic infrastructures and policies in that 
colony. Some of the Voltaic migrants came from rural areas, and wages they received 
                                                 
6
 WAST is an abbreviation for Western African Semi-Arid Tropics, a group of countries which were 
the main suppliers of labour force in the region. These countries are Mali, Niger and Upper Volta. 
 
7
 Upper Volta was the former name of the actual Burkina Faso. The country changed the name on 4 
August 1984, following the “revolution” which brought Thomas Sankara to power. For those historic 
reasons, I use the Upper Volta for events that occurred before 4 August 1984. 
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allowed them to support families back home. For the Ivorian plantation owners, the 
exploitation of cash crops was based on the combination of land, capital and labour. 
These aspects of production were kept as low as possible to be competitive. An 
annual average of 59 731 Voltaics went to work in the Ivorian plantations between 
1969 and 1973. The average was 56 203 between 1988 and 1993 (Konseiga, 2005). 
 
Côte d’Ivoire has taken the leadership in hosting migrants among Francophone 
African countries in West Africa, with Burkina Faso nationals representing half of the 
three-and-half million of those migrants (Konseiga, 2005). Ivoirité has revealed the 
porosity of the Ivorian frontiers and the density of the immigrant population. Since the 
economic crisis, foreigners have become scapegoats. In response, the government 
took measures to restrict labour migration and combat unauthorised entries. Expulsion 
has been viewed as the ideal weapon to control illegal migration. In addition, the 
government implemented the sojourn card in 1992 to boost control inside the Ivorian 
territory. The renewal of the sojourn card cost 5 000 CFA franc before the rule of 
President Laurent Gbagbo. His government increased the price to 15 000 CFA franc8. 
The economic crisis and Ivoirité have washed away the reputed hospitality of Côte 
d’Ivoire and have turned the country into a xenophobic place. Furthermore, not only 
do many migrants no longer consider Côte d’Ivoire a first destination, but emigration 
has escalated because many Ivorians want to escape the political paralysis and the 
economic crisis.  
 
2.4.2.2 Francophone African migration to Gabon 
According to the United Nations (2004: 57), Gabon hosted more than 100 000 
international migrants in the 1990s. In comparison with Côte d’Ivoire, the volume of 
foreigners in Gabon is insignificant. However, that number is considerable for such a 
small population, which is approximately 1 000 000 inhabitants. The country has 
therefore the highest percentage of migrants, from both the central African region and 
the African continent (UN-HABITAT, 2004: 92). Gabon has attracted foreigners 
because of a combination of several factors. On the one hand, Gabon stands out as 
one of the wealthiest countries in Central Africa because of its diverse national 
resources, including oil, manganese and timber. On the other hand, the country had 
                                                 
8
 R1 is approximatly equivalent to 80 CFA franc. 
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the highest GDP per capita of the region from mid-1970 to the first half of the 1990s, 
before being overtaken by Equatorial Guinea. 
 
The small population has always been a major inconvenience for the economy of the 
country. Pambou-Loueya (2003) shows that Gabon has imported workers since the 
arrival of the European settlers in the fifteenth century. Senegalese, for instance, were 
brought by the settlers to increase the insufficient labour force, but massive labour 
force importation started with timber exploitation. The shortage of workers was again 
pointed out after the Second World War when the colonial administration launched 
construction projects. 12 662 Senegalese, Cameroonians, Liberians and Nigerians 
were brought in by the colonial administration. Along with the labour force, the 
colonial authorities also agreed to the arrival of fishermen from Dahomey (now 
known as Benin), Togo and Ghana to supply foods to the working sites. The arrival of 
these foreigners brought out two characteristics in the Gabonese migration scheme. 
Firstly, migrants were grouped into specific areas and their population boosted by the 
arrivals of more migrants. Secondly, during that period the categorisation of some 
jobs started which led to the arrival of more foreigners over the years because 
Gabonese nationals were reluctant to take over these foreign-labeled jobs. For 
instance, of the 3 500 fishermen registered in Libreville in 1996, 80% were foreigners 
(Pambou-Loueya, 2003: 335).  
 
It was however the exploitation of oil and mines that augmented the streams of 
migration to Gabon. The government expressed its ambition to realise social and 
economic infrastructures following the abundant entries of petro-dollars from the 
beginning of the 1970s. Gabon then called for African solidarity to satisfy its massive 
labour force requirements. Consequently, bilateral agreements were signed with 
countries such as Senegal, Togo, Benin and Congo. The Gabonese embassy in the 
Senegalese capital, Dakar, for instance was in charge of recruiting workers, according 
to the agreement signed by the two governments in 1982 (Fall, 2003: 28). Since 1974, 
many other migrants have arrived outside the framework of the agreements. In fact, 
foreigners represented 25% of the officially registered workers during the 1993 
census. Of these foreign workers, 94.2% were Africans (Pambou-Loueya, 2003: 339). 
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In the history of migration in Gabon, 1986 is a fundamental turning point. During that 
year, the country was hit by an economic crisis never before experienced in its 
history. The state, the country’s primary employer, was obliged to close down several 
companies while others went bankrupt. Suddenly, unemployment became a real 
challenge for the government. Although the population remains small, the number of 
able Gabonese nationals seeking work has grown over the years. The unemployment 
rate amongst the active population for instance rose from 17.9% in 1993 to 21% in 
1997. In response, the government launched the concept of ‘Gabonisation’. In reality, 
it was a drive to nationalise the labour force by restricting the access of foreigners to 
the labour market. 
 
Fall (2003: 31) identifies the difficulties encountered by Senegalese teachers in Gabon 
following the application of “Gabonisation”. In order to discourage non-national 
teachers, the Gabonese government implemented measures that included length of 
service as a consideration in the payment of medical expenses or paying for the 
extradition of corpses, the payment of pension or delays in the payment of the 
salaries. In the academic private sector, employment law has largely been ignored in 
the case of foreigner teachers. As it was the case in Cote d’Ivoire, “Gabonisation” was 
accompanied by the government’s policy of expulsion as the solution to illegal 
immigration. Foreigners were regarded as the main cause for feelings of insecurity 
that erupted as a major social concern since the beginning of the economic crisis.  
 
Legislation strengthened these restrictive measures. On 18 June 1986, two pieces of 
legislation were adopted that redefined the modes of entry into the country. On 31 
July of the same year, another piece of legislation recommended an administrative 
authorisation for both entry and exit, apart from a visa. In 1994, another piece of 
legislation required foreigners who were already in the country to legalise their status 
and to pay residence fees, which had been increased. More than 55 000 foreigners 
were expelled from the country because they failed to fulfill the requirements 
(Zlotnik, 2003). 
 
2.5 The search for new destinations 
The search for new destinations is not a new issue. Francophone Africans have always 
migrated to other regions than France, Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon. However, the 
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importance of the diversification of destinations has grown since the traditional 
destinations have implemented restrictive measures to combat immigration. In this 
section, the growing phenomenon of illegal immigration is considered within the 
globalised context. It also traces the evolution of migration policy and the discourse of 
migration to South Africa, viewed as a new destination for Francophone African 
migration. 
 
2.5.1 Francophone African migration into the globalised concept 
Francophone African migration nowadays fits into the general context of African 
migration. In 1993, Russell (quoted by Adepoju, 2004: 68) predicted that the number 
of 35 million Africans living outside their own countries would increase. This number 
is far higher than the United Nations’s tally of 16 million international African 
migrants in 2000 (Zlotnik, 2004). The differences in the numbers reveal how difficult 
it is to measure the impact of emigration from African countries and to establish 
exactly how many migrants move within the continent and towards other parts of the 
world due to lack of real statistics.  
 
This lack of information can be explained by the fact that many movements happen 
outside the official channels. Numbers realised by censuses often do not include a 
large portion of foreigners in many countries because many of those foreigners are 
illegals. Besides, changes of residence and daily cross-boundary movement especially 
by feet or car are not fully taken into account. This is because of the arbitrary 
boundaries of African countries, which had divided the same ethnic groups into two 
or more countries. For those populations, crossings the administrative limits does not 
necessarily mean migrating from one country to another, but moving inside the same 
ethnic group area. In sum, African migration data are often over or under estimated 
according to the wishes of governments. Zlotnik (2003) sums up the complexity of 
gathering data in Africa as follows:  
 
Out of 56 countries in Africa, 19 have either no information allowing the 
estimation of the international migrants stock or at most one census with data 
than can serve as a basis for assessing the impact of international migration 
over the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
 45 
One of the patterns of migration in Africa is the problem of forced migrants. Africa is 
seen as a continent of refugees. Due to the multiplicity of conflicts, millions of people 
have to leave their homes and countries to seek shelter elsewhere. According to 
Alicea and Toro-Morn (2004: xxv), in 1980, refugees were the concern of only six 
countries located in eastern and central parts of the continent. In 1985, there were 
three million refugees throughout Africa. By 1995, 6.8 million refugees were 
concentrated in 13 states. Although the number had decreased to 3.6 million by 2000, 
Africa is still second to Asia as the continent with the most refugees worldwide 
second to Asia (Zlotnik, 2003). 
 
Illegal immigration is another pattern of migration in Africa. In South Africa, shortly 
after the demise of apartheid, 91 000 illegal immigrants were deported (Adepoju, 
2004: 71). Paradoxically, the more countries reinforce their legislation on migration, 
the more people’s movements become clandestine and spontaneous. Many Africans 
do not hesitate to risk their lives to attempt to find a refuge with better economic 
opportunities. Every year, people die in the Mediterranean Sea leaving Northern 
Africa to go to Europe. Part of this undocumented form of migration is the trafficking 
and smuggling of people, especially women and children, who are recruited through 
networks of agents. Women and girls are exploited as sex workers and children used 
as domestic servants in informal sectors and on plantations, and often become 
soldiers. 
 
Nowadays the proportion of women crossing borders among international migrants in 
Africa has increased tremendously. By 2000, it was estimated that 46.7% of the 16 
million international migrants in Africa were female (Zlotnik, 2004). Some join 
spouses who had gone before, but a growing number of women migrate alone or with 
their children. The possibilities of high wages outside their countries push women to 
consider themselves as possible sources of income for themselves and their families. 
In certain cases, the male partner stays at home with the children. However, migrant 
women still vulnerable because they could find themselves within the channels of sex 
exploitation. 
 
One of the main concerns about African migration is the departure of highly qualified 
people and students. Thousands of qualified Africans are escaping from the continent 
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because it does not offer them social and professional security, such as a stable career. 
This brain drain is increased by the need for a highly skilled labour force expressed by 
developed countries. It is estimated that brain drain currently represents a third of 
African skilled migrants (Mangolini & Revel, 2002). It has been estimated that to 
compensate for these losses the continent had to recruit skilled labour from Western 
countries at a price of four billion dollars annually (Tanner, 2005: 3). Generally, many 
Africans express the desire to stay in receiving countries where they study because 
they already have strong ties and networks that will help them to enter the job market. 
There has been an approximate increase of 2% in the expatriation of students from 
sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 (Mangolini & Revel, 2002).  
 
Migration from Francophone African countries fits the pattern of global movements 
of people according to the causes, forms and destinations of migration. The restrictive 
measures taken by the traditional countries of destinations (France, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Gabon) have limited the number of labour migrants legally entering those countries 
without, however, succeeding in decreasing the number of migrants in the host 
countries. Apart from the increase in international migration, Francophone African 
migration has diversified its destinations. Although France remained the favourite 
destination of Senegalese in 1995, for instance, their number was also significant in 
countries like Italy (32 953 migrants), Germany (26 000) and Spain (6 657). Among 
those migrants, the number of poorly educated people has increased, with ensuing 
difficulties.  
 
Within the globalised context, trade barriers are a feature, and, in order to be 
competitive worldwide, developed countries have adapted their legislation to the 
actual context. Developed countries have opted for the recruitment of highly educated 
and professional workers from poor countries to compensate for both an ageing 
population and local skills shortages in sectors such as education, health or 
technology. At the beginning of this millennium, European countries face a dilemma: 
after many years of restrictive measures on migration, confronted with demographic 
changes and socioeconomic pressure like shortage of a labour force in some sectors, 
many countries have realised the necessity of recruiting highly skilled migrants to 
satisfy the growing demands particularly in new technologies. However, the success 
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of these economies, based on new technologies, has also attracted other types of 
migrants, such as the undocumented.  
 
Maghreb has gained more prominence in African migration compared to Europe since 
the “old continent” strengthened its migration policies. The Northern African 
countries have increasingly become a key stopover on the road to Europe for 
thousands of Africans, especially those who cannot reach Europe legally. Illegal 
movements from Maghreb are not new. Sub-Saharan Africans have just expanded 
existing illegal streams linking the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea, which is likely 
to be seen as a space separating two different regions. On the one side, there is a 
prosperous and wealthy Europe, which sees its population getting older mainly 
because of low fertility levels. Europe will therefore need a larger labour force to face 
the shortages, but it has made a tremendous effort to combat illegal entries. On the 
other side, there is Maghreb, where poor and unstable economic, social and political 
conditions push its populations to look for a better life in Europe or elsewhere in 
North America or Asia. Behind Maghreb, there is also sub-Saharan Africa, which is 
even poorer and more unstable, with the exception of South Africa and to a lesser 
extent Botswana and Mauritius. 
 
Maghreb is characterised as a region of out - and in - migration. Countries such as 
Libya, Tunisia and Morocco have people crossing borders within the region. It has 
been estimated that Libya alone hosts two-and-half millions foreigners, including 200 
000 Moroccans, 60 000 Tunisians and some 30 000 Algerians. Tunisia had over a 
period of fifteen years (1986-2000) received an annual average of 77 300 people, with 
North Africans contributing six out of seven of this average (Boubakri, 2004). The 
Northern African out-migration in Europe is also important, considering that of the 
four million African migrants in Europe 80% are from Maghreb (Letourneux & 
Zemmouri, 2005). 
 
Moreover, Maghreb is a transit region for sub-Saharan African migration. Boubakri 
(2004) singles out the main reasons for the region’s re-emergence as a major stopover 
for sub-Saharan Africans. Firstly, a combination of factors has seen Libya attracting 
migrants from many regions, including the sub-Sahara. During the years of embargo 
(1992-2000) against Libya, the country enhanced its ties with sub-Saharan countries 
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through pan-African policies. Apart from being one of the major actors in the creation 
of the African Union, Libya has been active in substantial development aid towards 
sub-Saharan African countries. Besides, Libya has found itself involved in regional 
organisations, especially the “Group of Sahel and Sahara states”. The free movement 
of people within the region appears to be one of the characteristics of the organisation. 
As a result, and coupled with the fact that the country is an oil producer, Libya is a 
home to between one and one-and-half million Sub-Saharan Africans (Boubakri, 
2004). 
 
Secondly, Boubakri highlights the development of Saharan Sahalian towns, such as 
Tamanrasset and Djenet in Algeria, Sebha and Al-Awaynat in Libya, Gao in Mali and 
Agadès in Niger. The flows of goods, services and people between the two parts of 
the desert have helped these towns to become more integrated with structures like 
regional organisations. Meanwhile, the towns play a vital role in migration between 
sub-Saharan Africa, Maghreb and Europe as people have established well-developed 
networks for organising the departures of migrants. 
 
Thirdly, for many years Maghreb citizens have enjoyed crossing the borders of 
countries in the region without restrictive measures. For instance, North Africans and 
nationals from some Sahalian countries can enter Tunisia without a visa as tourists for 
a short period. After their legal stay, many remain in the country after obtaining 
employment or they stay for a while before crossing to Europe. This has led to 
intensive movement of people within the region. The reputation of the region as a 
transit area has been confirmed with the arrivals of sub-Saharan Africans (Boubakri, 
2004).  
 
Finally, geographical proximity is likely to be viewed as an ultimate and crucial factor 
in the choosing of Maghreb as the main departure and transit region from Africa. The 
proximity to Tunisia, Libya and Italy on the one side and Morocco and Spain on the 
other side has turned the Straits of Sicily and Gibraltar into ‘bridges’ particularly for 
illegal crossings.  
 
It therefore evident that Maghreb is a pivotal region for Francophone African 
migrants in the global context, especially if one considers illegal migration to Europe. 
 49 
Among the candidates for ‘crossing’, are Maghreb nationals, and legal sub-Saharan 
Africans living in Northern African countries. Although they have legal status in 
North Africa, many do not hesitate to risk their lives by attempting the sea crossing, 
during which thousand of people lose their lives. Some are arrested and the luckiest 
ones reach Europe. Boubakri (2004) shows that 40 000 illegal crossers were caught 
between 1998 and 2003. The same source estimates that only one illegal migrant out 
of five is apprehended.  
 
However, the sea crossing is only the second highest risk for many illegal Sub-
Saharan Africans. The highest risk is crossing the Sahara Desert. This long journey 
often starts when migrants from Western and Central African countries converge 
particularly in Agadès in Niger. Then, they follow an itinerary through the desert that 
takes them through Bilma and Sebha before arriving in Libya. Another main route 
leads from Agadès to Adrar, Djanet and Tamanrasset in Algeria before reaching 
Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. From Morocco to Libya, migrants find themselves in 
camps, which are the last stopover before the “crossing”. Migrants expect to reach 
Spain via the Strait of Gibraltar. They can also defy the 150 kilometres separating the 
Italian Islands of Lampedusa, Linosa and Sicily from Tunisia and Libya. 
Approximately, the journey can last more than a year, from their departure from their 
countries of origin to the last stopover in North Africa. Migrants sometimes save up to 
2 000 Euros to make the trip, which makes them vulnerable to gangsters, who attack 
them especially on the borders between Niger, Mali and Algeria, which migrants call 
La Maison du Diable (The House of the Devil), according to Soudan (2005).  
 
Illegal African migrants have also used the Canaries Islands as a stopover to enter 
Europe in recent years. This is mainly because of the intensification of controls on the 
two sides of the Mediterranean Sea.  
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Map 2:Trans-Saharan migration routes 
 
Source: www.migrationinformation.org 
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The issue of illegal crossings from North Africa to Europe has become a political 
concern, with the governments of Southern Europe countries putting tremendous 
pressure on their North African counterparts to deal with the problem. Italy, for 
instance, has refused to be “the parish of Europe”, whilst Libya, according to its 
president, Colonel Gaddafi, does not accept being “the coastal watch-dog of Europe” 
(Letourneux & Zemmouri, 2005).  
 
In response, the Maghrebian countries have opted for mutual agreement policies. 
Morocco, for instance, has concluded repatriation decisions with sub-Saharan 
countries such as Mali and Senegal. By bus, trucks and rarely planes, illegal migrants 
caught in Morocco are expelled by force and left at the point where they entered the 
country. Consequently, thousands of sub-Saharan Africans get lost in the desert. 
Northern African and European countries, especially Spain and Italy also cooperate to 
combat illegal migration. The signing of cooperative agreements obliges the African 
countries concerned to share the task of policing their international marine borders 
with the European countries of destination. Consequently, Italy is collaborating with 
Tunisia and Libya, while Spain is doing the same with Morocco. The cooperation 
includes the production of legal instruments to punish those guilty of organising and 
participating in illegal migration, the training of coastal surveillance staff (coast guard 
and naval forces), provision of electronic equipment and logistical support for the 
maritime security forces as well as joint patrols in Northern African countries’ waters.  
 
It appears clearly that for European countries, the solution to illegal migration from 
Africa is to be protected by “a ring of so-called third countries whose job is to act as a 
buffer between Africa and Europe, by monitoring exit points to Europe” (Boubakri, 
2004). 
 
2.5.2 The evolution of South African migration policy 
Throughout the existence of South Africa as a state, its migration policy has been 
conceptualised with the aim to select immigrants according to criteria such as race, 
nationality or religious belief. The country has implemented the “two-gate policy” 
(Kabwe-Segatti, 2006: 173), which has regulated the entry of millions of people, 
satisfying the criteria stated by different acts through the years, and preventing 
specific migrants from entering the country. 
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2.5.2.1 Towards the Aliens Control Act 
Crush and Peberdy (1998) provide a detailed historical overview of migration policy 
in South Africa. The merger of the Cape and Natal colonies, the two Boer republics 
and several Black chiefdoms in 1910 provided the opportunity for the new national 
entity to deal with migration from a common basis. It was a question of controlling 
the movement of people within the Union on the one hand and, on the other hand, 
regulating departures from and entries into the country. The Union took into account 
the immigration concerns of each province, but the basis of the national policy found 
its roots in the Cape Immigration Act (No 30) of 1906, which required any immigrant 
to be able to write out an application form in any European language. Natal was 
concerned about Indian immigration, the Orange Free State wanted to increase the 
number of the white population and the Transvaal wanted to reduce the number of the 
Black population (Klotz, 1997). The country reinforced its ties with Britain by putting 
its new policy within the British Empire context. Unsurprisingly, British immigration 
was encouraged. The Prime Minister, Louis Botha, soon after the Union, initiated a 
massive white immigration, especially from Britain (Brownell, 1977: 13). The 
government even passed the Land Settlement Act in 1912 in order to authorise white 
settlers to appropriate land suitable for settlement purposes.  
 
It took three years for the Union to draw up the first uniform immigration policy, 
called the Immigration Regulations Act of 1913. From the government’s point of 
view, immigrants referred to white people willing to enter into South Africa. The Act 
almost allowed whites free access, especially those from Western and Northern 
Europe able to write and read European languages. Thus, the Act fulfilled the Cape 
and the Orange Free State’s wishes. The Act also did not allow the entry of persons 
such as prostitutes, those undesirable for political reasons or with criminal records and 
those not suitable for the economic interests of the Union. According to the concern 
of the Transvaal, the Act limited the movements of Black people between the 
provinces, denying them de facto the status of citizens. Moreover, the Act did not 
consider African mine and farm workers coming from further afield because they 
were not allowed entry as permanent residents. As far as Natal’s preoccupation was 
concerned, the growing Indian population, especially traders, was viewed as a threat. 
Since the Union could select immigrants according to its requirements, Indians were 
considered “prohibited persons” soon after the implementation of the Act. 
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Crush and Peberdy (1998: 21) point out that this first national legislative tool was 
drawn up explicitly to keep the non-white population outside of the legal framework 
and served as a platform for subsequent immigration acts, which started with the 
amendments to the Immigration Regulation Act of 1913. 
 
Crush and Peberdy (1998: 22) argue that following a campaign of protest, led by 
Mahatma Gandhi and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) against many regulations, 
including the Immigration Regulation Act, which prevented Indians from moving 
between provinces and trading freely, the Indian Relief Act was introduced in 1914. It 
merely withdrew the head tax imposed on Indians and allowed the families of Indian 
residents in South Africa to enter the country. However, the Act did not remove the 
restrictions on Indians movement within the country.  
 
According to Crush and Peberdy (1998: 23), other amendments followed, especially 
in 1927 and 1931. The 1927 amendment granted the title of “domicile” to people who 
had been permanent residents in the Union for three years. In 1931, the amendment 
authorised the entry of some categories of illiterate Europeans, such as artisans and 
domestic workers. The South African immigration policy underwent other 
developments soon after World War I, when thousands of Eastern Europeans from 
countries such as Poland and Russia arrived in South Africa. Many of those new 
arrivals were Jewish. Thus, in addition to the Indians, the South African government 
now felt threatened by what they considered the Jewish peril. In order to curb the 
flows of Jews the government used Clause 4(1) (a) of the Immigration Regulation Act 
of 1913 that effectively kept non-whites from entering the country.  
 
The continued arrivals of Jews led to the government taking a further step in its 
discriminatory immigration policy with the introduction of the Immigration Quota Act 
in 1930. Based on the belief that Jews were different from the inhabitants of South 
Africa (Crush, 1998: 24), the entry to the Union depended on the country of origin, 
the country of birth and a valid passport; all of these had to be approved by a selection 
board. A annual quota of immigrants (50 in the beginning) was allocated to those 
coming from countries considered ‘unscheduled’ while the number was unlimited for 
people coming from the ‘scheduled’ countries. The criterion used to decide whether a 
country was ‘scheduled’ or ‘unscheduled’ was the country of birth and not the 
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citizenship of the immigrant. The government wanted to make sure that Jewish 
citizens from the scheduled countries did not enter South Africa. The government also 
obliged immigrants to have a valid passport to enter the country because after the war 
many immigrants from Eastern European countries did not have original identity 
documents (Crush & Peberdy, 2001: 25).  
 
Crush and Peberdy (2001: 25) point out that the Immigration Quota Act was followed 
by the Immigration Amendment Act of 1937, which mainly focused on Black 
immigrants. Mine workers could be recruited further afield for a specific period, but, 
were not granted the right of claiming a ‘domicile’ in South Africa. The Act further 
entrenched the powers of immigration officers, who could arrest any person they 
believed to be illegal without a warrant. 
 
The South African migration policy implemented by the government following the 
Union was the sum of the immigration laws of the former colonies (Cape and Natal) 
and the two Boer republics. In essence, it was a policy set up to favour the entry of 
Whites, with the exception of Jews who were seen as a threat. The migration policy 
also denied Indians the right of free movement within the country and did not allow 
Black migrant workers the right to acquire the status of citizenship. When the 
National Party came to power in 1948, further laws were enacted to facilitate White 
immigration, whilst at the same time trying to reduce the flow of English-speaking 
people. 
 
Before coming to power, the National Party had already launched a campaign of 
protest, accusing the United Party of encouraging immigration of English-speaking 
people in order to boost its electorate. Soon after its victory, the National Party 
welcomed immigrants from Germany and Holland especially (Crush & Peberdy, 
1998: 29). The previous immigration acts were once again amended in 1953 by 
reinforcing the powers of the minister in charge. He was, for instance, able to launch a 
deportation procedure against any person who was considered an ‘undesirable 
inhabitant’ for the interests of the Union. In 1960, anyone wanting to enter South 
Africa had to have a valid visa or an authorisation. 
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Two other pieces of legislation were set up at the time. The Population Registration 
Amendment Act and the Admission of Persons to the Union Regulation Amendment 
Act were introduced in 1950 and 1961 respectively. Because of the Population 
Regulation Act, people were obliged to carry an ID document clearly showing their 
place of birth and their race - the population was divided into four categories (Whites, 
Blacks, Indians and Coloured). The objective of the Act was to better control 
population movement inside the country. According to Crush and Peberdy (1998: 30), 
the regulation that migrants should carry their passports at all times, especially in 
Johannesburg, is a legacy of that Act. The Admission of Persons to the Union 
Regulation Amendment Act of 1961 was implemented to stop the flow of Black 
people between South Africa and its neighbouring countries. In 1960, with the first 
consequences of the apartheid policy (such as the declaration of the state of 
emergency and the treason trials), Black Africans were not keen to come to South 
Africa and hundreds of Whites left the country. The government therefore launched 
another immigration policy by opening the doors to skilled Whites from Europe, but 
with some restrictions for less-skilled Catholics coming especially from the southern 
part of Europe. On the other hand, Whites from recently independent southern African 
countries found a home in South Africa. 
 
In 1961, when South Africa became a republic, South African citizenship was 
withdrawn from those who had dual nationality because of the implementation of the 
Commonwealth Relations Act.  
 
During the following years, the powers of the state to control immigration were 
consolidated with legal tools like the Admission of Persons to and the Departure from 
the Republic Regulation Act of 1969, which allowed the minister to expel any 
foreigner considered unsuitable for the national interests. The Aliens Amendment Act 
of 1978 made it a criminal offence to employ, enter business with or harbour an alien 
who did not have the permit to work in the country. The Aliens and Immigration 
Laws Amendment Act of 1984 furthermore denied South African citizenship to Black 
inhabitants of the ‘independent homelands’ the South African citizenship. 
Immigration of skilled Black people from African countries became possible when 
the word “European” was removed from section 4(3) (b) of the Act. 
 
 56 
Crush and Peberdy (1998: 33) point out that a number of important developments in 
the South African migration policy occurred in 1984 and 1986 before the 
implementation of the Aliens Control Act of 1991. The Aliens and Immigration Laws 
Amendment Act of 1984 was merely another coercive measure to control immigrants 
within the country. Among the amendments made, the Act stated that it was unlawful 
for South Africa nationals to employ or/and to accommodate immigrants without 
valid permits. In 1986, another amendment “removed the definition of European from 
section 4(3) (b) of the act which had required all immigrants to be assimilable with 
the white population” (Crush & Peberdy, 1998: 33). As a consequence, Black 
Africans could officially migrate to South Africa. However, that immigration was 
mainly limited to the homelands, which were desperately in need of skilled workers. 
This amendment was the legal tool that allowed the first wave of Francophone 
African migrants into South Africa, particularly into former homelands. 
 
2.5.2.2 The Aliens Control Act of 1991 
The Aliens Control Act of 1991, also known as [Act No. 96 of 1991] was the latest 
legal tool formulated by the apartheid administration. The Act was made with the 
intention “to provide for the control of the admission of persons to, their residence in, 
and their departure from, and for matters connected therewith.” The Act firstly gives 
an insight into some definitions, for instance the meaning of alien, which refers to “a 
person who is not a South Africa citizen.” The act states that the Department of Home 
Affairs is in charge of the administration of immigration and the duties of its officers, 
and in section 5, the act highlights the admission to the Republic through specific 
ports of entry. Those ports of entry are defined as: 
(a) any place on the coast of the Republic; 
(b) any place in the Republic at or near any of the borders thereof; or 
(c) any airport in the Republic. 
 
The Act also recommends to immigrants to present themselves to an immigration 
officer at these different ports of entry with a valid passport and a visa issued by the 
Department of Home Affairs. In sections 25 and 26, The Aliens Control Act of 1991 
highlights the character of residence of immigrants in South Africa.  
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An Immigrants Selection Board, with a central committee in Pretoria and one regional 
committee for each of the provinces, has the powers, functions and duties conferred 
upon, entrusted to or imposed it by or under this Act (Section 24). The Immigrants 
Selection Board, according to the Act, can issue to a suitable alien the following 
permits describe in section 26: 
 
(a) a work permit, issued to any alien who applies to be temporarily employed 
or to temporarily manage or conduct any business in the Republic; 
(b) a business permit, issued to any alien who applies to enter the Republic for 
business matters; 
(c) a study permit, issued to any alien who applies to enter the Republic to be 
enrolled in primary, secondary and tertiary institutions; 
(d) a work seeker’s permit, issued to any alien who applies to enter the 
Republic to be temporally employed or to temporarily manage or conduct any 
business; and  
(e) a medical permit, issued to any alien who applies for the purposes of 
medical treatment. 
 
However, any prohibited person will not be granted a residence permit in South 
Africa. Section 39 of the Act states nine criteria to identify a prohibited person: 
 
(a) any person who is likely to become a public charge, by reason of infirmity or 
because he/she does not have enough means to support himself/herself as well 
as his/her dependants; 
(b) any person who, according to the Minister of Home Affairs, is an undesirable 
inhabitant for the Republic; 
(c) any person who lives or has lived directly or indirectly on the earnings of 
prostitution or procures or has procured persons for immoral purposes; 
(d) any person who has been convicted in any country of contravention of a law 
relating to exchange control and who is undesirable according to the Minister 
of Home Affairs; 
(e) any mentally ill person, or any person with communicable, visual disabilities, 
or someone having hearing problems; 
(f) any person with any contagious and communicable disease; 
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(g) any person who has been removed from the Republic by warrant under any 
law; 
(h) any person who has been removed from the Republic under a warrant in terms 
of section 45, 46, or 47 of this Act; and 
(i) any person who in terms of any other provision of this Act is a prohibited 
person.  
 
Section 43 of the Act allows a fine, imprisonment or removal from the Republic any 
person found within the country after having been refused entry, removed from or 
ordered to leave the Republic. 
 
The Aliens Control Act of 1991 has been considered the main piece of legislation 
sustaining the migration policy in South Africa from 1991 onwards. Even with the 
implementation of democracy in South Africa, the migration policy is still considered 
a legacy of the apartheid legislation (Crush & Williams, 2001; Kabwe-Segatti, 2006). 
A clear and urgent need to revise South African legislation and policy on international 
migration became evident with the implementation of the democratic process that the 
country embarked on in the mid-1990s, particularly with the adoption of the 1996 
Constitution. However, the Aliens Control Act of 1991 remains prominent in new 
legislation concerning international migration, as “the defining feature of recently 
reformulated immigration legislation has been the maintenance of an essential 
continuity with the policies of the previous regime” (Hill & Kotzé, 1997: 14).  
 
2.5.2.3 The Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995 
Soon after the ANC government came to power, an investigation revealed that the 
Aliens Control Act of 1991 was unable to address illegal immigration in South Africa 
(Hill & Kotzé, 1997: 14). The investigation also indicated that citizens of 
approximately 90 countries were excluded by South African visa requirements. 
However, some shortcomings were observed, especially the delivery system of visas, 
obtaining permanent resident status and the number of illegal migrants staying beyond 
the expiration of their temporary visitation times.  
 
The Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995 (Act No 76 of 1995) firstly dealt with 
the definitions of the previous Act. Among these definitions, an “alien” was 
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considered a non-South African citizen or an inhabitant of the former homelands in 
Section 1. The Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995 was designed, according to 
Kabwe-Segatti (2006: 180), to be “a protectionist approach to employment and 
subsided education, selection according to qualifications and the amplifications of 
measures against undocumented migrants.” Among the major changes introduced by 
the 1995 amendment, Kabwe-Segatti (2006: 180) points to the following three. 
Firstly, it was not possible to change the purpose of stay if the alien was already 
inside the Republic. Secondly, to decrease the expenditures of the Department of 
Home Affairs as far as repatriation of illegal migrants was concerned. Lastly, to 
changes time of detention procedures of illegal migrants.  
 
Hill and Kotzé, (1997: 15) summarise the amendment of 1995 as follows: 
 
-General measures designed to strengthen the capacity of the judicial system 
and the Department of Home Affairs to act against illegal aliens in the 
country. 
-Provision for five categories of temporary residence permits: visitor’s permit, 
work permit, study permit, work-seeker’s permit and medical permit. The 
purpose of any temporary residence permit may not be altered - only the 
conditions and period of validity. 
-The issuing of work and study related immigration permits is restricted to 
points outside the country. 
-The restriction of the Minister’s prerogative to grant exemptions from the 
provisions of the Aliens Control Act. 
-The inclusion of a clause (Section 32(e)) that specifically empowers the 
Minister to take steps “to ensure proper exploitation of the local labour market 
before a work permit or work-seeker’s permit is issued. 
 
In spite of the modifications brought by the Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995, 
South African legislation on international migration was still perceived by many 
critics as a failure by not being able to transform the legislation of the previous era. In 
order to tackle the issue, the Minister of the Department of Home Affairs appointed a 
task team, which was also charged to analyse the international migration patterns and 
make recommendations to update the policy.  
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2.5.2.4 The Draft Green Paper on International Migration 
The Draft Green Paper on International Migration was proposed to the Minister and 
then published in the government gazette on 13 May 1997 by the Department of 
Home Affairs for general information and comments from interested parties. The 
Draft Green Paper on International Migration posits three types of foreigners entering 
South Africa: immigrants who are willing to settle permanently in the country, 
refugees who are escaping from their country of origin and seeking asylum in South 
Africa and migrants who are in the country illegally. In general principles, the 
document recommends a planned system according to the country’s national interest. 
A future national policy on migration should take into account four objectives: 
 
(a) to enhance the country’s integration into, and competitiveness within the 
global economy; (b) to further the process of regional integration and 
development within SADC; (c) to generate macro-economic growth and 
employment opportunities in the formal and informal sectors, as outlined in 
GEAR framework; and (d) to provide improved living standards for our 
people (Section 1. 1. 2). 
 
The Draft Green Paper on International Migration claims that the country needs a 
policy that can attract skilled workers, easily put private companies on the global 
skills market and facilitate the accessibility of the country to entrepreneurs and 
investors. However, such a policy should be drawn up within the constitutional 
framework, according to international standards and ranking sub-regional cooperation 
foremost. It should also have a designed and implemented strategic plan based on: 
 
-an evaluation of the present and future needs of the country’s labour force; 
-annual immigration and migration targets and quotas; 
-a reconsideration of immigrant selection and control; and 
-an improved and controlled temporary access for SADC workers and highly skilled 
migrants from other regions (Section 1. 5. 2). 
 
The Draft Green Paper on International Migration in Section 2. 5 also recommends 
the modernisation of the immigration and migration policy by: 
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(a) the design and implementation of a market-related point system as a 
screening and admissions framework for individuals who wish to immigrate to 
South Africa; and 
(b) special, well-managed legal avenues of entry for SADC citizens who seek 
to enter South Africa on a temporary basis in four areas: (i) unskilled or semi-
skilled workers who are legitimately in demand by South African employers, 
using an annual, flexible, quota system; (ii) small traders, by issuing a special 
trade permit; (iii) students, by easing access and administrative convenience; 
and (iv) cross-border family visitation, by the use of special border passes. 
 
As far as undocumented migrants are concerned, the document advises the creation of 
principles for a well-developed jurisprudence regarding the enforcement of a genuine 
application of the new migration regime. These principles emphasise that (1) 
enforcement must be rights-based, (2) the enforcement must put its attention on illegal 
immigrants, and (3) the enforcement must empower government bodies to: (a) expose 
the fraudulent use of documents, (b) better control ports of entry, and (c) strategically 
supervise traditional ports of entry of illegal immigrants (Section 3. 1. 2). 
 
The Draft Green Paper on International Migration focuses on the situation of refugees 
in Section 4. It encourages separate legislation on refugee protection in line with the 
1951 Geneva Convention of the United Nations and the OAU Convention of 1969 
that is more “rights-regarding, solution-oriented, with the sharing of the burden across 
all SADC member states.” However, this legislation should emphasise a temporary 
sojourn of refugees (Section 4. 2. 1). 
 
Lastly, the authors of the document suggest that the Department of Home Affairs 
should be named the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Services (DCIS). 
The change of the name of the department will be accompanied by a genuine 
transformation of its structures, the grant of sufficient human and financial resources 
able to deal with the challenges of the new policy and a better cooperation among 
departments concerned with migration. The achievements and objectives of the 
implementation of the migration policy will be presented to parliament annually.  
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Crush and Williams (2001: 5) point out some recommendations made by the Draft 
Paper. The document acknowledges the need for South Africa to develop an 
immigration policy based on national self-interest and territorial integrity. It also 
recommends taking into consideration the opportunities and challenges presented by 
globalisation. Therefore, it is wise to encourage forms of migration and immigration 
that South Africa could benefit from. The last concern of the four preliminary 
considerations and principles of the Draft Paper is to be aware of regional issues and 
needs. The Draft Paper on International Migration also points out the increase of 
illegal migration flow into the country, which is regarded as a cause of social ills.  
 
With the arrival of thousands of Africans after 1994, particularly illegal immigrants 
and refugees, South Africa’s government adopted restrictive measures such as arrests, 
detention and deportation. The methods used by police to arrest illegal immigrants, 
often according to the darkness of the skin, have been met severe criticism. Most 
arrested immigrants are sent to the Lindela Centre before being deported (Harris, 
2001).  
 
2.5.2.5 The Refugees Act of 1998 
The Refugees Act of 1998 became effective in 2000. The Act was aimed at updating 
South African policy with international legal tools relating to refugees. The Act was 
set up to provide a legal framework for refugees, from the step of seeking asylum to 
integration into society, and included issues such as respect for their rights and their 
obligations.  
 
The Act in Section 2 defines a refugee as any person who: 
 
(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her 
race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular 
social group, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual 
residence is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it. 
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The definition also extends to internally displaced people and views a refugee as any 
person who: 
 
(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either part or the whole of his 
or her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her place of 
habitual residence in order to seek refugee elsewhere. 
 
The Act also lists the categories of persons excluded from refugee status and those 
who can lose their refugee status. As far as the first category is concerned, the Act 
refuses to consider as a refugee any person who has committed a crime against peace 
or a crime against humanity; a person who has committed a non-political crime, but 
punishable by South African law; any person guilty against the objects and principles 
of international organisations such as the United Nations or the Organisation of 
African Unity; and any person who is already under the protection of another country 
(Section 4). As far as the second category is concerned, a refugee can lose his or her 
status if he or she is no longer persecuted in his or her country of his or her 
nationality, if he or she has lost his or her nationality, if he or she becomes a South 
African citizen or a citizen of a country other than the country of his or her 
nationality, or if the causes of his or her departure come to an end (Section 5).  
 
The administration of the Act is under the authority of the Minister of Home Affairs, 
who can delegate any power granted or duty imposed by the Act to any officer within 
the department. At the root level, as many Refugee Reception Offices can be opened 
throughout the country as are required (Section 8). Refugee Reception Offices are 
under the supervision and the regulation of the Standing Committee for Refugee 
Affairs. This latter organisation can also formulate and implement procedures for the 
granting of asylum, work in collaboration with the representatives of the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), revise and monitor decisions 
taken by Refugee Status Determination Officers relating to unfounded applications, 
and the Act guarantees the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs the right to 
determine the conditions under which an asylum seeker permit can be issued as far as 
studying and working in South Africa are concerned (Section 11). The Refugee 
Reception Offices, among other duties, issue to applicant asylum seekers permits that 
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the holders must renew from time to time. However, the Act makes room for a 
Refugee Appeal Board to hear and determine any question of law and any appeal 
concerning the interpretation of the Act (Section 14).  
 
The Act delineates refugee’s rights and obligations. As far as the rights are concerned, 
a refugee is formally recognised by a written document of his or her refugee status, 
which guarantees him or her full legal protection. After five continuous years of 
residence in South Africa the refugee may apply for an immigrant permit. He or she 
can also seek employment and receive the same health services and education that 
South African citizens have (Section 27). The Act ensures refugees an identity 
document which must have: 
 
(a) an identity number of the holder compiled in the prescribed manner; 
(b) the holder’s surname, full forenames, gender, date of birth and place of 
country where he or she was born; 
(c) the country of which the holder is a citizen, if any;  
(d) a recent photograph of the holder; and 
(e) the holder’s fingerprints or other prints, taken and displayed in the 
prescribed manner (Section 30). 
 
In Section 31, the Act also recognises the right of refugees to apply for travel 
documents. Refugees are obliged to respect South African laws. For national security 
reasons or disturbance of public order, a refugee can be removed from the Republic.  
 
2.5.2.6 The Draft White Paper on International Migration 
After the release of the Draft Green Paper on International Migration, individuals and 
organisations commented on the document. The Department of Home Affairs then 
appointed another task team to consider these comments and to draw up a Draft White 
Paper on International Migration which was released and approved by the Cabinet on 
31 March 1999. 
 
The task team identified some of the problems relating to the effectiveness of the 
Aliens Control Act of 1991 and the Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995 from 
public input and other comments. It was acknowledged that the existing policies were 
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not able to prevent the flows of illegal immigrants into the country. It was a concern 
that the prevention and redress of illegal immigration should be a priority in the new 
policy, but it was acknowledged that officers in charge of policing illegal immigrants 
are few and that the granting of permanent residence was still based on apartheid 
criteria (Section 6.3). Furthermore, the arrival of illegal immigrants has a negative 
impact on South African society as a whole. Illegal immigrants compete with both 
South African citizens and other residents of the country for scarce resources, scarce 
public services and job opportunities. Illegal immigrants were also implicated in 
criminal activities and corruption of state institutions in their quest for the required 
documents.  
 
The Draft White Paper recognises that it is important to formulate policies enabling 
South Africa to benefit from the worldwide movement of people with skills, expertise, 
resources, entrepreneurship and capital within the context of globalisation and who 
are able to fulfil the country’s objectives of reconstruction, development and nation-
building (Section 4.1). The document also argues that such policies must accord with 
the interests of domestic communities. Therefore, the consideration of affirmative 
action in immigration could easily be understood by local communities as permission 
for employers to go abroad to look for what South Africans lack in terms of skills and 
expertise. The affirmative action in immigration policy should first consider citizens 
of the country and members of the Southern African Development Community, then 
the rest of Africa and lastly the rest of the world (Section 4.4). This strategy is viewed 
as one of the keys for a successful implementation of the macro-economic plan, the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR). The Draft White Paper 
on International Migration advises that South Africa should: 
 
- attract foreign investments, especially as fixed capital investments or 
employment producing enterprises; 
- assist the tourist industry, in respect of which South Africa has a competitive 
world advantage; 
- facilitate international trade and commerce; 
- recognise the informal sector and allow some controlled cross border 
movement of traders who benefit it; and 
- attract foreign skills and entrepreneurial energies (Section 5.2). 
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The Draft White Paper on International Migration argues that a formulation of a new 
policy should be undertaken within the constitutional framework and that the 
government must be the cornerstone of the migration system, which “should enable 
Government to retain control on who enters the country and the conditions and length 
of his or her stay” (Section 6.4.1). Government should start by preventing illegal 
immigration by reducing both “pull factors” and “push factors” in South Africa and 
the countries of origin of illegal immigrants. The reduction of “pull factors” could be 
done by the enforcement of labour law to regulate migration flows and the “push 
factors” can be reduced based on bilateral and multilateral discussions, and 
international cooperation with other African countries. Government also should 
secure borders to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country, with the case 
of the border between the United States of America and Mexico taken as an example, 
and remove those already in the country through deportation. However, deportation 
should the viewed as the ultimate act of the process which starts with “law 
enforcement, monitoring, investigations, detention and adjudication.” 
 
The Draft White Paper on International Migration admits that a new policy should 
consider “a bottom-up approach”, which takes into account community needs and 
puts them into a general formulation of a national policy. According to the document, 
the following priorities should be considered: 
 
- ensuring that illegal aliens do not take available job opportunities away from 
community members and do not compete with them for scarce services; 
- ensuring that illegal aliens do not become public charges or become involved 
in criminal activities; 
- ensuring that education is provided at community level to avoid any form of 
xenophobia by making communities understand the tragedy of illegal 
immigration while cooperating with law enforcement authorities; 
- ensuring the resettlement of refugees and ensuring that they are not confused 
with illegal immigrants; 
- ensuring that communities, industries or businesses which need to acquire 
the skills or contribution of foreign workers can do so without administrative 
delays or problems; and  
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- ensuring a community-based production of data and information necessary to 
determine the need for quotas of foreign labour” (Section 6.5). 
 
A new shape of structures is also proposed. An Immigration Service (IS) at the 
community or regional level, with the participation of the public in commenting on 
procedures set for immigration law is highlighted. It is required that the IS enforces 
immigration laws within communities and cooperates with policy by considering the 
communities’ interests regarding the threat of illegal immigrants and some related 
issues such as crime, integration of immigrants into local communities and 
xenophobia. An Immigration Review Board is set to advise and monitor the 
Immigration Service, especially regarding rule-making.  
 
As far as criteria for admission are concerned, the authors of the Draft White Paper on 
International Migration believe a clear distinction of criteria to distinguish prohibited 
persons should be made. This will lead to another distinction of temporary residence 
permits, which will be issued to people wanting to stay in South Africa for more than 
three months. The ten temporary residence permits are student permits, work permits, 
exceptional skill or extraordinary qualifications permits, diplomatic corps and foreign 
authority permits, exchange permits, treaty person permits, investor and self 
employed person permits, crewperson permits, relative’s permit and medical 
treatment permits. 
 
In the Section 8.2, the document proposes a list of persons who should be considered 
as prohibited: 
 
- people carrying infectious disease; 
- people with a record of criminal offences; 
- any person against whom a warrant has been issued by any country linked with 
South Africa by diplomatic ties and relating to genocide, murder, drug trafficking or 
money laundering; 
- people judicially considered incompetent; 
- people previously deported from South Africa and for whom the application is still 
to be rehabilitated by Immigration Service; 
- members of criminal or terrorism organisations; and 
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- members of associations promoting racial beliefs or social violence.  
 
The Draft White Paper then emphasises the financial management of migration by 
“reducing the social cost of immigration, enhancing policing at the community level, 
and better internal administrative procedures which should free existing financial and 
administrative capacity” (Section 12.2). 
 
2.5.2.7 The Immigration Act of 2002 
The release of the Immigration Act of 2002 was viewed as an update of the previous 
acts and incorporation of recommendations regarding immigration policy in South 
Africa. However, the Act gives the impression of perpetuating the legacy of the two-
gate policy system (Kabwe-Segatti, 2006: 183). One the one hand, the Act reiterates 
the attraction of skilled migrants whilst at the same time protecting the country from 
the flows of thousands of unskilled and illegal migrants. One the other hand, South 
Africa presents itself as the economic power on the continent, consequently attracting 
thousands of migrants. The Immigration Act was released on 31 May 2002 and aimed 
“to provide for the regulation of admission of persons to, their residence in, and their 
departure from the Republic; and for matters connected therewith.”  
 
The Act takes into consideration the propositions made by the Draft White Paper on 
International Migration, including the support of a culture of human-rights at 
government and civil society levels, facilitating of temporary permits, and the fight 
against illegal immigration and xenophobia. It encourages the creation of a synergy 
between the governmental bodies related to immigration or the promotion of 
economic growth, from which local communities will benefit and which could attract 
foreign investors, skilled human resources and businessmen, indispensable to the 
development of the country (Section 2.1). The Act recommends that the Department 
of Home Affairs reaches these objectives by cooperating with the South African 
Police Service, South African Revenue Service and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. In order to achieve these objectives, the Act also urges the Department of 
Home Affairs to make public its financial records concerning immigration and to 
modernise its administration within its structures and the relations with the public 
(Section 2.2). The cooperation between the Department of Home Affairs and other 
bodies is effected by the appointment of the members of the Immigration Advisory 
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Board, which includes representatives from various entities. The function of the board 
is to counsel the Minister of Home Affairs about the formulation and the 
implementation of the immigration policy.  
 
The Act mentions the conditions under which temporary and permanent resident 
permits can be delivered. As far as permanent resident permits are concerned,  
 
(1) Upon admission, a foreigner may enter and sojourn in the Republic only if 
in possession of a temporary residence. 
(2) Subject to this Act, upon application and upon prescribed examination at 
the port of entry, one of the temporary residences … may be issued to a 
foreigner. 
(3) If issued outside the Republic, a temporary residence is deemed to be of 
force and effect only after an admission. 
(4) A temporary residence is to be issued on condition that the holder is not or 
does not become a prohibited or an undesirable person. 
(5) For good cause, as prescribed, the Department may attach reasonable 
individual terms and conditions to a temporary residence. 
(6) Subject to this Act, a foreigner may change his or her status while in the 
Republic” (Section 10). 
 
The Act then distinguishes between the different types of residence permits issued by 
the Department: 
 
The visitor’s permit is issued to any foreigner holding a visa and who could provide 
financial or other guarantees for his or departure. The visitor’s permit lasts three 
months and can be renewed, as long as the holder provides financial resources for his 
or her departure and has proved to visit the Republic for academic sabbaticals, 
voluntary or charitable activities, research or other prescribed activities and cases. The 
holder of a visitor’s permit is not susceptible of conducting work in the Republic. 
 
The diplomatic permit can also be delivered by the Department of Foreign Affairs to 
an ambassador, a minister, a career diplomat or a consular officer of a foreign country 
or to a representative of an international organisation recognized by the Republic. The 
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other potentials receivers of the diplomatic permit are the immediate relatives and 
attendants, servants or personal employees of the diplomats listed above. The holder 
of the diplomatic permit may combine a separated issued work permit if they may 
conduct work in the Republic. 
 
The study permit is issued to any foreigner who wants to study in the Republic of 
South Africa for a period longer than three months. However, the potential holder of 
the study permit must provide guarantees of paying tuition fees as well as guarantees 
that he or she could support himself or herself during his or her stay in the Republic. 
The holder of the study permit is not required to work, unless it is a part-time work for 
a period not longer than the prescribed period or a temporary or full time work during 
the academic vacation periods if the holder attends a higher education institution. In 
some cases, the holder of the study permit can also work as practical training in a field 
related to his or her study. 
 
The treaty permit is held by a foreigner conducting activities in the country based on 
international agreements that South Africa is a party to. Apart from the Department of 
Home Affairs, the treaty permit can be issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs or 
another organ of the state responsible for the implementation of the treaty. 
 
The business permit is received by a foreigner wanting to establish or invest in a 
business so that he or she can be employed. The permit is also issued to his or her 
members of family.  
 
The crew permit is allocated to a foreigner who is a member of the crew of a ship by 
the Department of Home Affairs to a holder whose movement is restricted to 
particular areas and he/she is not allow to work. 
 
The medical treatment permit is issued by the Department of Home Affairs to any 
foreigner willing to get medical treatment in the Republic for a period no longer than 
three months. The holder of the medical treatment permit is forbidden to work in the 
Republic.  
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The Department of Home Affairs also may deliver the relative’s permit to any foreign 
member of immediate family of a citizen or a resident in the Republic. However, the 
resident or the citizen should prove that he/she has the means to support the relative 
during his/her sojourn. The relative’s permit does not give the right to work.  
 
The Department of Home Affairs issues four different categories of work permits, 
namely the quota work permit, the general work permit, an exceptional skills work 
permit and the intra-company transfer work permit. The first category is applied to 
any foreigner satisfying the quota determined annually by the Minister in consultation 
with the Ministers of Labour and Trade and Industry. The second category is allocated 
to any foreigner if his/her employer proves that the applicant does not fall within the 
first category of the work permit and if the employer has been unable to employ a 
person with similar qualifications in the Republic. The third category is issued to any 
foreigner with exceptional or qualifications. Lastly, a foreigner can be granted an 
intra-company transfer work permit for a period no longer than two years to work for 
a branch of an international company in the Republic. 
 
The retired person permit is granted by the Department of Home Affairs for a period 
exceeding three months to any foreigner willing to retire in the Republic. However, 
such foreigner must provide evidence of a pension or irrevocable annuity or 
retirement account or a minimum prescribed net worth. The holder of a retired person 
permit may work in the Republic under some circumstances determined by the 
Department of Home Affairs.  
 
The corporate permit is granted to a corporate applicant to employ a determined 
number of foreigners by the Department of Home Affairs in consultation with the 
Ministers of Labour and Trade and Industry. 
 
The exchange permit is granted to a foreigner participating in a cultural, economic 
and social programme or to a foreigner under the age of 25, to conduct a work for no 
longer than a year. 
As far as temporary residence is concerned, in addition to these different categories of 
permits, The Department of Home Affairs may issue an asylum permit, cross-border 
pass and transit visa to an asylum seeker under the Refugee Act, to any foreigner from 
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neighbouring country who does have not a passport but a prescribed identity 
document issued by the Department of Home Affairs, or a foreigner traveling to 
another country and who is using the facilities of different ports of entry of the 
Republic.  
 
2.6 The discourse on migration in South Africa 
The general elections in April 1994 were synonymous with the demise of the 
apartheid regime in South Africa and the beginning of a new era for the country. The 
country’s readmission to the international scene resulted in many different exchanges, 
including the flow of people. Apart from the labourers recruited in neighbouring 
countries to work on farms and mines in South Africa, the country also witnessed 
migration from other African countries further afield. Since 1994, thousands of 
Africans have arrived in South Africa and it is unlikely that this influx will cease any 
time soon. 
 
The South African government has been criticised for its management of the 
migration issue. Criticism has come from both human rights groups and scholars. The 
government has chosen to control and exclude immigrants rather than manage the 
problem by giving opportunities (Crush, 2003). Police brutality as method of arrest 
and the deportation system have especially been pointed out. A holding centre known 
as Lindela Centre through which many migrants pass prior to their deportation has 
also been the focus of major human rights investigations and complaints.  
 
Xenophobia is one of the main issues related to migration in South Africa. The 
general hostility towards foreigners has taken many forms. Among these are public 
violence and vigilantism, political statements and media publications (Harris, 2001). 
Hostility has linked foreigners to social problems like unemployment, crime, poverty 
and the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS. The origins of xenophobia could be 
broadly explained through research and historical events, which show that a majority 
group in a bad economic position feels threatened by a minority group, especially 
immigrants (Shindondola, 2001: 9). Called amakwerekwere or amagongogo by local 
Africans, foreign Africans have been harassed in one form or another. This dramatic 
and painful hostility cannot be better illustrated than by the following story (Vale, 
2003: 86):  
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In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on 
a train: one, a Mozambican, was thrown out while the other two, both 
Senegalese citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed on the roof trying to 
escape the crowd. This violence was inflicted by members of a crowd who 
were returning from a rally in the country’s administrative capital, Pretoria. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The characteristics of Francophone African migration have been determined by 
colonisation and its legacy. France as the former colonial power had been considered 
as one of the destinations for millions of Africans from French-speaking countries. 
Over the years the shapes and features of Francophone African migration have 
changed. On the continent, Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire have also received Francophone 
Africans. The flows of migrants in Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire are parts of large-scale 
movements of Africans moving within the continent (GCIM, 2005: 5; The United 
Nations, 2004: 55; Castles & Miller, 1998: 125). These trends occur in other parts of 
the developing world, where “south-south” migration is prominent. In this context, the 
flows of Africans to South Africa have tremendously increased since 1994. For 
Francophone Africans, South Africa therefore represents a new alternative destination 
in response to push factors in their countries of origin. 
 
In the light of the three main questions underpinning this study, the following 
hypotheses emerge from the historical review above:  
 
1. The departure of Francophone Africans from their regions of origin is a 
consequence of political, economic, social and academic turmoil. 
2. Their choice to come to South Africa is a consequence of their inability to migrate 
to traditional destinations such as France, Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon.  
3. The choice of South Africa is also based on its economic, political and academic 
similarities to developed countries. 
4. The settlement of Francophone African migrants in specific cities within South 
Africa follows the spread of a social network nationwide. 
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This historical review has also highlighted: 
1. The labour market context 
2. the higher education context 
3. Conditions favouring forced migration  
on the African/South African divide. 
The four categories of migrants to be used below (introduced in Chapter 1) relate 
directly to these three factors:  
-Legal migrants relate to labour market differences between sending areas and South 
Africa 
-Students as migrants relate to the higher education context, and 
-both refugees and extra-legals relate to forced migration. 
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Chapter Three  
 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3. 1 Introduction 
The three main questions of the study have led to four hypotheses and a four-way 
categorisation of migrants, as spelled out in the previous chapter on the historical 
context of Francophone migration. This chapter will complement the historical and 
the geographical analysis with an overview of theories relating to the complex 
processes of migration. 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines an overview of the 
evolution of the theoretical analysis of the causes of migration before the following 
two sections focus on “explaining and integrating the leading contemporary theories 
of international migration” (Massey et al., 1993: 432). The causes of migration are 
often viewed through economic considerations. As argued by Kok et al. (2003: 13), 
migration is also related to issues such as development and that the causes of this 
phenomenon should therefore not be seen as purely economic. According to Massey 
et al. (1993) or Schrool (cited by Jennissen, 2004: 32), the study of the causes of 
migration could be undertaken with reference to theories on the initiation of 
migration. These theories are presented in the second section. The third section 
explores theories of the perpetuation of migration. Lastly, the chapter describes the 
methodology used for this thesis. 
 
3. 2 An overview of the evolution of the theoretical analysis 
A massive body of literature has already been generated by the need for theoretical 
frameworks to understand population mobility (Castels & Miller, 1998; Keely, Kritz 
& Tomasi, 1981; Kok et al., 2003; Richmond, 1994; Solomon, 2001). Ravenstein, 
who wrote The Laws of Migration in the nineteenth century, is considered as one of 
the pioneers of the theoretical analysis of migration (Castels & Miller, 1998; Jansen, 
1970, Kok, et al., 2003). Ravenstein’s early theoretical approaches were broadly 
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based on statistical laws and have had a substantial influence on the subsequent 
analyses of economists, demographers and sociologists9. Kok et al, ( 2003: 12) 
mention other contributions to the analysis of migration, including William Thomas 
and Florian Znaniecki’s The Polish Peasant in Europe and America published in the 
late 1920s and Peter Rossi’s book on urban migration published in 1950, Why 
Families Move. These early analyses of migration contribute significantly to the 
diverse schools of thought that aim to explain migration. 
 
Migration analysis was often studied through the equilibrium approach and the 
structural historical approach (DeFay, 1998). The equilibrium approach emphasises 
economic factors and explains the reasons for migrating as a decision made by 
individual migrants after a careful consideration of different factors in both sending 
and receiving regions. In addition, according to the equilibrium approach, migration 
occurs within a free labour market where migrants are mobile and they move from 
regions of economic scarcity to regions of economic abundance. These moves take 
place within a free market regulated by the state properly managing the pull factors in 
order to increase competitiveness.  
 
The structural-historical approach is mainly based on the model of a Marxist political 
economy. Cheap, docile and exploitable migrants are pulled into the capitalist 
economy due in particular to the drive for increased profits. The desire to keep labour 
costs as low as possible push capitalists to bring in pliable, inexpensive and unskilled 
                                                 
9
 Jansen (1970: 10) summarises the seven “laws” that theorists of migration have since considered the 
basis of analysis. Ravenstein’s ‘laws” are described as follows: 
 
1. (...) the great body of our migrants only proceed a short distance and that there takes place 
consequently a universal shifting or displacement of the population, which produces 
“curents of migration” setting in the direction of the great centres of commerce and 
industry which absorb the migrants.. 
2. The process of absorption (limited in range, but universal throughout the country) go in 
the following manner: the inhabitants of a country immediately surrounding a town of 
rapid growth, flock into it; the gaps thus left by the rural population are filled up by 
migrants from more remote districts, until the attractive force of one of our rapidly 
growing cities makes its influence felt, step by step, to the most remote corner of the 
Kingdom. Migrants enumerated in certain centres of absorption will consequently grow 
less with the distance proportionately to the native popluaton which furnishes them... 
3. The process of dispersion is the inverse of that of absorption and exhibits similar features. 
4. Each main current of migration produces a compensating countercurrent. 
5. Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centres 
of commerce and industry. 
6. The natives of towns are less migratory than those of rural parts of the country. 
7. Females are more migratory than males. 
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workers from peripheral countries. In addition, the structural-historical approach 
identifies the way that changes in the underlying conditions of society influence 
individuals differently, depending on their gender, socioeconomic status and ethnic or 
national identities. 
 
The history of immigration theory in sociology expanded with the Chicago school of 
Sociology in the 1920s and 1930s, which put the assimilation perspective at the centre 
of the melting-pot, which was itself the outcome of migration (Heisler, 2000: 77). 
 
Stouffer’s concept of the intervening opportunities is among the first sociological 
theories particularly focused on migration (Bijak, 2006: 6). The concept points out 
that migratory movements are proportional to the attracting numbers of opportunities 
available at the regions of arrival, which are close to the regions of departure. Clearly 
the concept is questionable when long distance movements take place.  
 
Lee’s concept of push-pull factors which explains migration through attracting factors 
in the receiving regions, coupled with deterring factors in the sending regions, is 
derived from Stouffer’s findings. The push-pull factors model however has evident 
limitations with regard to its explanation of people mobility in the sense that same 
categories of migrants can prevail over time if the same push factors predominate in 
the sending regions. Furthermore, Skeldon (1990: 125-126) for instance believes that 
even though the push-pull model lists a series of reasons for migrating, those reasons 
merged together still fail to present a clear structure within which the causes of 
migration can be understood. As a consequence, Skeldon (1990: 126) states that “the 
push-pull theory is but a platitude at best.”  
 
The trends and patterns of international migration have changed over the years, and 
reasons for and causes of migration have become so complex that a single theory is 
inadequate to explain and conceptualise them. As argued by Haldenwang (quoted by 
Olaleye, 2000: 15), the analysis of migration has spread over several fields of study, 
with each specialist field of study defining its own concept of migration (Brettell & 
Hollifield, 2000: 3). 
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Anthropologists put a particular accent on cultural changes that take place because of 
migration on the one hand, and on the other hand how migration has an effect on 
ethnic identity. Besides, anthropologists are interested in the roles played by social 
networks in sustaining cultural difference, particularly in the receiving regions.  
 
Economists focus on the circumstances and conditions that attract different types of 
migrants to explain migration, in addition to the economic effects of migration which 
include the human cost and the benefits of in- and out-migration. Moreover, 
economists show a great interest in wage difference and the structural changes within 
capital markets and service sectors. Therefore, migration is viewed as a mechanism to 
redistribute the labour force internationally, with the more economically advanced 
regions attracting most migrants.  
 
The theoretical models used in demography aim to describe the time and the specific 
groups involved in the process of migration. The demographic theoretical approach, 
which is similar to the geographic one, also emphasises the social and economic 
impact of migration on the regional structure in both the sending and receiving 
countries. Characteristics such as age, gender, ratios, structure and differential fertility 
rates of migrants, as well as influences of migration on population growth are 
therefore considered.  
 
Initially, the sociology of international migration focused on the debate between 
functionalist and conflict-oriented theories of social migration (DeFay, 1998). The 
main input was based on the processes of social changes that occur when a specific 
group migrates from its region of origin and settles in another region. The study of 
migration then became more complex when economic, structural and political factors 
were taken into consideration. In his theoretical approach of sociology, Hoffman-
Nowotny (Keely, Kritz & Tomasi, 1981: 65) grouped migration and its related 
phenomena into a single concept of “the theory of societal systems”. The sociological 
approach to understanding migration could then emphasise constellations of socio-
structural conditions and socio-cultural factors, including the interpretation of 
sociological, socio-psychological and economic concepts through stratification, 
mobility, social change, status crystallisation, symbolic interaction and marginal 
utility. Two main streams of questions have dominated the study of migration in the 
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field of sociology in recent years. On the one hand, it is a question of looking at the 
reasons why migration takes place and how it continues over time. On the other hand, 
sociologists are interested in the incorporation of migrants in receiving regions. Ethnic 
groups take centre stage within these two streams of questions. 
 
Migration has on the one hand been studied through the social and political structures 
of sending and receiving regions, and on the other hand, sociology has inquired into 
the processes of social integration and adaptation of migrants in host regions by 
asking why migration takes place and how the phenomenon sustains itself over time. 
Migration is often viewed through the pull-push approach because it is a consequence 
of a combination of both positive factors in receiving regions and negative factors in 
the sending ones. Migration becomes more effective if forces of attraction in the 
regions of destination increase.  
 
The theoretical approach to migration can also be viewed and classified from the 
macro level of analysis, particularly analysis linked to push-pull factors, to the micro 
level of analysis which takes into account rational choices. Richmond (1994: 48) 
diversifies both macro and micro theories by pointing out that macro theories “focus 
on migration streams, identifying those conditions under which large-scale 
movements occur and describing the demographic, economic, and social 
characteristics of the migrants in aggregate terms.” In addition macro theories, 
through structural or cultural perspective, take into consideration adaptation 
processes, economic and social integration or assimilation of migrants in the host 
regions. Richmond (1994: 48) shows that micro theories are concerned with: 
 
studies of socio-psychological factors that differentiate migrants from non-
migrants, together with theories concerning motivation, decision making, 
satisfaction and identification. It may also include some aspects of immigrant 
adaptation when regarded from a strictly individualistic perspective as distinct 
from the broader societal consequences.  
 
3.3 Theories on the initiation of migration 
One of the well-known texts on theories of migration is the compilation made by 
Massey and his colleagues (Massey et al., 1993). The authors distinguish between 
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theories that focus on the initiation of migratory movements and theories that 
emphasise the perpetuation of migration across time and space (Kok et al., 2003: 13). 
The overview of theories of international migration in this study is based on their 
compilation, as researchers in sociology of migration expect to understand why 
migration is taking place, why it sustains over time and how migrants integrate 
themselves into the host societies (Heisler, 2000: 77). 
 
3.3.1 Neoclassical economics theory 
This theory is widely considered the oldest best-known model of labour migration 
(Jennissen, 2004: 33). It was developed by the likes of Todaro, Harris and Sjaarstad. It 
explains the causes of migration by looking at wage differences in various 
geographical regions within the context of labour supply and demand. People are 
likely to migrate to regions with higher wage rates and migration is a decision 
undertaken at the individual level. Individual migrants also consider labour 
productivity and the degree of organisation of workers in the potential regions of 
destination.  
 
Massey et al. (1993: 434) illustrate the neoclassical economics theory with an 
example of a region that has a large labour force and limited capital resources on the 
one hand, but a low wage equilibrium on the other hand, whereas another region has a 
limited labour force in all sectors of activities, but has sufficient capital resources. The 
latter region is also characterised by high market wages. Workers of the first region 
are motivated to move away from the region because of differential in wages. 
However, before moving, migrants must take a number of financial risks considered 
as investments, such as the costs of traveling and maintenance during the trip and 
period of searching for work. They must also consider other risks, such as the 
difficulties in learning a new language, adapting to a new labour market and the 
psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones. Migrants expect positive 
returns, especially financial rewards. An economic equilibrium between sending and 
receiving regions is expected if the flows are pursued over a long period.  
 
However, some critics point out that international political and economic 
environments are not taken into account. Indeed, Castels and Miller (1998: 21) argue 
that the theory is among those unable to predict future flows. The authors point out 
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that a closer analysis shows that labour migrants from underdeveloped regions belong 
largely to the middle class, whereas the poorest people should be considered as the 
first to move to more advantageous economic regions.  
 
3.3.2 New economics of migration 
Contrary to the theory of neoclassical economics which explains migration as the 
result of individuals deciding to maximise their income, the new economics of 
migration theory views population mobility as a collective decision made by groups 
of people, such as families, households and sometimes the entire community. The 
theory has been developed by Massey et al., Stark, Stark and Taylor. According to 
Massey et al. (1993: 436), the objective of migrating is to maximise income and to 
minimise economic risks. To achieve these targets, groups of concerned people 
diversify destinations of the labour force. Some family members take jobs or other 
economic activities locally, while others, perhaps the more skillful or those more 
likely to adapt to a foreign environment, are sent to regions with greater economic 
potential. Families, households and communities can therefore rely on migrants’ 
income for support if the local economy deteriorates or if their own economic 
activities fail to generate an adequate income.  
 
Massey et al. highlight the importance of decision making by entire communities to 
send some of their members abroad to overcome barriers to access to capital and 
credit on the local market. Moreover, the theory considers the diversification of 
destinations of members of families, households and communities as one of the 
responses to local market pressures. In developing countries, there are deficiencies in 
private insurance and governmental and credits markets. Castels and Miller (1998: 22) 
argue that the non-availability of capital for entrepreneurs, along with chances to 
secure employment elsewhere are also new economics factors explaining the move of 
people from underdeveloped regions to the most developed ones. The patterns 
identified by the new economics of migration theory are likely to expand from 
sending regions like Francophone Africa “if globalisation, and particularly 
liberalisation, further reduce the stability of employment, [because] they may make 
households feel even less secure and increase the need to spread their risks” (Stalker, 
2000: 131). 
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3.3.3 Segmented labour-market theory 
Also known as dual labour-market, this theory is based on the division on the labor 
market into the primary and the secondary sectors, with natives having most of the 
jobs in the primary sector while migrants are found mainly in the secondary sector 
(Piore, 1976: 35). Migration is therefore an outcome of pull factors observed in the 
receiving countries. While reviewing the theory, Weeks describes the dual labour 
market theory as follows (Britz, 2002: 42): 
 
It suggests that in developing regions of the world, there are essentially two 
kinds of jobs - the primary sector, which employs well educated people, pays 
them well, and offers them security and benefits; and the secondary labour 
market, characterised by low wages, unstable working conditions, and lack of 
reasonable prospects of advancement. It is easy enough to recruit people into 
the primary sector, but the secondary sector is not so attractive. 
 
The current world economy dominated by capitalism sustains labour migration from 
underdeveloped regions to the more advanced ones. The more industrialised 
economies are always looking for a cheaper and more flexible labour force. Massey et 
al. (1993: 441) argue that structural inflation, social constraints on motivation, 
economic dualism and the demography of labour supply are the main reasons behind 
the quest for a cheaper and more flexible labour force. 
 
Massey et al. (1993: 441) explain structural inflation as the relation between wages 
and social status. Wages are often considered a corollary of social qualities, status and 
prestige. The increase of wages corresponds to the amelioration of social qualities, 
status and prestige. These informal social expectations coupled with pressure from 
formal institutions such as trade unions are supposed to ensure that wages correspond 
to the social status of workers. However, many employers are reluctant to satisfy 
these requirements although informal social expectations and formal institutions, such 
as union contracts, bureaucratic regulations or company job classifications, oblige 
them to do so. For employers, increasing wages, particularly in “times of labour 
scarcity, is expensive and disruptive” because “wages must be increased 
proportionately throughout the job hierarchy in order to keep them in line with social 
expectations” (Massey et al., 1993: 441). Consequently, for the employers the best 
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option appears to be to recruit from the migrant population which is likely to accept 
low wages. 
 
Massey et al. (1993: 441) also point to motivational problems as an explanation for 
migration through the dual labour market theory. Those motivational problems could 
result from the readjustment of the hierarchy caused by the movement of a number of 
workers up the ladder of the company. Apart from seeking an income, the 
accumulation of social status is the main concern of many workers. However, each 
hierarchy has a lowest level and employers need workers to occupy the jobs at the 
bottom of the hierarchy and to replace those who have moved up. However, at the 
bottom, “there is no status to be maintained and there are few avenues for upward 
mobility” (Massey et al., 1993: 441). Employers therefore have to fill these positions 
largely with workers whose primary interest is money, not prestige and status. 
Migrants often take these jobs because for many, especially when they first arrive in a 
new environment, the sole aim is to work to earn money to achieve specific goals, 
such as sending money home or improving their living standards.  
 
According to Massey et al. (1993: 442), the dual labour market theory explains the 
demand for migrants by most economies through an economic dualism, in which there 
is a clear distinction between capital and labour force: 
 
Capital is a fixed factor of production that can be idle by lower demand but 
not be laid off; owners of capital must bear the costs of unemployment. 
Labour is a variable factor of production that can be released when demand 
falls, so workers are forced to bear the costs of their own unemployment 
Massey et al. (1993: 442).  
 
As a consequence of that dualism, there are, on the one hand, skilled workers in the 
labour intensive primary sector who are dealing with the best, most costly and most 
advanced equipment. Their jobs are stable and they can be considered as part of the 
capital because employers have invested in them for the long term through training 
and education, for instance. It becomes too expensive for employers to let these 
workers go elsewhere. On the other hand, there is the labour intensive secondary 
sector where workers hold unstable and unskilled jobs. They can be laid off at any 
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time with little or no cost to employers, especially during quiet periods. Therefore, 
because of low wages or unstable conditions in the secondary sector, local citizens are 
not keen to work there. Once again, the recruitment of migrants is often viewed as the 
solution to fill the void in the secondary sector. 
 
With reference to the dual labour market Massey et al. (1993: 443) also lately 
emphasise the demography of labour supply, which focuses on the participation of 
women and teenagers in the job market. The status of women has changed, especially 
in developed countries. Unlike in the past, women have increased their presence in the 
job market because of three essential socio-demographic reasons. Firstly, women 
want to have a career and earn an income. Secondly, the increase in divorce rates 
makes it necessary for women to focus on well-paid jobs because it will be their only 
source of income. Thirdly, the decline in birth rates and the extension of formal 
education have pushed more women into the job market. On the other hand, teenagers 
permanently move in and out of the job market. Teenagers are not reluctant to take on 
dead-end jobs because they do not consider these jobs as permanent. 
 
3.3.4 World system theory 
Population mobility is viewed as a consequence of upheavals caused by the 
penetration of a capital economy into non-capitalist or pre-capitalist regions and 
which since then has brought as many people as possible from the previous non-
capitalist regions into the world market economy (Jennissen, 2004: 52). Since the 
expansion of European civilisation into other continents, capitalism has not ceased to 
spread its influence. Indeed, the present capitalist world-economy has its roots back in 
the sixteenth century (Wallerstein, 2000: 253). A world-system is viewed as a social 
system, with boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation and 
coherence based in core, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries (Wallerstein, 1974: 
374). This penetration was first supported by colonial regimes, then by neo-colonial 
governments and nowadays by multinational firms. Moreover, “the drive for the 
endless accumulation of capital” (Wallerstein, 2000: 260) has brought owners and 
managers of capitalist companies to look for greener pastures beyond Europe and 
North America. Developed countries, where multinational companies have their 
headquarters, are known as core countries while developing countries are those on the 
periphery. The implementation of the world-economy has been accompanied by the 
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spread of a functional and geographical division of labour. Therefore, the main 
streams of people mobility seem to take the opposite direction to the penetration of 
capitalism, whereas capital spreads from the core sphere to the peripheral, people 
migrate from the peripheral to the core countries. In addition, Massey et al. (1993) 
explain this movement in opposite directions with reference to the use of land, the 
extraction of raw materials, labour, material links, ideological links and the 
composure of global cities. 
 
Massey et al. (1993: 445) describe land as one of the main elements sustaining the 
world systems theory. Once established in the periphery countries, capitalist farmers 
strengthen their landholding and introduce mechanised production, cash crops and 
industrially produced inputs such as fertilisers or insecticides. Traditional land 
production is destroyed because individual ownership displaces community 
ownership existing in periphery countries before the arrival of capitalist farmers. The 
peasant farmers become redundant particularly because of the mechanisation of 
farming introduced by capitalist property owners. Peasant farmers thus find 
themselves excluded from the local market network and are consequently driven out 
of their own country to become a displaced labour force. 
 
According to Massey et al. (1993: 445), supplying the core region with raw materials 
has always been one the reasons for the expansion of capitalism across the world. A 
paid labour force is the driving force behind the extraction of raw materials, 
especially in the peripheral regions, to be sold on the international market. 
Furthermore, factories established in the peripheral regions have pushed peasant 
farmers to abandon their traditional social equilibrium, a loss aggravated by the 
recruitment of more women. Women have become the main providers in many 
households, but traditional crafts and home industries cannot compete with the 
capitalist factories. Therefore, in periphery regions, thousands of people have been 
turned into potential migrants because they have lost their traditional identities and 
places in their communities. 
 
Massey et al. (1994: 446) also consider material links to explain the causes of 
migration through world systems theory. Multinational companies and neo-colonial 
governments have developed material links in communication and transportation in 
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order to send the results of their investments in the peripheral regions to the core 
countries. These material links not only facilitate the transportation of goods, 
information or capital; but also favour the flow of people between the two regions, 
especially from the peripheral regions to the core regions. The development of 
communication and transportation structures has made people-mobility easier in terms 
of distances and costs. 
 
Others elements, according to Massey et al. (1994: 446), that explain migration 
through world systems theory are ideological links. The legacy of colonialism has 
established close ties between the former colonial powers and the former colonies. 
The cultural links forged through language, educational systems and lifestyle have 
reinforced ideological links from the core countries to the periphery regions. Potential 
migrants have been lured by the lifestyle portrayed by the mass media from the more 
technologically advanced regions, particularly Western countries. 
 
Finally, the last point of world system theory that Massey et al. (1993: 447) focus on 
is the structure of global cities. The interconnected world ruled by globalisation is 
managed by a small number of major cities linked by banking, finances, services and 
high-technology inputs. These global cities are characterised by the high profile of the 
labour force whose wealth and education are the main features. This high-class labour 
force manifests the need for unskilled workers to be domestic servants, waiters or 
drivers. Global cities are also major attractions for potential migrants. 
 
3.4 Theories on the perpetuation of migration 
Once established, whatever the reasons that motivate it, the movements of people are 
perpetuated over time through migrant networks forged between sending and 
receiving regions, the participation of international organisations and the migration 
system. 
 
3.4.1 Social network theory 
Bourdieu has put capital at the core of his theoretical approach (Bourdieu &Wuthnow, 
1991: 511-512). He points out that the economic, symbolic, social and cultural 
resources define the place of individuals in the social strata and that individuals use 
these forms of capital to enhance or perpetuate their positions in the social 
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classification. Social capital is therefore viewed as positions and relations that 
individuals have within different groups or social networks. Portes and Sensenbrenner 
describe the application of social capital to the sociology of migration through 
“bounded solidarity” and “enforceable trust”. They state that  
 
…the former refers to principled group behavior that emerges specifically 
from the situational circumstances in which immigrants may find themselves 
in host societies. It is independent of earlier shared values. The latter refers to 
the ability of group goals to govern economic behavior based on expectations 
of higher community status and the fear of collective sanctions” (Heisler, 
2000: 83).  
 
However, according to Massey et al. (1993: 447) “migrants’ networks are sets of 
interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin 
and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community 
origin.” A social network presents nodes and links that facilitate flows and enhance 
migration movements thus reducing cost and risk for other potential moves. For first 
arrivals, migration is necessarily costly because they have no social ties to rely on. 
However, as the number of migrants increases, a social network provides useful 
information and enables further moves and settlement. Sometimes the network is 
expanded to every location where the same community’s migrants have settled and 
every group will then be aware of what is happening elsewhere. Potential migrants 
can thus maximise their job opportunities by choosing lower risks areas and migration 
becomes a reliable and secure source of income. A social network increases the 
probability of migration followed by additional movements and an expanding 
network, and so forth. 
 
3.4.2 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory points out the role played by private institutions and voluntary 
organisations in the perpetuation of migration. In many receiving regions, imbalances 
are created by the discrepancies between the number of people who want to gain entry 
into the country of destination and the small number of visas and permits allowed by 
the policies implemented to curb the flow of migrants into the country. As a 
consequence,  
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a migration industry emerges, consisting of recruitment organisations, 
lawyers, agents, smugglers and other middle-people. Such people can be both 
helpers and exploiters of migrants. Especially in situations of illegal migration 
or of oversupply of potential migrants, the exploitative role may predominate” 
(Castels & Miller, 1998: 26).  
 
Private and voluntary organisations extend their role by providing help to those 
migrants who are marginalised because they lack legal status. Their assistance ranges 
from social services, counseling, obtaining of legal documentation, transport, or 
labour contracts. According to Britz (2002: 43), these organisations “help perpetuate 
migration in face of government attempts to limit the flow of migrants”. 
 
3.4.3 Cumulative causation 
Myrdal (1957: 27) points out the inequalities between regions. He sees migration as 
an evolutionary process which takes place from disadvantaged economic regions to 
“the lucky regions”. In addition, according to Massey et al. (1993: 451), “causation is 
cumulative in that each act of migration alters the social context within which 
subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional 
movement more likely.” The authors point out six socioeconomic factors - the 
distribution of income, the distribution of land, the organisation of agrarian 
production, the culture of migration, the regional distribution of human capital and 
social labeling – that perpetuate migration as far as cumulative causation is 
concerned. 
 
Massey et al. (1993: 451) identify the distribution of income as one explanation for 
the perpetuation of migration because before being involved in the migration patterns, 
a specific community witnesses disequilibrium in household incomes, which may be 
low because the subsistence level or the standard of living is similar. Once one or 
more members of a household migrate and send part of their income back home, the 
remittances increase the income of the household. The concerned household will 
move up the social strata. As a result, more households will encourage members to 
migrate to enable them to move up from the low level of the local income hierarchy. 
The level of income of the entire community will be at the same level again once 
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many households reach a certain level of social life because of the migrants’ earnings. 
However, more departures will be needed to sustain the level of income. 
 
Massey et al. (1993: 452) also emphasise the distribution of land in their analysis of 
the perpetuation of migration according to the cumulative causation theory. The 
theory focuses on non-migrants who acquire land for agricultural reasons on the one 
hand, and on migrants who in many cases buy in their regions of origin for its prestige 
value or for a future use, on the other. The more migrants use their higher earnings to 
buy farmland, the more land they withdraw from local peasants. Thus, more local 
peasants will wish to migrate with the intention to acquire higher earnings and to 
become landowners. 
 
Another socioeconomic factor of cumulative causation mentioned by Massey et al. 
(1993: 452) is the organisation of agrarian production. Migrant landowners who 
would like to farm their land are likely to use more capital-intensive methods such as 
machinery, herbicides, fertilisers and improved seeds because they will be able to 
afford them with their financial resources. Local labourers are however still using 
traditional techniques due to the lack of financial resources. The number of people 
willing to migrate consequently increases with the intensification of the 
mechanisation of agriculture.  
 
The fourth socioeconomic factor of cumulative causation pointed out by Massey et al. 
(1993: 452) is the culture of migration. Initially people migrate for a short period in 
order to satisfy specific needs and to achieve specific aims. However, their 
perceptions change once they are in host regions because of difficulties encountered 
and achievements. “Once someone has migrated, therefore, he or she is very likely to 
migrate again, and the odds of taking an additional trip rise with the number of trips 
already taken” (Massey et al., 1993: 452). Moreover, over the years, in the sending 
regions, migration becomes part of the values of the community. This will lead to 
further departures. 
 
The regional distribution of human capital concerns the quality of migrants. Initially, 
migration is selective because it involves at least well-educated, skilled, productive 
and highly motivated people. Massey et al. (1993: 452) also posit that the departure of 
 90 
these quality migrants is an economic gain for the receiving regions, while it is a loss 
for the sending ones. Consequently, further movements of departure from the sending 
regions are expected as economic stagnation is observed. Moreover, the spread and 
the rise of education in the sending regions causes the perpetuation of migration 
because, over time, well-educated, skilled, productive and highly motivated 
generations will emerge who would want to satisfy their ambitions elsewhere.  
 
Lastly, Massey et al. (1993: 453) identify social labeling a socioeconomic factor that 
expresses the way native citizens consider the nature of jobs. Some jobs in receiving 
regions are labelled as migrants’ jobs because many migrants are recruited for specific 
jobs and for a specific period of time. However, once this period is over, the jobs are 
still seen as migrants’ jobs by local citizens. The social definition of work is thus 
changed due to migration. 
 
3.4.4 Migration system 
Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) lay emphasis on the components of migrants between two or 
a group of countries. Although the movements are happening in all the directions, it is 
likely the countries with higher wages and better welfare conditions mostly attract 
migrants; while countries with lower wages and poorer welfare conditions are the 
sending ones. Kritz and Zlotnik also put a particular accent on space and time in the 
determination of an international migration system. Indeed, historical relationships 
between two or a group of countries set up structural conditions which determine the 
flows within a system. Besides, the evolution of political and economic spaces affects 
“the supply of and demand for migrants” (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992: 4).  
 
Massey et al. (1993: 454) offer some hypotheses and propositions about a migration 
system: 
 
1. Countries within a system need not to be geographically close since flows 
reflect political and economic relationships rather than physical ones. 
Although proximity obviously facilitates the formation of exchange 
relationships, it does not guarantee them nor does distance preclude them. 
2. Multipolar systems are possible, whereby a set of dispersed core countries 
receive immigrants from a set of overlapping sending nations. 
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3. Nations may belong to more than one migration system, but multiple 
membership is more common among sending than receiving nations. 
4. As political and economic conditions change, systems evolve, so that 
stability does not imply a fixed structure. Countries may join or drop out of a 
system in response to social change, economic fluctuations, or political 
upheavals. 
 
3.5 Research design and methodology  
The following section provides the research design and methodology followed for this 
study because, as stated by Franckfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996: 15), 
methodology is “a system of explicit rules and procedures upon which research is 
based and against which claims for knowledge are evaluated.” Methodology therefore 
tends to play a triple role. Firstly, it is a replication because it is conducted in the same 
way by other scientists and researchers in order to avoid unnecessary mistakes. 
Secondly, methodology uses logical interpretation to present reliable inferences from 
actual observations. Finally, methodology looks at intersubjectivity for the sharing of 
information within the scientific community. The methodological process, however, 
can be conducted only after a clear research design, such as this appendix features, 
including data collection, data analysis and the problems encountered.  
 
3.5.1 The research design 
Studying Francophone African migration to South Africa was primarily conducted as 
empirical research based on existing studies on migration (as I shall demonstrate in 
the literature review) in South Africa, on the continent and worldwide. Considered as 
“the blueprint that enables the investigator to come up with solutions to the problems 
and guides him or her in the various stages of the research” (Franckfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996: 99), the research design on the migration of Francophone African 
migrants in Cape Town intended to verify four components. Firstly, the research 
process was designed to compare whether the arrivals of Francophone Africans in 
South Africa in general and Cape Town in particular (viewed as the independent 
variable) are related to the streams of Francophone African migration from the 
continent to other parts of the world (considered as the dependent variable). Secondly, 
the research design was intended to evaluate the flows of Francophone Africans to 
South Africa as the consequences of both the demise of apartheid in South Africa and 
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the implementation of restrictive measures in traditional destinations such as France, 
Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire. Thirdly, the research was designed to attempt to understand 
further Francophone African arrivals in South Africa within the framework of South 
Africa, viewed as a new destination. Finally, the last component (generalisation) is 
intended to apply the findings on Francophone Africans in Cape Town to other 
communities within the country or elsewhere.  
 
A combination of both quantitative and qualitative research was considered because 
they complement each other although there are some differences between the two. As 
pointed out by Patton (quoted by Nkau, 2003: 42), both quantitative and qualitative 
models can be combined for the study of one project. It is important that the two 
paradigms use systematic procedures for gaining new information. Neuman (2000: 
122) states that, apart from different assumptions about social life and objectives, one 
of the major differences between qualitative and quantitative research is the nature of 
data. Qualitative research deals with “soft data”, including words, sentences, photos, 
symbols and so forth, while quantitative research focuses on “hard data” which lies 
with numbers in particular. This leads to different research strategies and techniques 
of data collection. Qualitative research guides me towards the analysis and the 
interpretation of the reasons behind the departure of Francophone African migrants 
from their countries of origin and their choice of South Africa in general, and Cape 
Town in particular. Quantitative research oriented me towards the interpretation of 
economic and demographic data of the countries of origin of migrants to explain the 
reasons for their departure. It was also helpful in measuring and testing the hypothesis 
of the growth of the arrival in South Africa of African migrants in general and 
Francophone Africans in particular. The quantitative approach allowed the 
construction of an historical profile of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town.  
However, with reference to the present study, the researcher puts more emphasis on a 
qualitative approach for four main reasons among the five that Maxwell highlights 
(Nkau, 2003: 39). Firstly, a qualitative approach was useful to understand the course 
of events which push Francophone Africans to migrate; they gave their feelings about 
and perceptions of the events leading to their decision to leave. Secondly, the context 
within which the events took place had a major impact on the decision to migrate. 
Thirdly, through a qualitative model, the course of events could not be anticipated and 
explained prematurely. Finally, a qualitative approach allowed an understanding of 
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the context within which the events and actions took place. Qualitative work at the 
individual level described migrants’ life histories from their sending countries to Cape 
Town. Qualitative methods facilitated the capturing of information about the 
migration process. In this regard, comparative analysis makes a distinction between 
information gathered from Francophone African migrants in Cape Town and their 
counterparts in Johannesburg, as well as from potential migrants outside South Africa. 
 
With regard to the qualitative approach, case studies were considered as one of the 
strategies used to understand the complexities of the different categories considered. 
Considered as being probably “the most flexible of all designs” (Hakim, 1987: 61), 
case studies are able to describe a social phenomenon clearly. The case studies were 
the examination of the migration life of each respondent, from the reasons explaining 
his/her departure from the country of origin to his/her settlement in Cape Town. The 
case studies gave flexibility and diversity, which explains the choice of both a single 
case and multiple cases. As shown by Hakim (1987: 63) “a single example often 
forms the basis for the researcher on a typical, deviant or critical cases”, while 
“multiple case designs can be limited to two or three settings or extend to dozens of 
cases either to achieve replication of the same study in different settings or to compare 
and contrast different cases”.  
 
Hakim (1987) considers five types of case studies (individual case histories, 
community studies, case studies of social groups, case studies of organisations and 
institutions and case studies of events, roles and relationships). From the five types of 
case study, individual case histories is the type best suited to understand Francophone 
African migration to Cape Town. Individual case studies are set to “provide an 
enormously detailed and substantiated account of a person’s history with reference to 
some specific personal characteristic or series or events they have experienced” 
(Hakim, 2987: 65). Furthermore, individual case studies offer detailed explorations of 
personal insight into experiences that could help the researcher to make a distinction 
between popular perceptions of the reasons causing the departure of migrants and 
their personal analysis of the situation. These popular perceptions could for instance 
be the general idea that French migrants come to South Africa solely because they are 
escaping from civil war or seeking better economic opportunities (Sichone, 2003: 
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131). These perceptions contrast with the reasons given by migrants themselves when 
they explain their departure, such as the language factor or the pursuit of their studies. 
 
3.5.2 Interviews and focus groups 
42 in-depth interviews and four focus groups were conducted. After a review of 
available literature and media articles, a list of questions was developed in order to 
collect data orally. In-depth interviews have been chosen because they are free and 
non-directive and respondents are therefore able to supply more information. Focus 
group interviews were considered in order to obtain information from a group 
discussion because it reveals and clarifies a diversity of opinions. The researcher 
considered a smaller group of Francophone Africans in order to illuminate the 
dynamics of the Francophone African migration to Cape Town. The respondents were 
therefore found through the snowball technique, whereby interviewees are located by 
an interconnected web of linkages.  
 
Interviews were conducted in Cape Town, Johannesburg and in Libreville in Gabon. 
The interview schedule containing a number of broad questions on migration causes 
and consequences was piloted. This is an example of the structure of the interviews 
conducted in Cape Town:  
 
• Place and date where the interview takes place 
 
Presentation of the interviewee 
• First and surname  
• Occupation 
• Nationality 
• Age (facultative) 
• Marital status 
 
1. Background of the interviewee 
• Educational and professional formation 
• Professional experience 
• Social situation back home 
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2. Before leaving 
• Perspectives 
• In which other places (countries especially, had you been and for how long 
before coming to South Africa)? 
• The motivations for leaving 
• Did you have other alternatives than leaving? 
• When exactly did you decide to leave? 
• What was your opinion about migration before leaving your country? 
• What were your familial and surrounding influences in your move? 
• What kind of help did you get from your family and friends? 
• What were the criteria of the choice of the country of destination? 
• What was your knowledge on the country of destination? 
• What did you know about South Africa? 
• Where did you get your information about South Africa? 
• How many languages could you speak? 
• For how long did you plan to spend away? 
 
3. The migration route 
• Did you use some networks to make things easier for you? 
• How did you leave (car, plane, boat, train or walk)? 
• How did you get required travel documents (passport, visa, permit etc)? 
• Was it difficult to get the required documents from the South African Embassy 
in your country (for non-extra-legal migrants)? 
• How did you enter into South Africa without required documents and without 
been caught by the police (for extra-legal migrants)? 
• Did you known exactly where you were going? 
• Free talk about the migration route, from his/her place up to Cape Town (with 
some interruptions to clarify if necessary, with some issues like controls on 
borders of every country crossed) 
• Did you come to South Africa because you could not go to Europe or 
America?  
• What was special about the choice of South Africa and Cape Town? 
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• In which other cities and towns had you been before moving to Cape Town 
and for how long did you stay there? 
• What was your main reason of moving to Cape Town? 
• Arrival in Cape Town and settlement. 
 
4. Life in Cape Town 
• The current position (job, study, accommodation and the price of the rent, 
family, etc.). 
• What is your impression of Cape Town about: the cost of life, public services, 
availability of decent jobs, business opportunities, treatment by employers, by 
customers, violence, health care, xenophobia, freedom and democracy, police 
harassment, etc? 
• How much approximately do you earn monthly? 
• What are your first priorities? 
• And then, what do you do with the rest of money? 
• Are conditions in Cape Town like you expected? 
• Has your condition dropped or improved since you came to Cape Town? 
• How and for how long did you learn English? 
• How can you evaluate your level in English now? 
• Apart from English, do you speak any South African language? 
• What is the situation of a new Francophone African migrant in Cape Town 
who does not know English very well? 
• What are the advantages and the disadvantages of being a Francophone 
African in Cape Town? 
• Does a Francophone African community exist in Cape Town? If yes, what are 
their characteristics? If no, what is missing regarding the implementation of 
such a community? 
• Do French reinforce relations between Francophone Africans despite coming 
from different countries? 
• In your communities, is French mostly used as the main language? 
• Are Francophone African migrants different from others? 
• Are religious brotherhoods (like Mourides for Senegalese Muslims) or 
countrymen associations stronger regarding people relations than French? 
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• Have you already achieved your expectations in Cape Town? 
• If no, what do you think still to do and for how long? 
• Do you send money back home? 
• What advice will you give a fellow countryman or another African who would 
like to come to South Africa in general and in Cape Town in particular? 
• What is your opinion on xenophobia in South Africa? 
• Do you think the position of South African politicians (about NEPAD, African 
Renaissance and African Union, etc) is reflected by the behaviour of the 
population towards African migrants? 
• As a foreigner, do you see yourself in South Africa as an invader, a 
businessman, an African brother who has brought something (what?) or 
someone who is taking advantage of South African opportunities? 
• What is your comment about some stereotypes of foreigners, such as 
Nigerians as being linked with illegal activities like drug, Congolese to 
prostitution, etc? 
• What are your futures plans (futures destinations and the reasons)? 
 
Table 1: Composition of interviews 
 Cape Town Johannesburg Libreville 
(Gabon) 
Legal migrants 6 (2 women) 3 (1 woman) 3 
Students 6 (2 women) 3 (2 women) 1 
Refugees 6 (2 women) 3 (1 woman) 1 
Extra-legals 6 (2 women) 3 1 
 
The interviews were done in English and French, and the gender, age and class of the 
interviewees were considered. The interviews were recorded on audiotape after 
obtaining permission from the interviewees. The conventions indicating hesitations, 
silences, emphases and overlaps provide a method for interpreting data and 
identifying structure and patterns in it. The interviews were transcribed and the 
resulting texts were analysed. In addition, extensive notes were taken during the 
interviewing process. 
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Four focus groups were formed (three in Cape Town and one in Johannesburg). Most 
of the focus groups were held in Cape Town. The focus groups were organized 
according to two major characteristics. The first aim was to gather information from 
Francophone African migrants’ experience in some others countries before their 
arrival in South Africa. Lastly, the objective of the focus groups was to understand 
similarities and differences of various experiences of migrants collectively, besides 
the information gathered from individual interviews. These major characterisations of 
focus groups were useful to generate new ideas for the four hypotheses considered at 
the beginning of this study as highlighted in the conclusion of Chapter 2. The 
questions addressed in the focus groups were related to the three main questions of 
this study: the motivations for migrants to leave their countries, their choice of South 
Africa and their arrival in Cape Town. 
 
The four focus groups were structured as follows: 
 
Table 2: Cape Town Focus group 1 
Participants Gender Category of 
migrant 
Country of origin 
1 Man Legal migrant Cameroon 
2 Man Refugee DRC 
3 Woman Student Congo 
4 Man Extra-legal DRC 
 
 
 
Table 3: Cape Town Focus group 2 
Participants Gender Category of 
migrant 
Country of origin 
1 Woman Refugee Rwanda 
2 Woman Student Gabon 
3 Man Refugee Burundi 
4 Man Legal migrant Cote d’Ivoire 
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Table 4: Cape Town Focus group 3 
Participants Gender Category of 
migrant 
Country of origin 
1 Man Student Algeria 
2 Man Legal migrant Senegal 
3 Man Refugee DRC 
4 Man Extra-legal Congo 
 
Table 5: Johannesburg Focus group  
Participants Gender Category of 
migrant 
Country of origin 
1 Man Legal migrant Morocco 
2 Man Student Cameroon 
3 Man Extra-legal DRC 
4 Woman Refugee DRC 
 
Lastly a simple observation of Francophone African migrants, particularly Congolese 
refugees was conducted in Muizenberg for a short period of time. The simple 
observation was aimed on the one hand to assess migrants’ proficiency in English, 
Afrikaans and isiXhosa and their aptitudes to communicate with the local populations. 
On the other hand, the simple observation of Congolese refugees was intended to look 
at the degree of integration of those migrants into the local community as far as their 
economic activities were concerned.  
 
3.5.3 Data analysis 
The analysis of data gathered depends on the type of research. Qualitative and 
quantitative data analyses have similarities and differences as shown by Neuman 
(2000: 418-419). Four similarities relate the two forms of data analysis. Firstly, 
inference guides the researcher to scrutinise the information gathered, expecting to 
reach a conclusion by reasoning and simplifying the density of the data. Secondly, the 
methods of data gathering used by researchers make the data available to a large 
number of people. Thirdly, data analysis in both forms gives prominence to the 
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comparison of all data gathered. Lastly, the researcher aims to avoid errors or false 
conclusions. Four methods of data analysis differentiate quantitative and qualitative 
forms. Firstly, “qualitative research is often inductive” (Neuman, 2000: 418), which 
allows researchers to discover specific data when the process of gathering evolves, 
while quantitative analysis is highly developed around standardised data. Secondly, 
the analysis of quantitative data is possible once the whole process of gathering is 
done, which is quite different from qualitative forms of analysis, which can be guided 
in unanticipated directions in the early data collection process. Thirdly, qualitative 
analysis can lead to the construction of new concepts by verifying the interpretation or 
the generalisation of a theory. In contrast, quantitative analysis “manipulates numbers 
that represent empirical facts in order to test an abstract hypothesis with variable 
constructs” (Neuman, 2000: 418). Fourthly, qualitative analysis is less abstract than 
statistical analysis and closer to raw data. 
 
Tech’s methods of handling qualitative data were used to transcribe both focus groups 
and interviews. Eight steps were followed that Creswell (1994: 155) describes as 
fellows:  
(a) reading through all the transcripts carefully with a purpose of getting a general 
sense of the whole and underlying meaning of the transcripts; 
(b) picking a single shortest or most interesting transcript and going through it 
once again; 
(c) making a list of topics or clusters to get similar topics; 
(d) going back to original data and abbreviating the topics as quotes and writing 
quotes next to the appropriate segments of the text; 
(e) developing the most descriptive wording for the topics and converted them 
into categories by grouping related topics; 
(f) making final decisions on abbreviations for each category and alphabetising 
existing data; 
(g) assembling the data material belonging to each category in one place and 
performing a preliminary analysis; and 
(h) recoding the existing data. 
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3.6 Limitations of the study and difficulties encountered 
Although all efforts have been made to make this study descriptively defensible, like 
many other scientific research studies it suffers from a number of weaknesses. 
 
First, the study uses statistical data from the 1996 and 2001 censuses in order to draw 
up a representative population of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town. It 
does not, however, cover the total population during the decade that the study is 
focused on (1994-2004). The study also suffers from a lack of reliable sources for 
data to give an insight into all categories considered, particularly refugees and extra-
legals. 
 
Second, the fieldwork undertaken outside South Africa is limited to Libreville in 
Gabon. The aim of conducting research outside South Africa was to gather the 
potential migrants’ perceptions on the reasons for leaving their countries of origin and 
their idea of South Africa, while still outside the country. Gabon was chosen because 
it is one of the traditional destinations of Francophone Africans on the continent, as is 
Cote d’Ivoire. Fieldwork conducted in the latter country might have given more scope 
and comparative aspects. However, this choice could be justified by the problems 
encountered during this study. 
 
Another difficulty was the time spent on organising the interviews and focus groups 
due to the lack of trust that respondents felt towards the researcher. This was more 
perceptible for the category of extra-legals, who were not keen to be interviewed. The 
snowball technique and the fact the researcher himself is a French-speaking African 
helped to break the barrier of distust. 
 
Even though these limitations and difficulties could have had an adverse effect on the 
findings of this research, it is assumed that their effects are minimal and may not 
significantly influence the descriptive analysis of this study. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to show a synthesis of theoretical background of 
international migration based on the initiation and the perpetuation of migration; with 
an overview of the evolvement of the theoretical analysis. This synthesis was mainly 
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based on the work done by Massey et al. (1993). The chapter also aimed to a provide 
a group of theories which will be used to confirm hypothesis on the departure of 
Francophone Africans from their countries of origin to their arrival in South Africa in 
general and in Cape Town in particular; as well as the conditions of perpetuating these 
movements. The chapter also describes the methodology used to conduct this study. 
The research design hypothesises the arrivals of Francophone Africans in Cape Town 
as the outcome of the implementation of restrictive measures and policies in some of 
the traditional countries of destination as well as of the rise of South Africa’s political 
and economic profile.  
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Chapter Four 
 
                          PUSH FACTORS IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA AND 
                      PULL FACTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
                    
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter is subdivided into two parts. In the first part, the reasons for the departure 
of Francophone Africans are highlighted. The reasons motivating the flows of people 
are complex and could range from economic to environmental ones. Solomon (2001: 
76) gives a revised version of the variables stated by Adepoju (2005) to explain the 
causes of migration in West Africa and adds socio-cultural factors, geographic 
proximity, precedent and global economic political economy to explain the migration 
system in the Southern African region. These variables inform the analysis in this 
chapter of the push and pull factors that influence migration from Francophone 
African countries. In its second part, the chapter focuses on the reasons why 
Francophone African migrants choose to move to South Africa. Firstly, the analysis 
pays particular attention to the place South Africa occupies on the continent. 
Secondly, this section considers South African political achievements, economic 
opportunities, educational infrastructures and the language factor as the reasons that 
migrants note as motivating their choice of South Africa as host country. Along with 
these South African pull factors, this section also reflects on social capital as one of 
the main factors in migrants’ choice of South Africa. The research method used in this 
chapter draws on a wide range of secondary resources on push and pull factors, on the 
theoretical orientation discussed in Chapter 3 as well as the empirical interview 
material gathered during the fieldwork. These three sources have guided analysis.  
 
4.2 The reasons for leaving their countries of origin 
Generally, migration is viewed as a desperate solution to the deterioration of living 
conditions, including political, economic, social and environmental conditions 
(Solomon, 2001: 76). This section, based on the theoretical models that explain the 
movements of people and the results of the fieldwork, highlights the reasons why 
Francophone Africans leave their countries of origin by the thousands. It furthermore 
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aims to describe the political, economic and demographic settings, as well as the 
social-cultural context and environmental conditions of these departures. 
 
4.2.1 Political settings 
4.2.1.1 Historical evolution of Francophone African politics 
If there is a group of countries that continues to feel the pressures of the legacy of 
colonisation, it is the Francophone African countries. According to Meredith (2005: 
493), “the Francophone states in Africa constituted the only region in the world where 
France retained enough influence to support its claims to medium-power status.” The 
post-colonial era in Francophone Africa was symbolically a continuum of the colonial 
state. All Francophone African countries earned their independence peacefully and 
with the former ruler’s blessing, with the exception of Algeria, which became 
independent after eight dramatic years of civil war, and to a lesser extent Guinea, 
which refused to be part of the Communauté (a new political and administrative 
colonial organisation proposed by France to its colonies in 1958).  
 
Chazan et al. (1999: 42) argue that the functional notion of government could not 
separate decision-making from the implementation of those decisions. These failings 
in governing capacities are rooted in the years preceding and following independence. 
African societies were unable to muster a strong opposition to France’s intention to 
choose the leaders of the newly independent countries. One could argue that at 
independence, African countries lacked a well-educated political elite due to the 
colonial academic system. Many of the new African leaders at independence were 
part of the French colonial political and administrative organisation during the 
colonial era. The most prestigious were the Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor and 
the Ivorian Félix Houphouet-Boigny who were ministers in the French government 
before the independence of most Francophone African countries in 1960 (Meredith, 
2005: 58). Meredith (2005: 70) also argues that the newly independent states survived 
due to French assistance, including financial and technical support, presidential aides, 
military advisers and government servants. 
 
In return, France jealously preserved its control and influence over its former colonies 
from potential Western and Communist rivals in the context of the Cold War. 
Francophone Africa constituted France’s domaine reservé (natural preserve) or chasse 
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gardée (private hunting ground) (Schraeder, 2000: 321). Within that sphere of 
influence, France set up a core of countries, called le pré-carré according to their 
economic importance and the charisma of their leaders to police its policy, guided by 
economic interests on the continent. The leaders of these countries and their 
successors were guaranteed long term-term reigns, regardless of their political 
achievements and their democratic records as long as they looked after France’s 
interests. One illustration of France’s paternalism in regard to its former colonies is 
the former Metropolis’s military intervention in Gabon to restore to power President 
Leon M’Ba, victim of a coup d’état in 1964 (Meredith, 2005: 177). 
 
France’s paternalism worsened the political situation in Francophone Africa due to 
two factors: the setting up of autocratic regimes and the involvement of the military in 
the political scene. The support of autocratic regimes was symbolised by the adoption 
of a single-party political system in most Francophone African countries. In the late 
1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, a single-party system spread over the 
continent, for example (Chazan et al., 1999: 503): National Liberation Front (FLN) in 
Algeria; Cameroonian People’s Democratic Union (RDPC) in Cameroon; Congolese 
Workers Party (PCT) in Congo; Popular Movement of Revolution (MPR) in Zaire; 
Democratic Party of Cote d’Ivoire-African Democratic Union (PDCI-RDA) in Cote 
d’Ivoire or Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) in Gabon. Schraeder (2000: 269-270) 
points to the reasons for the creation of a single-party system in Africa: a single party 
was seen as the representation of African political organisation during the pre-
colonisation era. Within it, the African traditional consensus building allowed each 
individual to express his/her opinion. The creation of a single-party system was 
justified by the need for an “enlightened elite” as the driving force to lead African 
societies towards a communist development. Furthermore, a single-party system was 
viewed as the ideal solution to end ethnic conflicts that emerged on the continent soon 
after independence. For the Gabonese president, Omar Bongo, the multi-party system 
weakened national unity and countries became vulnerable to external covetousness 
(Rossantaga-Rignault, 200: 124).  
 
The African political scene was also characterised by the seizure of power by “leaders 
in khaki”. The murder of the first Togolese president, Sylvanus Olympio, by a fringe 
of the army led by Etienne Eyadema (who later became known as General 
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Gnassingbé Eyadema) in 1963 launched an endless outbreak of both successful and 
unsuccessful coup d’états in Francophone Africa. Schraeder (2000: 246) shows that 
by 1999 Djibouti was the sole Francophone African country which had not 
experienced an attempt of seizure or a full seizure of power by the army. Some 
countries such as Benin and Burkina Faso had a record of six successful armed 
challenges of power before the democratic changes at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
assumption of power by “men in khaki” was made possible by the incapacity of 
politicians to handle ethnic crises that emerged soon after independence. The army’s 
break into the political arena was accompanied by the promise to return power to 
civilians once the crises were solved. However, in most cases, soldiers did not keep 
their promises, as Mobutu did in the then Congo-Leopoldville in 1965 (Meredith, 
2005: 115). Later, coup-d’états were justified as the solution to overthrow despotic 
regimes. One could argue that it was likely to be considered that change could not 
only be brought by guns. The army has always represented a permanent threat to 
civilian leaders because “military intervention is not a habit that men with guns will 
find easy to abandon” (Solomon, 2001: 101). Once in power, most of the leaders 
consolidated their regimes under a single-party system like in Congo, Zaire, Mali and 
Burkina-Faso.  
 
The evolution of political regimes under a single party led by a civilian or a soldier 
failed to promote diversification of points of view. When elections were organised, it 
was mainly to confirm the incumbent leader and his ruling party in power. 
Francophone African political conservatism was characterised by long reigns of 
presidents like Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire, Eyadema in Togo, Bongo in 
Gabon and Mobutu in Zaire, who were pillars of the French pré-carré (backyard) on 
the continent. Opposition parties were illegal, except in Senegal and in Mauritius. 
 
The single-party system reached its nadir at the end of 1980s, considered as the “lost 
decade” (Meredith, 2005: ), when many Africans preferred to exile in order to escape 
death or jail, as they dared to express opinions than opposed the official discourse of 
the dictatorial regimes in power. Gordon10, (quoted by Schraeder, 2000: 224) argues 
that one of the causes of emigration in Africa from the 1970s was political 
                                                 
10
 Gordon, A. 1998. “The New Diaspora: African Immigration to the United States”. Journal of Third 
World Studies 15, n 1: 79-103. 
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persecution. Emigration was synonymous with an “exit option”, by which Gordon 
(2000: 224) meant “the difference between freedom and prison and even life and 
death”. 
 
The end of Cold War brought hope for democratic reforms in Francophone Africa. 
Changes in Eastern Europe had a significant effect on public opinion and were 
followed by strikes in most Francophone African countries asking for political 
reforms. These political reforms were put into effect following the famous discourse 
of La Baule by French President François Mitterrand in June 1990. During the annual 
Franco-African summit, the French president launched the famous La Doctrine de La 
Baule (The Baule Doctrine) (Schraeder, 2000: 328) when he said:  
 
French eagerness to offer development aid is bound to cool off in the case of 
authoritarian regimes which fail to heed the need for democratisation while 
regimes prepared to embark on the courageous path of democracy will 
continue to have our enthusiastic support (Meredith, 2005: 387). 
 
Mitterrand warned African leaders that France’s aid would be directed to those who 
were engaged in political reforms towards the implementation real democracy. 
Political changes and democratic reforms subsequently did occur on the continent. In 
Francophone Africa, the path of democracy started with the organisation of national 
conferences where national business, professional, religious, labour, and particularly 
political representatives gathered to draw up new mechanisms for political life. The 
national conferences were organised following the example of the Etats-Généraux in 
France during the Ancien Regime.11 The single-party system in Francophone Africa 
was perceived as the French absolute monarchy, responsible for the stagnation of the 
society. Like the French Etats-Généraux, participants viewed the national conferences 
in Francophone Africa as a way to a new beginning. 
 
Schraeder (2000: 275) outlines the major pillars of these meetings in Francophone 
Africa. The meetings were held in the capital of each country, the place that 
                                                 
11
 During the Ancient Regime in France, the Etats Généraux were political meetings during which new 
ideas were proposed to the king to rule. These meetings were not held to question the king’s ruling or 
reign. On the contrary, at the end of the meeting, the king was granted a new legitimacy (Rossantaga-
Rignault, 2000: 192). 
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symbolised the political and administrative power of the country. The meetings were 
granted the feature of sovereignty, in the sense that they were independent from 
external influence. In some cases like in Zaire, the adjective “sovereign” was added to 
the title of the meeting, which became the sovereign national conference. At the end 
of these meetings, a government was appointed and mandated to implement the 
decisions taken. The national conferences appeared to be legislative bodies in charge 
of elaborating a new constitution. In Gabon, for instance, five principal resolutions 
concluded the meeting: (1) the full and immediate adoption of multiparty-system, (2) 
the formation of a transitional government, (3) the organisation of parliamentary 
elections, (4) the adoption of a Charter of freedom and of a financial, economic and 
social programme and (5) the administrative and political re-organisation of the state. 
Finally, a committee was set up to follow the conclusions of the national conference 
(Rossantaga-Rignault, 2000: 191). 
 
From 19 to 28 February 1990, Benin organised the first national conference in 
Francophone Africa. At the beginning of the conference, delegates proclaimed the 
meeting sovereign and called for the creation of transitional institutions. Civil society 
was one of the major beneficiaries of the meeting, as it was incorporated within 
political, economic and social structures for the first time in the history of the country 
(Joseph, 1999: 23). The success of the Benin meeting, which was concluded by the 
adoption of democratic reforms known as renouveau démocratique (democratic 
revival), stimulated the other Francophone African countries. Overall, the national 
conferences in Francophone Africa played a double role as argued by Rossantaga-
Rignault (2000: 193). On the one hand, they freed the populations from the fear 
imposed during dictatorial reign. On the other hand, the national conferences were 
used as a platform for the participants to negotiate their roles and places in the new 
political structures. In the latter case, the Benin example was also used by other 
regimes to consolidate power in a multipartite system. In Zaire, for instance, the 
national conference lasted more than two years because President Mobutu found it 
difficult to accept the recommendations of the meeting, which was supposed to be 
sovereign. A political rift appeared between him and the prime minister elected by the 
sovereign national conference. Etienne Tshisekedi was also Mobutu’s fierce 
opponent. A Zairian politician described Mobutu’s attitude towards political change 
as follows (Meredith, 2005: 392): 
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He loves power … He can’t see himself sharing the power with somebody that 
he doesn’t nominate. His conception hasn’t changed since democracy arrived. 
Mobutu explains himself very easily: one chief governs … He doesn’t consult. 
But people like him never believe that they take wrong decisions. Mobutu is a 
man who is very influenced but he has his opinions. The last word is always 
his. 
 
It is true that the national conference was a turning point in the implementation of 
democracy in Francophone Africa. Since then, tremendous achievements have been 
witnessed, illustrated by alternance (changeover) of leaders and parties in some 
countries, with the more successful cases including Benin, Madagascar and Mali.  
 
However, in most of the Francophone African countries, democracy has consolidated 
dictatorial regimes. Unfair elections have replaced coup-d’états and other means used 
during the one-party system to stay in power. Nowadays, it appears that the candidate 
in power in Francophone Africa cannot lose elections, except in a few countries, such 
as Benin and Mali. More than a decade after democracy was established in 
Francophone Africa, many leaders and parties who ruled during the one-party system 
are still in power, including Blaise Campaoré in Burkina Faso since 1987, Paul Biya 
in Cameroon since 1982, Omar Bongo in Gabon since 1967, Lansana Conté in Guinea 
since 1984 and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia since 1984. Denis Sassou-Nguesso 
in Congo has returned to power, following a civil war. Others died while they were 
still in charge, such as Félix Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 in Côte d’Ivoire after thirty-
three years in power and the Togolese Gnassingbé Eyadema who led his country from 
1967 to his death in 2005.  
 
This leads to the lack of organisation of free and fair elections on a regular basis. 
When elections are held in most Francophone African countries, most of the parties 
and candidates do not have equal access to media, for instance. It is common in 
Francophone Africa that the losers accuse the winners (mostly the party in power) of 
cheating. The lack of free and fair elections also results in legislative assemblies 
where the ruling parties have an overwhelming majority. The opposition is sometimes 
represented by satellite parties controlled by the ruling party. Another feature of the 
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lack of free and fair elections is the failure to distinguish the ruling party from the 
state. It is not a surprise that the ruling party controls the institutions of the state, such 
as the judiciary, military and administrative institutions. This means that the ruling 
party controls its own actions, as was the case during the one-party system era. 
 
4.2.1.2 Some examples of armed conflicts in Francophone Africa 
The quest for political power has also resulted in wars in Francophone Africa. Armed 
conflicts are viewed as one of the main causes of the displacement of many Africans. 
Africa as a whole is considered a home for armed conflicts (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; 
Joseph, 1999; Nugent, 2004; Schraeder, 2000). Even more than conflicts between 
states, civil wars have devastated the continent. Thirty-five civil wars were registered 
in Africa from 1960 to 2000, although some of those conflicts took place in the same 
countries, over time with some examples being the Biafra war in Nigeria, which killed 
approximately one million people, and the longest civil war on the continent in Sudan 
with its one million and half victims (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004: 141). 
 
In general, civil wars on the continent are viewed as the last solution in the process of 
contested sovereignty when a group of people assert their authority over a part of the 
territory and challenge the central authority (Schraeder, 2000: 280). Francophone 
countries have also witnessed civil wars since their independence, for example in 
Chad, Congo, Senegal, Algeria, Central African Republic and Cote d’Ivoire. 
However, in the region of the Great Lakes, the most notorious conflicts in Burundi, 
Rwanda and DRC have their roots back in the 1950s before escalating beyond 
imagination in the late 1990s. The conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are the 
ones detailed in this study because of the number of victims and migrants that they 
caused. 
 
4.2.1.2.1 Civil war in Burundi 
Conflicts in both Burundi and Rwanda have many similarities because of historical 
and social parallels between the two countries. Although Nugent (2004: 456) suggests 
“the passage of the events in Burundi … had a dynamic of their own,” the reality is 
that the two countries have so many similarities that the course of events cannot be 
separated. Both conflicts have their roots in the time before the independence of the 
two countries in 1962. The Ruanda-Urundi colony was first under the rule of 
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Germany before Belgium was put in charge to administer the colony by the League of 
Nations, following the defeat of Germany in the First World War and the conclusion 
of the Versailles Treaty. After the Second World War, Ruanda-Urundi acquired the 
status of United Nations Trust territory under the Belgian administrative authority. 
The societies of the two entities were and still are dominated by two major ethnic 
groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, which the colonial rulers, particularly the Belgians, 
had divided into two opposed ethnic and racial groups. To divide and rule, Belgians 
spread the so-called “Hamitic hypothesis” which states that the Tutsis were 
descendents of the Hamites and were superior to the Hutus (Nugent, 2004: 51). 
During the colonial period, Belgians gave the minority Tutsis access to education and 
chieftaincy. Colonisation effectively separated ethnic groups with the same language, 
the same culture and a common history forever. However, as shown by Nugent (2004: 
113), there were some exceptions in Urundi because some Hutus were still able to 
infiltrate the chieftaincy hierarchy. Besides, two lineages, the Bezi and the Batare, 
were competing for the control of the chieftaincy.  
 
The societies were further divided with the creation of political parties, which took the 
competition for power between the ethnic groups or lineages to another level. In 
Urundi, the Bezi lineage was linked with the nationalist Parti de l’Union et le Progrès 
National (Union and Progress National Party, UPRONA), while the Batare lineage 
was associated with the Parti Démocratique Chrétien (Christian Democratic Party, 
PDC). The UPRONA won the legislatives in 1961, but its leader, Prince Rwagasore, 
was assassinated after the victory. From that point, the country has witnessed reprisal 
and counter reprisal likely to be considered as boxing games, in which both Hutus and 
Tutsis have retaliated in massacres. The first series of killings in the post-
independence era occurred in 1965 when a Hutu prime minister was killed. The Hutu 
revolt was answered by army repression, which was mainly dominated by Tutsis. The 
country entered into further turmoil during the 1960s and 1970s, especially in 1972, 
following a Hutu rebellion attack in the Tutsi region. In a space of three months, 
about 200 000 Hutus were killed in a reprisal and many more people, mostly Hutus 
were forced to leave the country (Meredith, 2005: 489). The Tutsi domination was 
consolidated by two consecutive military regimes of Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza 
and Major Pierre Buyoya. In 1993, the assassination of the elected president, 
Melchior Ndadaye, by the army plunged the country into a maelstrom of violence 
 112 
which resulted in the killing of Tutsis and the reprisal of the army against the Hutu 
population. Sixty per cent of the 50 000 to 100 000 people killed were Tutsis, while 
some 500 000 refugees fled the country (Nugent, 2004: 458). In April 1994, the death 
of President Cyprien Ntaryamira was also a source of more ethnic conflicts, which 
were also influenced by the situation in neighbouring Rwanda.  
 
4.2.1.2.2 Genocide in Rwanda 
By sharing the same ethnic puzzle and having been ruled by the same colonial 
powers, Rwanda evolution seems similar to Burundi’s. However, in Rwanda a major 
change introduced by the colonial power brought significant upheavals in the 
Rwandese society. The Belgians decided to redistribute cattle between the two ethnic 
communities, and as a result, a new social hierarchy determined by the possession of 
cattle appeared. Some Hutus took advantage of the situation and found themselves 
within a new social stratum. Later the introduction of political parties and subsequent 
elections as a mode of designation allowed the Hutus to overpower the Tutsis because 
of their numbers. Moreover, the last Tutsi King, Kigeri V, was overthrown in 
November 1959. A Tutsi attempt to kill Grégoire Kayibanda, the leader of 
Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (Republican Democratic Movement, MDR), 
the largest Hutu party, was followed by extraordinary massacres, which forced some 
22 000 Tutsis to look for refuge elsewhere (Nugent, 2004:55). After independence in 
1962, the Hutus consolidated their domination in the Rwandese political arena. 
Approximately 130 000 Tutsis had found refuge in Congo, Tanzania, Burundi and 
Uganda (Meredith, 2005: 487). Under Grégoire Kayibanda, the first president, a 
system of quotas was established for school and university places and in civil 
services; where the Tutsis were allocated a 9% take, the percentage supposed 
representing their proportion of the population (Meredith, 2005: 489). 
 
According to Meredith (2005: 490), at the beginning of the 1990s, an economic crisis 
hit the country mainly due to drought, resulting in shortages in food production and a 
drop in coffee prices which had an impact on the farmers’ incomes. Moreover, the 
government’s budget decreased by 40% in 1989; at the same time the GDP of the 
country fell by 5.7%. The economic situation created a climate for new ethnic 
conflicts. The Kigali regime was contested through a civil war by the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front (RPF), a group dominated by Tutsis. Some of them were living in exile 
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since the events of 1959. The situation was worsened by the shooting down of the 
airplane carrying both the Rwandese president, Juvénal Habyarimana, and his 
counterpart from Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, on 6 April 1994. As if it was a signal, 
the shooting down of the plane was viewed as a pretext for killing Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus. From 6 April to July 1994, more than 937 000 people were killed in 
what has been considered the cruelest genocide the African continent had ever 
witnessed. Moreover, the genocide in Rwanda has been viewed as “slaughter on a 
scale not witnessed since the Nazi extermination programme against the Jews” 
(Meredith, 2005: 487). The seizure of power by the RPF stopped the genocide. 
However, the aftermath was terrible.  
 
In the space of 100 days some 800 000 people had been slaughtered … More 
people had been killed more quickly than in any other mass killing in recorded 
history. … The entire country had been laid to waste. Nearly two millions 
people inside the country were refugees, uprooted from their homes. 
According to the World Bank, the genocide had left Rwanda the poorest 
country on earth (Meredith, 2005: 523). 
 
The genocide forced some 1.7 million people to find refuge outside the country, with 
one million in ex-Zaire, 550 0000 in Tanzania, 160 000 in Burundi and 5 000 in 
Uganda, and approximately 1.2 million internal refugees (Appleyard, 1998: 193).  
 
4.2.1.2.3 The Congolese conflicts 
Turmoil has always accompanied the evolution of the DRC since the Belgian king 
appropriated the territory in the nineteenth century. Under the tutelage of King 
Leopold II, the Congo was one of the territories where colonial abuses reached a 
climax. However, colonisation made a vast territory approximately 80 times bigger 
than Belgium into a single geographical, administrative and political entity. The 
complexity of the Congo is first and foremost its geographical features. Nugent (2004: 
85) points out that “the Western Congo faced towards the coastal port of Matadi and 
Leopoldville, on the lower reaches of the Congo River. The minerally rich regions of 
Kasai and Katanga were linked by rail to Zambia and South Africa.” The colonial 
enterprise of grouping into one territory different communities failed nearly as soon as 
independence was won. The country faced the temptation of the richest provinces of 
 114 
Katanga and Shaba to secede, the mutiny of the army and the struggle of politicians to 
implement national unity (Laremont, 2005: 140). The unity of Congo was also shaken 
when another uprising broke out in the Kwilu District under the leadership of Pierre 
Mulele and contested the legitimacy of the central government in 1963. The next 
rebellion broke out when the FLNC (Front pour la Libération du Congo) invaded the 
province of Shaba twice, in March 1977 and a year later. The troops of the FLNC 
were mainly made up of former rebels behind the secession of the province of 
Katanga more than a decade earlier. Furthermore, the country was torn by two 
successive and identical civil wars, which have created more than two million victims 
and the displacement of more people both internally and beyond the Congolese 
borders.  
 
For more than three decades, these civil wars and other attempts at rebellion were 
quelled by the dictatorial reign of Mobutu, who was backed by Western powers. 
However, ethnic resistance and regional minorities had never been shut down totally, 
especially in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the country where the movements 
were claiming to represent the inheritance of Patrice Lumumba, the country’s first 
prime minister, assassinated on Mobutu’s instructions in 1963.  
 
When millions of Hutu refugees escaped from the Tutsi retaliation after the Rwandese 
genocide in 1994, Interahamwe militia groups also crossed the Zairian border. They 
were suspected of taking part in the genocide. Once in the refugee camps in Zaire, 
they continuously attacked the Zairian Tutsis, called Banyamulenge. Many of those 
groups of Banyamulenge were descendents of the Rwandese and Burundian Tutsis 
who found refuge in Zaire after the early pogroms in both Rwanda and Burundi 
before and after their independence. Mobutu was accused of supporting the 
Interahamwe because he did not attempt to prevent the attacks and he did not crack 
down on the establishment of a small Hutu state in refugee camps where the former 
soldiers of the Rwandan army set up their own administration and organised the 
recruitment and training programmes (Meredith, 2005: 527).  
 
The Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan governments used security concerns at their 
respective borders to justify their support of rebel movements to topple the Mobutu 
regime, which led to what many like Weiss and Carayannis call the First Congo War 
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(Laremont, 2005: 147). The First Congo War started in November 1996, following 
the order given by the vice-governor of the province of the south-Kivu to all the 
Banyamulenge to leave Zaire on penalty of death (Meredith, 2005: 531). Many of the 
Banyamulenge joined various small rebel groups. Later all those groups formed the 
Alliance des Forces de Liberation du Congo (AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. 
From the eastern region of the country the rebels without interruption marched 
towards the capital Kinshasa, sometimes without fighting. The First Congo War 
ended in May 1997 when the AFDL entered into Kinshasa, the capital of the country, 
and its leader proclaimed himself the new president.  
 
Soon after his seizure of power, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was suspected of ruling the 
country in the same way his predecessor had done, and among the evils he was 
criticised for were corruption and the lack of democratic reforms. Some of his allies, 
mostly those from the eastern part of the country, abandoned him. “In the short fifteen 
months between the end of the First Congo War and the start of the second, Kabila 
managed to antagonize the UN, Western donors, his domestic opposition, and his 
foreign sponsors” (Laremont, 2005: 150). Furthermore, Kabila started accusing his 
former Rwandese and Ugandan allies of exploiting for their own interests the 
immense Congolese mineral resources.  
 
The Second Congo War started in August 1998 and ended in 2003 with the setting up 
of a transitional government, although sporadic tensions continued. On 2 august 1998, 
some of the best units of the Congolese army mutinied and launched a rebellion from 
the eastern part of the country, with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. A 
heterogonous political wing of the rebellion was grouped under the RCD 
(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, Congolese Rally for Democracy). 
However, Kabila received support from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and 
Sudan. Some of these countries intervened because of security at their own borders, 
for instance Angola, but most of them were attracted by Congolese mineral resources, 
expecting the Congolese government’s reward. 
 
The Congolese conflicts were also singular because of their consequences. 
Approximately three million people lost their lives in both the First and the Second 
Congolese Wars. Many victims died from disease or starvation. Millions of others 
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were forced to look for refuge elsewhere. The Congolese conflicts have also been 
characterised by the vast number of children used as soldiers. Its configuration also 
underpins the continued abuse of civil populations by militia groups despite cease-
fires between their patrons. Thousands of civilians have been raped, left homeless, 
killed or have suffered from any number of crimes. The spread of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic by displaced persons and soldiers in particular throughout the entire Great 
Lakes region and even beyond is another feature of the Congolese conflict.  
 
4.2.1.3 The collapse of the Francophone African state 
The conditions that drive Francophone Africans from their countries create the feeling 
that the state is incapable of designing and implementing real policies for 
development. The populations thus lose confidence in the state as the driving force 
behind any form of development. The crisis of the African state is illustrated by a 
myriad of challenges, including the weakness of the economy, the lack of genuine 
democratic reforms and the pressure from international financial and economic 
organisations, as well as from the Western governments (Huxtable & Villalon, 1988: 
279).  
 
Huxtable & Villalon (1988: 11-13) broadly define the postcolonial African state as 
follows: Firstly, the African state is defined as a client state particularly in the context 
of the Cold War, which ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning 
of the 1990s. During the Cold War period, the African client state was a major 
beneficiary of the superpowers’ military rivalry, which allowed the African states to 
conduct to major armed conflicts in the 1990s in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC, for 
instance.  
 
The second type of postcolonial African state is the personalised state, based on the 
centralisation and the paternalism of the head of the state. In the personalised state, 
the concept of state itself is closely tied to one individual. Consequently, a 
generational debate limits the state’s performances, with permanent pressures asking 
for the modernisation of both the state and the party in the case of a one-party regime. 
Although the phenomenon was not only encountered in Africa, the authors believe 
that it was widely implemented throughout the continent, with some notorious 
examples such as the Zaire of Mobutu Sese Seko, the Togo of Gnassingbe Eyadema, 
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the Cote d’Ivoire of Felix Houphouet-Boigny and the Gabon of Omar Bongo. Lancine 
Sylla (Huxtable & Villalon, 1988: 12) describes the succession of the charismatic 
leader as the “Gordian knot of African politics.”  
 
Thirdly, the postcolonial African state as the consequence of the second feature was 
labelled as both an overdeveloped and a centralised state. One of the characteristics of 
the personalised state was to gain political support from as many crucial social sectors 
as possible. The public sector of the African state following independence was the 
major employer in most of the countries. The number of employees in the public 
sector increased dramatically and unnecessarily, with greater centralisation of power 
and almost no local government responsibility, resources or power. The highly 
inefficient state therefore becomes the primary consumer of resources to the detriment 
of economic development. Overcrowded administrations were among the focal points 
targeted by the SAPs imposed by the IMF on the African states.  
 
Fourthly, the postcolonial African state was regarded as a prebendal or rentier state. 
Many leaders in Africa, in order to consolidate their power, have not hesitated to 
allocate specific groups of individuals some material privileges, with a direct access 
to the state. This has created clientelist networks within which “the very exercise of 
state power inhibits economic growth, and thus the state eventually undercuts the very 
basis of its own survival” (Huxtable & Villalon, 1988: 13). 
 
Lastly, some postcolonial African states have been considered extractive states. The 
main function of the state has been to extract mineral resources and other forms of 
wealth for the profit of those in power, instead of building developmental capacity for 
the benefit of the state and the population. Moreover, the fluctuations of the mineral 
and agricultural products on the international market have hastened the disintegration 
of the state. 
 
Chabal and Daloz (1999: 5) focus on the Weberian tradition in sociology in their 
interpretation of the state. They summarise the analysis by pointing out that the 
modern state is the consequence of the process of emancipation from society to an 
autonomous entity with genuine political institutions. An efficient state will 
successfully implement and run a civil service unimpeded by the dynamics of social 
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pressures. The debate on the postcolonial African states has been on the sustained 
legacy of colonisation. Following independence, the African state was the 
transplantation of the colonial state. Chabal and Daloz add neglect of culture as one of 
the failures of the African state. Indeed, the postcolonial Francophone African state 
inherited aspects of the colonial state, such as centralization, and it has effectively 
been put in place as a rigid institution, which has represented a major hurdle for 
development. 
 
The Francophone African state has been weak and has failed or collapsed over time 
because they have been incapable of fulfilling their required functions. As a political 
institution, a state has three main functions, as pointed out by Zartman (1995: 5):  
 
(1) The state as the sovereign authority, the accepted source of identity and the 
arena of politics; (2) the state as an institution - and therefore a tangible 
organization of decision making and an intangible symbol of identity; and (3) 
the state as the security guarantor for a populated territory. 
 
Apart from these traditional functions, the state also supplies other services including 
medical and health care, education and infrastructure such as roads and railways, and 
a banking and fiscal system. The state can also ensure the promotion of civil society 
and the sharing of environmental benefits. 
 
When a state is unable to perform these functions, it passes through different levels of 
disintegration: weakness, failure and collapse. Rotberg (2004) describes these levels 
as follows:  
 
Weak states cannot properly deliver political goods due to open ethnic or religious 
conflicts. States are ruled by despots, therefore law is weakly applied, corruption 
increases and the GDP (gross domestic product) declines. Handler (1990: 52-53) 
presents weak states according to criteria ranging from the size of the population to 
the place of a country on the international system. According to him, the small size of 
the population and the area of a country are the first two criterions of a weak state. As 
far as economy is concerned, weak states are characterised by a small GNP in 
absolute terms, with a little or no heavy industry. Economically, a high degree of 
 119 
specialisation of products, particularly the exportation of mineral and agricultural 
resources, small domestic markets and a high dependence on foreign capital are the 
other features of weak states. Weak states have limited military powers to defend 
themselves against external threats, with a very high or a total dependence on 
weapons acquisition on the international market. On the international system, weak 
states have little or no influence at all on the balance of power and they have a strong 
support for international law and norms and of international organisations, from 
which they expect much support and aid. The perpetuation of the disintegration of 
weak states results in failed states.  
 
According to Rotberg (2004), in failed states the central authority is unable to control 
national borders and is incapable of fulfilling required functions. Mostly, government 
troops battle against warlords. Furthermore, the economic infrastructures, health care 
and academic systems often deteriorate. The failed system is controlled by a small 
group surrounding the ruler, from whom that oligarchy derives advantage. Life for the 
majority of the population becomes difficult because of inflation, corruption or food 
shortage.  
 
Collapsed states are the bottom line of disintegration. Political, economic, social or 
academic indicators are non-existent. 
 
However, as far as Francophone African states are concerned, their evolution since 
independence has been characterised by the transition from weak states inherited from 
colonisation to failed and then collapsed states. The DRC is the most salient example 
of the passage from a weak to a collapsed state in Francophone Africa. As described 
by Castells (2000: 99), the DRC (then Zaire until 1997) demonstrated a typical 
personal appropriation of the state by the late President Mobutu. As a consequence of 
the collapse of the state, according to Castells (2000: 99) “Zaire became … the 
epitome of predatory politics, as well as of human catastrophes”.  
 
Using the political and socioeconomic aspects described above, Table 6 classifies 
Francophone African states from their independence up to 2004. 
 
 
 120 
Table 6: Classification of Francophone African states 
Weak states Failed states Collapsed states 
Benin 
Burkina-Faso 
Cameroon 
Djibouti 
Gabon 
Guinea 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Morocco 
Mauritius 
Senegal 
The Seychelles 
Togo 
Tunisia 
CAR 
Chad 
Congo 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Mauritania 
Niger 
 
Burundi 
Comoros 
The DRC 
Rwanda 
Source: Author 
 
The wellbeing of a Francophone African state is shown by its economic potential and 
its democratic achievements. The disintegration of states in Francophone Africa 
includes the deterioration of socio-economic conditions, the collapse of the academic 
and health systems, and the spread of poverty. Crossing national boundaries has 
become the last resort to escape the collapse and to look for better living conditions, 
especially when there is no guarantee that a country would be able to perform better 
in the near future and no guarantee that the state would not fail or collapse. 
 
4.2.2 Economics conditions 
Economic disintegration has been considered by Castels and Miller (1998), Solomon 
(2001), Adepoju (2004) and Meredith (2005) as one of the major causes of migration 
in Africa. This assertion has been supported by theoretical models such as 
neoclassical economics, new economics of migration, segmented labour-market 
theory and world system theory which view migration as a consequence of economic 
motives. Africa in its entirety has entered the twenty-first century as the poorest 
continent. The economy of many countries is still based on the exportation of raw 
materials and agricultural products because the industrialisation of those products on 
the continent has not occurred. Therefore, Africa has missed out on becoming an 
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industrialised society and it seems that the continent is also likely to miss out on the 
information revolution.  
 
Similar to the political conditions, the economic situation of Francophone African 
countries can partly be explained by colonisation. The “economie de traite” (trade 
economy) was one of the pillars of the colonial enterprise (Hugon, 2004: 19). Under 
the trade economy, colonies were viewed as providers of both mineral resources and 
agricultural products to the Metropolis, on the one hand, and one the other hand the 
same colonies were also seen as markets for French manufactured products. The trade 
economy was sustained by “the monopoly of the French flag, the polarisation of the 
flows between colonies and France, the protection of colonial markets from other 
colonial powers and overpriced imports and exports” (Hugon, 2004: 19). After the 
independence of Francophone African countries, these economic relations between 
the Metropolis and its former colonies were not ruled out. Instead, the influence of 
France kept on growing. As a matter of fact, pointed out by Hugon (2004: 22), “in 
1970 70% of the cumulated social capital of processing industries belonged to 
foreigners.”  
 
Characteristics of the economy in Francophone Africa are also the inheritance of both 
the political and economic doctrines adopted by this group of countries in the years 
following their independence. As pointed out by Nugent (2004: 140), most 
Francophone African countries chose to embrace capitalism due to the influence of 
the former colonial ruler, France. However, a few countries adopted socialism, 
including Guinea, Mali, Benin and Congo. The debate around the adoption of either 
capitalism or socialism in Western Africa in particular was illustrated by the choices 
of Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, two of the economic powers at the eve of independence. 
As a response to the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah, who advised French colonies 
to cut themselves free from the Metropolis in order to develop, the Ivorian leader 
Félix Houphouet-Boigny replied (Nugent, 2004: 167): 
 
A wager has been made between two territories, one having chosen 
independence, the other preferring the difficult road to the construction, with 
the Metropolis, of a community of men in equal rights and duties. Let us each 
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undertake his experiment, in absolute respect of the experiment of his 
neighbour, and in ten years we shall compare the results. 
 
However, during the single-party regime, Francophone African leaders adopted an 
ambiguous position, in which on the one hand they were convincing their supporters 
of the necessity off cutting ties with imperialism, which was seen as the driving force 
of colonisation, yet on the other hand, the same leaders kept economic relationships 
with the Western countries. Private companies, particularly from France, were the 
main actors in the private sectors in Francophone Africa (Nugent, 2004: 140).  
 
The nature of Francophone African economy has been the continuation of the idea of 
French colonialism in Africa. Of all its colonies on the continent, France only 
considered Algeria as a colony of settlement. The others were viewed as colonies of 
exploitation. The main purpose was to take and send to France all kinds of resources, 
including mineral resources, cash crops and human resources, such as soldiers and 
workers. After their independence, Francophone African countries did not break that 
trend, as industrial centres were not developed to transform those resources on the 
continent. For many scholars (Hugon, 2004; Meredith, 2005) the failure of mastering 
industrial technologies has a variety of causes, including over-investment, weak 
external competitiveness, small markets, bureaucratic hurdles, political risk and 
import-substitution industries. 
 
However, despite the differentiation in the choice of political and economic doctrine, 
African leaders staked the fate of their countries’ economies on the selling of mineral 
resources and cash crops on the international market where prices are regulated 
largely by the Western buyers. Francophone African countries have specialised as 
producers and exporters of mineral resources and cash crops. In the first category, 
Algeria, Gabon and Congo are among the main exporters of oil and natural gas, while 
the DRC, for instance, is well known for mineral resources such as uranium, cobalt, 
manganese and copper. As far as the agricultural producers are concerned, Cote 
d’Ivoire has based its economy on the production and the exportation of cocoa and 
coffee, Senegal produces and exports peanuts, while other Sahalian countries such as 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad have opted for cotton. Finally, the countries of 
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the rain forests of the Congo basin (Cameroon, Gabon, Congo and the DRC) and Cote 
d’ Ivoire also export timber.  
 
The first signs of a slowdown of national economies appeared when non-producers 
where hit by the first oil crisis at the beginning of the 1970s. According to Meredith 
(2005: 276-277), oil prices went from $3 in 1973 to $12 in 1974. Later on, the price 
for an oil barrel doubled from $19 in 1979 to $39 in 1981. As a result in, the non-
producer countries, some economic sectors such as agriculture and industry were hit 
by higher oil costs. Apart from the oil crisis, the African economy entered into a new 
chapter when the prices of commodities started to fall. Schraeder (2000: 228) points 
out that the economic turning point for the DRC (then Zaire) was linked to the decline 
of the price of copper on the international market. In fact, the decline of 62% of the 
price of copper (from $1.40 a pound to $0. 5 a pound in 1974) caused a shortage of 
$600 million for the government in 1975. The decline of the price of commodities on 
the international market also had a huge impact on the agricultural sector. The 
collapse of the agricultural sector was mainly the consequence of the lack of efficient 
investment, the low prices for products and inadequate marketing systems. The 
agricultural sector became unattractive and thousands of peasants migrated to cities to 
look for a better life. Food production deficits were covered by food imports by some 
relatively wealthy countries, while others opted for food aid.  
 
The collapse of Francophone African economies at the beginning of the 1980s could 
be interpreted as the result of bad choices made by the leaders throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s. Unable to face financial challenges, Francophone African states, like 
others on the continent, called for Western countries and international donors to 
intervene. “Senegal in 1979 became the first African state to obtain a structural 
adjustment loan from the World Bank” (Meredith, 2005: 369). The solution was built 
according to the metaphor used by Nugent (2004: 328): “African states were sick 
because they had drunk from the same contaminated source.” The structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) were considered by economic experts from the 
developed world to be the ideal solution to alleviate economic paralysis in Africa. 
Four major conditions are seen as the main pillars of the SAPs in Africa (Schraeder, 
336-337).  
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(1) The termination of food subsidies that kept food prices artificially low, 
effectively discouraging farmers from planting food crops; (2) the devaluation 
of national currencies to stimulate exports and the domestic production of 
manufactured products; (3) the trimming of government bureaucracies; and (4) 
the privatisation of parastatals (state-owned corporations). 
 
The implementation of the SAPs has become the sine qua non condition for African 
countries to receive aid from international institutions. The seal of approval of the 
IMF is yet another drastic condition for African countries that must agree to its terms 
for debt rescheduling or renewed lending.  
 
But since their implementation, the SAPs have received strong criticism for not 
ending African economic paralysis. One of the shortcomings of the SAPs is that these 
economic reforms were drawn up by the employees of the IMF or the World Bank 
who did not understand or consider the specific political, economic and social features 
of each country where the programmes were to be implemented. As far as the four 
major conditions are concerned, when government subsidies for food were cut, some 
products like bread disappeared from the local markets. The trimming of government 
bureaucracies and the privatisation of parastatatals increased the level of 
unemployment and finally, the devaluation of the CFA franc12 impoverished the 
largest part of the population.  
                                                 
12
 The CFA franc is the common currency of 14 African states, mainly former French colonies. The 
CFA franc had a fixed exchange rate with the French franc and later with the euro. The countries using 
of the CFA franc are grouped into two zones, with each zone using a common currency in both the 
Communauté Economique Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of 
Central Africa or CEMAC and the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (West African 
Economic and Monetary Union) or UEMOA. The 14 countries using the CFA franc are Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in Central Africa. Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d’ Ivoire, Guinea-Buissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo in West Africa. The 
CFA franc was created on 26 December 1945, the same day France ratified the Bretton Woods 
Agreement, with the aim of sustaining French Franc devaluation. CFA stood for Colonies Françaises 
d’Afrique (French colonies of Africa). The exchange rate was 1 CFA franc = 1. 70 FRF (FRF = French 
franc). In 1958, the CFA stood for Franc de la Communauté Française d’Afrique (Franc of the African 
Financial Community). When most of the former African colonies became independent in 1960, the 
French franc was already revalued since 1st January, and the exchange rate at that time was: 1 FCFA = 
0.02 FRF.  
 
France and the countries using of the CFA franc form the Franc Zone within which the CFA franc was 
guaranteed stability with France and it was set up to encourage unvestment and trade. The Franc zone 
also guarantees the CFA franc financial and budgetary discipline by binding treaties. However, during 
the collapse of Francophone African economies from the 1980s, the French franc was appreciating vis-
à-vis the dollar. France then decided in January 1994, with the pressure of the IMF, to devalue the CFA 
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The implementation of SAPs and the weight of external debt have caused many 
African countries to enter into “a vicious cycle whereby poor education, poor health, 
and malnutrition forestall economic growth to perpetuate poverty” (Adepoju, 2004: 
61). These external factors have been amplified by internal hurdles which have led to 
the plight of Africa. 
 
For many years, the GDP has been used to measure the economic growth of African 
states. The GDP per capita is viewed as the indicator of economic wealth, because it 
is the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year, 
divided by the average population for the same year. As shown by Table 7, countries 
with a high GDP per capita such as Algeria, Gabon, Morocco, Mauritius and Tunisia 
have been considered the wealthiest in Francophone Africa. One could ask if there is 
a correlation between the importance of the GDP per capita of a specific country and 
its profile as a host country for migrants. At first glance, it seems possible because the 
wealthiest countries (according to their GDP per capita) in Francophone Africa, like 
Gabon in Central Africa and Tunisia and Morocco in Magrheb, are the main receiving 
countries in these regions. Likewise, Cote d’ Ivoire in West Africa enjoyed a high 
annual GDP per capita and was the main direction chosen by migrants of the region 
before the civil war. The GDP per capita surely expressed the economic growth of 
some of these countries, mainly because of the exportation of resource minerals and 
agricultural products, oil for Gabon and cocoa for Cote d’ Ivoire. The economic 
growth therefore justifies the relatively strong economic performances which have 
attracted migrants. 
 
However, the high GDP per capita only sustains relatively strong economic 
performances because of the poor redistribution of the economic growth. Indeed, 
because of corruption, mismanagement and bad choices, the majority of the 
populations have not fully benefited from economic growth. The GDP per capita has 
been criticised because it does not reflect the economic development, which differs 
from the economic growth (Hugon, 2004: 30). In general, the GDP per capita does 
                                                                                                                                            
franc by 50% to boost Francophone African economies to become more competitive on the 
international market. The exchange rate became: 1 CFA franc= 0. 01 FRF. Since 1st January 1999, 
with the adoption of the European Union currency, 1 CFA franc = 0. 152449 euro or 1 euro = 655. 957 
CFA franc. 
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not take into account differences in the cost of living in different countries and the 
indicator can greatly vary from one year to another based on fluctuations in the 
foreign exchange rates of the country’s currency. Such fluctuations may change a 
country’s ranking greatly from one year to the next, even though they often make 
little or no difference to the standard of living of its population. 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has therefore set up other 
indicators to more accurately value the economic development. Among these 
indicators are the Human Development Indicator (HDI) and the Human Poverty 
Indicator (HPI). Hugon (2004: 31) distinguishes one from another by explaining that 
the former is an aggregate reflecting life expectancy at birth, literacy rates and an 
adjusted GDP per capita; while the latter is related to life expectancy, education, and 
basic services such as access to clean water and health services.  
 
With some exceptions, such as Seychelles, Mauritius, Tunisia and Morocco which 
have indicators superior to 0.7 (Table 7), economic development in Francophone 
African countries is still low. The state of economic development in these countries 
does not distinguish itself from the rest of the continent. According to Adepoju (2004: 
61) “Africa is a region of contradictions: rich in resources, it is nevertheless the 
world’s poorest major region … Across the continent, illiteracy remains high and 
health conditions continue to deteriorate.” Migration then becomes a strategy to 
escape these deteriorating economic conditions, which seem unlikely to improve 
soon.  
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Table 7: GDP per capita and the HDI of Francophone African countries in 2003 
Countries GNP per capita in 2003 
(US dollar) 
HDI in 2003 (World 
Ranking) 
Algeria 2 090 0.722 (103) 
Benin 517 0.431 (162) 
Burkina-Faso 345 0.317 (175) 
Burundi 83 0.378 (169) 
Cameroon 776 0.497 (148) 
CAR 309 0.355 (171) 
Chad 304 0.341 (173) 
Comoros 538 0.547 (132) 
Congo 949 0.512 (142) 
Cote d’Ivoire 816 0.420 (163) 
DRC 107 0.385 (167) 
Djibouti 886 0.495 (150) 
Gabon 4 505 0.635 (123) 
Guinea 459 0.466 (156) 
Madagascar 324 0.499 (146) 
Mali 371 0.333 (174) 
Mauritania 384 0.477 (152) 
Mauritius 4 274 0.791 (65) 
Morocco 1 452 0.631 (124) 
Niger 232 0.281 (177) 
Rwanda 195 0.450 (159) 
Senegal 634 0.458 (157) 
Seychelles 8 610 0.821 (51) 
Togo 362 0.512 (143) 
Tunisia 2 530 0.753 (89) 
Source:http://hdr.undp.org 
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4.2.3 Demographic settings 
 
Table 8: Area and population indicators of Francophone African countries in 
2004 
Countries Areas Population Percentage of 
Urbanised population 
Percentage of the 
population under the 
age of 15 
Algeria  2 381 740 32 000 000 58.3 33.5 
Benin     112 620  7 000 000 43.8 45.6 
Burkina-Faso     274 000 13 000 000 17.4 48.9 
Burundi      27 830   6 800 000 9.6 46.9 
Cameroon     475 440 16 000 000 50.6 42.4 
CAR     622 980   3 900 000 42.2 43.1 
Chad  1 284 000   8 600 000 24.5 46.7 
Comoros         1 862      800 000 34.4 42.3 
Congo     342 000   3 700 000 53.1 46.8 
Cote d’Ivoire     322 460  16 600 000 44.4 41.8 
Djibouti       23 200       700 000 83.3 43 
DRC  2 344 860  52 800 000 31.2 46.8 
Gabon     267 670    1 300 000 83.1 41 
Guinea     245 860    8 500 000 34.2 44 
Madagascar     587 040   17 400 000 26.3 44.6 
Mali  1 240 190   13 000 000 31.6 49.2 
Mauritania  1 025 520     2 900 000 60.5 43.2 
Mauritius         2 040     1 200 000 43.1 25.3 
Morocco     712 550    30 600 000 56.8 31.8 
Niger  1 267 000    12 000 000 21.6 50 
Rwanda       26 340      8400 000 16.6 45.2 
Senegal     196 720   10 000 000 48.9 43.5 
Seychelles            450          80 000 48.8 NC 
Togo       26 790     4 900 000 34.5 43.9 
Tunisia      163 610     9 800 000 63.4 28.5 
Total 13 974 772 281980 000   
Source: Jeune Afrique L’intelligent. L’Etat de l’Afrique. Hors-Série Nº 8. Paris: 
Jeune Afrique. 
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The repartition of the Francophone African population over space is unequal if one 
compares various countries. Francophone African countries can be subdivided into 
four categories as far as their population is concerned. The first category is made up 
of countries that have a population of more than 20 million inhabitants. These 
countries are Algeria (32 millions), Morocco (30 566 000) and the DRC (52 771 000). 
The countries with a population of between 10 and 20 million are in the second 
category. Among the seven countries in that category, Madagascar, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Cameroon are the most populous with a number of 17 404 000, 16 631 000 and 16 
018 000 inhabitants respectively. Forty-eight per cent of Francophone African 
countries represent the third category, with populations numbering between one and 
ten million. These are heterogeneous categories because, on the one hand, countries 
such as Rwanda (8 400 000) and Guinea (8 480 000) have populations close to ten 
million while, on the other hand, Gabon and Mauritius have a million inhabitants. 
Lastly, Comoros (768 000), Djibouti (703 000) and Seychelles (81 000) are in the 
fourth category, with fewer than one million inhabitants. Although it is not a general 
assumption, it appears that the most populous countries provide the most migrants in 
Francophone Africa according to their numbers in host countries such as France, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Gabon or in South Africa. However, the number of inhabitants alone 
cannot explain the dynamics of emigration from some countries. 
 
The forecasts of the Francophone African population predict an increase in many 
countries. According to Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent (2005), it has been projected that, 
unless a catastrophe occurs, Francophone African countries can expect a boom in 
their population, especially in the sub-Saharan part. In fact, the population will almost 
double by 2050 in countries such as Togo (from 4 900 000 in 2004 to 10 million in 
2050), Senegal (from 10 000 000 to 20 100 000) and Gabon (from 1 300 000 to 2 500 
000). The expansion of the population could even be tripled during the same period in 
Mali (from 13 000 000 to 46 000 000) or Burkina Faso (from 13 000 000 to 42 400 
000). This evolution will be sustained by the high rate of demographic growth, for 
instance in Niger (2. 91%), Chad (2. 85%) and in the DRC (3%).  
 
The dynamics of Francophone African population are also characterised by the 
growing urban population and percentages of young people. The increase of the urban 
population brings more socio-economic challenges, which the authorities fail to meet, 
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such as services delivery in sectors such as education and health. Young people are 
more and more involved in migration, as they see it as the best chance of survival. 
Lumembu (2000: 88) shows how far desperate young Africans will go to escape 
poverty. In 1999, two young Guineans of 14 and 15 years old were found dead in the 
landing gear of a plane in Belgium. 
 
4.2.4 Socio-cultural context 
The socio-cultural variables that push Francophone Africans away from their 
countries of origin range from the culture of migration to the weakness of the state. 
These aspects also include urbanisation and working and studying conditions.  
 
Among the six socioeconomic factors of the cumulative causation theory that Massey 
et al. (1993) describe in their analysis, the culture of migration is the one which 
explains the departure of people towards other regions as part of values that 
communities acquire over the years. As shown in Chapter 3, migration is a well-
established social feature in the valley of the Senegalese River, for instance. In fact, 
migration is considered as one of the rare ways for disadvantaged social classes, such 
as women, young people and slaves, to gain respect in the society and to reposition 
themselves in the social strata, because of the wealth they can acquire by migrating. 
Because societies in the valley of the Senegalese River have experienced migration 
for many decades, more of their members will look for improved conditions 
elsewhere. As pointed out by Saint-Exupery (2005: 16), in the town of Somankidi in 
the northern part of Mali, 17.5% of the inhabitants have left for Europe or other 
African countries. The culture of migration had been established since World War II. 
Migration is vital and it has become the main activity providing incomes for the 
survival of the town.  
 
The culture of migration has developed over the years in Francophone Africa because 
of the poverty gap between class factions. The socio-cultural context of migration can 
thus be described with reference to different social classes. Schraeder (2000: 150-151) 
grades African society into four social classes, with the African peasantry being the 
only rural one. In many countries, the rural population makes up the largest number of 
inhabitants. Indeed, the percentage of the rural population in countries such as 
Burundi, Rwanda, Burkina Faso and Niger is 90.4%, 83.4%, 82.6% and 78.4% 
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respectively (Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent, 2005). The agricultural sector provides food 
and livestock for its own consumption, for the urban, and sometimes the international, 
markets. However, rural peasants are often attracted to towns where they expect to 
make a better living. In most cases, new arrivals in the city end up in the lowest urban 
class: the lumpenproletariat. Unemployed people and street vendors, maids and cooks 
constitute that lower urban social class, and educated people, unable to find an 
adequate job, swell the ranks every day.  
 
The African proletariat is just above the two lowest classes and forms the core of the 
manpower of urban industry. The earnings of the African proletariat are merely 
enough to survive on a daily basis. The middle class refers to a heterogeneous class of 
workers from shopkeepers to the lower ranks of the government bureaucracies, 
including teachers, soldiers and those in the private sector. However, the deterioration 
of living conditions has obliged them to find other ways to survive. Finally, at the top 
social strata there is the African bourgeoisie, a small elite of politicians and 
bureaucrats that retain the largest part of the wealth of the country. Migration is 
considered the only way to escape this social classification.  
 
Another social-cultural variable of migration in Francophone Africa is urbanisation. 
The urban centres in Francophone Africa are homes to both rural and international 
migrants. These urban centres in Francophone Africa are mainly the creations of 
French colonialism, although large commercial and religious centres were observed in 
great empires such as Kongo and Mali in the pre-colonial era. With French 
colonisation, the structure of an urban centre was formed by the administrative area, 
which was clearly separated from the African areas. In most cases, the African areas 
were previously small villages like in Libreville in Gabon, Brazzaville in Congo or 
Abidjan in Cote d’ Ivoire. Those African areas were viewed as reservoirs of the 
manpower needed by the colonial authorities. The biggest town in each colony 
became the capital of the new countries when independence was proclaimed. Capital 
cities in most Francophone African country became the most important cities in the 
countries, where political, administrative, economic, judiciary and academic activities 
were concentrated. The centralisation of all sort of activities in the main cities is one 
reason why both internal and international migrants are flooding in great numbers to 
Dakar in Senegal, Libreville in Gabon, Bamako in Mali, Brazzaville in Congo, and 
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Kinshasa in the DRC. The increasing population of the major Francophone African 
cities demonstrates the degree of urbanisation in those centres. The expansion of 
Abidjan in Cote d’ Ivoire, for instance, is illustrated by the growth of its population 
over the years. In 1931, 10 000 people were living in Abidjan. By 1961, the city was a 
home for 180 000 people, the number reached 2 500 000 persons by the end of the 
1990s (Schraeder, 2000: 121). However, that expansion of the population has been 
accompanied by social concerns such as poor education and health. Therefore, the 
urbanisation of many Francophone African cities has been associated with the spread 
of poverty, which is evident in large numbers of slums surroundings urban centres.  
 
As far as working and studying conditions are concerned, people are pushed away 
from their countries of origin by low income, limited career opportunities, the poverty 
of tertiary institutions and the poor quality of education. The low income in some 
Francophone African countries is illustrated by Thiomiano’s (2000) example of a 
Burkinabe student in France who earned 3 000 French francs monthly from his part 
time job. After his studies, the company wanted to employ him for 5 000 French 
francs whilst he could find a job in the administration in Burkina Faso for 1 600 
French francs a month. Low income is reinforced by the high level of unemployment 
which compels those with jobs to take care of the extended family.  
 
Career opportunities are also limited because many employers prefer a person with a 
degree from a French or American university rather than one with degrees from 
African or some European universities, particularly from former socialist countries. 
The continuation of their studies thus pushes many Francophone Africans away from 
their countries of origin. Universities in many African countries do not offer 
conditions required for a good education. Overcrowded classes, lack of financial 
resources and the absence of updated materials are some of the shortcomings of 
tertiary education in Francophone Africa. These difficulties accumulated for many 
years, hidden by the incapacity of the population to speak out due to the oppression of 
dictatorial regimes. With the democratisation of the 1990s, tertiary education 
collapsed (see Section 4.2.6). Strikes, inadequate curriculum, the lack of trust by 
employers and the politicising of universities were some of the reasons for the failure 
of Francophone African universities. For many young Africans, migration is the only 
means of getting a decent education and responding to job opportunities in the 
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globalised world. A student explains his desire to pursue his studies abroad as 
follows: 
 
Today we are living in a world called a ‘planetary village.’ We are becoming 
more and more citizens of the world. For anyone to find himself/herself in 
such a world, he/she must have many landmarks; I mean a good academic 
formation and the mastering of international languages. As far as I am 
concerned, it is an international handicap if someone does not complete 
his/her academic formation in another system than the one used in his/her 
country of origin and if that person can just speak one international language 
(Gabonese student, Libreville, 23 July 2004). 
 
4.2.5 Environmental conditions 
The deterioration of the environment is also one of the factors behind the move of 
thousand of people in Francophone Africa. The deterioration of ecological systems 
partly depends on the composition of the physical geography. According to Adepoju 
(2004: 64), “the physical geography in Africa is heterogeneous, embracing fragile arid 
and semi-arid ecosystems that coexist with more stable rainforests and coastal low-
lands.” Francophone Africa stretches from the Sahelian region in the western part of 
the continent to the rainforest region in Central Africa. The climate of Francophone 
Africa also extends to the Mediterranean in the Maghreb and the tropical climate in 
the Indian Ocean. The movements and the settlements of the populations in these 
different regions are closely coupled with the nature of the evolution of the ecological 
systems. Environmental deterioration such as floods or desertification have obliged 
some populations to move from their settlements to safer ecological regions. 
According to Adepoju (2004: 64), at the end of the 1980s approximately 10 million 
people in Africa found themselves migrating due to ecological deterioration. Apart 
from the increasing population pressure on the environment in Francophone Africa, 
ecological constraints are mostly characterised by the combination of drought, floods 
and desertification in the Sahel region in particular.  
 
The Senegal River is one of the most important rivers in the Sahel region. In Mali, for 
instance, the river flows across both “wetter” and “dry” Sudanese climate zones 
(Appleyard, 1998: 70). This double characteristic of the river allows the practice of 
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both sedentary agriculture in the former region and nomadic livelihood in the latter 
area. In the “wetter” climate zone, the river gains a surplus of water which flows 
down from the Fouta Djalon highlands in Guinea. Over the years, this region has been 
the breadbasket of the whole Sahel region, which has always attracted migrants 
(Boone, 2003: 282).  
 
However, excessive rainfall results in floods. On the other side, the scarcity of rainfall 
has dramatic consequences on all kind of activities, because it brings droughts like in 
1963, 1968-1973, 1983-1985 or during 1986-1988 in Mali (Appleyard, 1998: 71). 
According to Boone (2003: 305), from the beginning of the 1970s and for almost a 
decade, “the Senegal River’s floodplain was reduced to about 25% of its normal size.” 
Along with these inconveniences, desertification enhances drastic environmental 
conditions in the Sahel region. More and more useful lands disappear every year due 
to the advance of the Sahara Desert. This leads the populations to migrate southwards 
to overpopulate some regions that are already threatened by the sandbanks of the 
coast of the Atlantic Ocean for instance. In these narrow, overpopulated regions, the 
ecological system has deteriorated even more, deteriorated, mainly due to overuse of 
natural resources, the degradation of suitable lands for cultivation or wind erosion. At 
the end of the day, all these aspects make way for desertification. As a result and as 
pointed out by Findley et al. (quoted by Adepoju, 2004: 65), the deterioration of 
environmental conditions leads to “a massive loss of resources and the displacement 
of whole families and communities.” 
 
4.2.6 The collapse of the academic system 
Higher education institutions in Francophone Africa, like many other institutions of 
the Western state, were created following the example of the colonial ruler. However, 
France initially did not want to create higher education institutions in its colonies 
(Ade Ajayi et al., 1996: 38). The colonial power encouraged few Africans to pursue 
their studies in the Metropolis, as France wanted to control a nucleus of évolués able 
to be assimilated into French culture while leaving the mass of the populations 
uneducated. The situation was similar in the Belgian colonies, particularly in the 
Congo. In the absence of higher education institutions in its colonies, France provided 
scholarships to Africans who obtained their baccalaureate to study in the Metropolis. 
These funds were deducted from each colony’s budget. However, the growing 
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number of African students in France and their anti-colonialist discourse pushed 
France to delocalise campuses to some cities in the colonies, especially Dakar in 
Senegal and Tananarive in Madagascar, with Dakar for instance set to receive 
students from all West and Central Africa (Ade Ajayi et al., 1996: 56).  
 
After independence, Francophone African countries created their own universities, 
viewed also as symbols of the newly gained independence and considered “as a key 
component in the development process of the continent” (Lindsay, 1985: 129). Full 
control of universities by Africans themselves happened gradually over the years. 
However, teaching programmes in these Francophone African institutions were 
mostly the replication of the ones used in France, even though some programmes did 
not sometimes take into account African realities. The former colonial power also 
provided manuals and technologies that, according to Alidou (Federici et al., 2000: 
38), the French academic system had rejected because viewed as inadequate. 
 
Up to the 1990s, crucial problems encountered in Francophone African universities 
were kept silent because most of these countries were under dictatorial regimes. One 
of the features of the pressure from dictatorial regimes has been the lack of academic 
freedom. This includes the freedom of the members of the academic community, 
development and transmission of knowledge, research, study, discussion, 
documentation, production, creation, teaching, lecturing or writing (Diouf and 
Mamdani, 1994: 362). The pressure from dictatorial regimes was illustrated by a 
range of actions and decisions, from censorship of teaching to summary executions of 
academics and students. During those years, many staff members were forced to 
migrate outside their countries of origin due to the lack of freedom of expression. 
Apart from moving to European or American countries, Francophone African 
university intellectuals found refuge in other African countries, like Guinean nationals 
escaping from the Sekou Toure’s dictatorship to settle in Gabon (Pambou-Loueya, 
2003: 339).  
 
The crisis of Francophone African universities broke out at the beginning of the 
1990s. At first glance, the Francophone African university crisis appeared to be 
institutional. After two decades, the African university had failed to implement the six 
social functions identified in a workshop in 1972 (Lindsay, 1985: 129): 
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(1) pursuit, promotion, and dissemination of knowledge; (2) research; (3) 
provision of intellectual leadership; (4) manpower development; (5) promotion of 
social and economic modernization; (6) promotion of intercontinental unity and 
international understanding. 
 
Along with the political, economic and social situation, the university crisis was an 
illustration of the collapse of Francophone African states. In countries involved in 
armed conflicts such as the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, staff and students abandoned 
campuses to find refuge elsewhere. This obliged some universities in those countries 
to close down. However, armed conflicts alone cannot fully explain the Francophone 
African university crisis. The collapse of higher education in Francophone Africa 
system has deeper roots.  
 
Ade Ajayi et al. (1996: 146) highlight three main points underpinning the African 
university crisis in general. Firstly, they point out the scarcity of financial resources. 
Universities suffered from the economic situation in Francophone African countries. 
Two decades after their creation, most Francophone African universities lacked funds 
to “sustain acceptable standards of instruction, research and service” (Ade Ajayi et 
al., 1996: 146). The authors also refer to the restriction of grants provided by 
government. This has made it difficult for higher education institutions to find income 
to recruit foreign lecturers and researchers, to finance nationals’ training or 
conference attendance abroad as well as the purchase of books and other materials 
required for teaching and research. The lack of finances has put Francophone African 
research behind because the institutions have not been able to update their material, 
particularly in science. Financial scarcity has also had an impact on publication since 
most of Francophone African higher institutions do not have their own publishing 
facilities. Publishing abroad has become a real cause for concern, especially after the 
devaluation of the CFA franc. 
 
Moreover Ade Ajayi et al. (1996: 147) note the “stagnation and deterioration of 
physical resources.” Many universities in Francophone Africa were built some years 
following the independence in 1960. Some were allocated to provisional structures 
acquired from the colonial period. Since their construction or their acquisition, the 
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maintenance of the structures has been neglected. Hence, the deterioration of the 
structures over the years has not been able to cope with the growing number of the 
students and staff populations. The deterioration of the structures has accelerated with 
the unplanned expansion of the infrastructures to respond to the increase of the 
number of students and staff. As a result, the shortage of lecture rooms and 
laboratories, student and staff housing, and staff offices are one of the main 
characteristics of Francophone African universities.  
 
Apart from the points listed by Ade Ajayi et al., the African university crisis has also 
been sustained by the implementation of the SAPs. These rcovery programmes have 
reduced financial supplies and academic personnel and salaries (Diouf & Mamdani, 
1994: 73). This have increased the demotivation of both academic personnel and 
students. Diouf and Mamdani (1994: 21) also acknowledge that the crisis of the 
African university has its internal reasons in the incompetence and negative 
competition among academic personnel.  
 
Since the adoption of democracy in most Francophone African countries, the 
university community has expressed its hunger by strikes which often paralyse the 
academic calendar. Chronologically, the most notorious strikes in universities from 
1990 to 1995 are summarised as follows (Federici, 2000, 118-150): 
 
11-14 January 1990: Algeria. Students strike against reduction of grant, for an 
improvement of education and for better access to employment at the end of the 
studies. At least 50 people injured. 
 
9 February 1990: Niger. Students strike against reduction of educational funding. 
Three to fourteen students killed.  
11 May 1990: Zaire. Students strike against the regime of President Mobutu Sese 
Seko: 52 students killed.  
 
23 November 1990: Guinea. More than a month of demonstrations against the loss of 
grants and poor quality of education. Two students killed and three wounded.  
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16 April 1991: Benin. Students strike for the payment of grants and the improvement 
of studying and living conditions. One student wounded. 
 
17 May 1991: Zaire. Demonstration of students. Two students killed, 20 students and 
the Secretary of State for Education wounded.  
 
11 September 1991: Cote d’Ivoire. End of a two month strike by lecturers against 
government violation of academic freedom and police harassment on the campuses. 
December 1991: Senegal. Two month strike of students demanding better living and 
studying conditions.  
 
29 February 1992: Togo. Students protest over grants. Government ban closed the 
university. 
 
14 July 1992: The Minister and the Ministry’s Secretary General were held hostage 
by students demanding the payment of their grants. 
 
20-25 January 1993: Cameroon. Students strike against the increase of fees.  
 
15 March 1993: Cote d’Ivoire. Students strike demanding a revision of their 
programmes and an improvement of their grants and housing conditions. 
 
9 April 1993: Mali. Resignation of the government after a strike of students. One 
student killed and 45 persons wounded, including 20 from the security forces.  
 
June 1994: Congo. President Pascal Lissouba cancelled the academic year because of 
a long students strike. 
 
June 1994: Gabon. The university in Libreville is closed down due to a protest of 
students demanding the increase of their grants following the devaluation of the CFA 
franc.  
 
November 1995: Mali. Crisis in the education system following a student strike 
demanding the payment of grants and an improvement of studying conditions. 
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The essence of the collapse of the academic system in Francophone Africa lies with 
the structure of the system itself and its relationship with the state in general as well as 
the nature of the state itself (see Section 4.2.13 of this chapter). Indeed, as shown by 
Diouf and Mamdani (1994: 18), the state in most African countries controls the 
intellectual production of the university because it provides wage labour that 
academics need to define or maintain their status in society.  
 
4.2.7 Summary of push factors in Francophone Africa 
The variety of migration configurations, such as labour, student, refugee and 
clandestine migration has a multitude of causes. In Francophone Africa, the causes of 
migration for the four categories of migrants considered in this study are a 
combination of the factors analysed above. Legal migrants and students justify their 
departure from their countries of origin with four main reasons.  
 
Firstly, they chose to go abroad due to the economic, political, educational and social 
paralysis. These reasons are summarised by an interviewee as follows: 
 
It is frustrating to realise that after a couple of years one’s social or 
professional situation has not changed. Many Africans are formed in high 
profile Western universities where they are often majors of their promotions. 
Once back home, they rapidly realise the gap between their formations and the 
conditions of work. While their former Western or Asian former classmates 
climb professional grades and have career prospects, Africans see their social 
situation declining day after day. The only solution is to go to work or to study 
abroad, especially in developed countries with all advantages like career 
prospects, high salaries or good formation for students. Young Africans like 
their countries, their continent, but working and studying conditions are so 
disappointing. They do not have any choice. (Cameroonian, Libreville, 27 July 
2004)  
 
Secondly, students opt for migration because they want to pursue their studies. Most 
of the respondents reveal that their desire to pursue education is the principal reason 
that they leave their countries of origin: 
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Actually, my intention was to go to Germany. I came to South Africa to study 
because I did not to want to stay at the university in Yaoundé, because the 
studying conditions were bad and it was difficult to complete an academic 
year without students or lecturers strikes. (Cameroonian, Cape Town, 22 
October 2004) 
 
Thirdly, legal migrants especially are keen to migrate in order to further their careers: 
 
In Congo, due especially to the unstable situation in the eastern part of the 
country, it was not possible for me to undertake to complete my specialisation. I 
wanted to be a specialist surgeon but due to the war, there were no appropriate 
programmes implemented to help people to have real career prospects. 
(Congolese, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005). 
 
Fourthly, legal migrants and students explain their move because of economic and job 
opportunities that their countries of origin cannot offer. These categories of migrants 
struggle to make a living despite their qualifications. These experiences do not 
encourage working in their countries of origin once they complete their education. 
Migration is viewed as a way to improve their earnings and their standard of living. 
 
After obtaining my degree, I compared what I could earn in Cameroon and 
here. I realised that it was in my interest to stay working here. After 
completing my training, I accepted the job offer. (Cameroonian, Libreville, 27 
July 2004) 
 
Finally, a few respondents say they leave their countries of origin to travel around and 
to experience other cultures.  
 
The two other categories of migrants considered are pushed away from their region of 
origin mainly by the seven factors described above. Armed conflicts and political 
crises are the most common reasons behind refugee and extra-legal migrations. A 
Rwandese national describes her arrival in South Africa as follows: 
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I left my country a long time ago because of the genocide. I did not have any 
other choice than running away from my country. I was young and we went to 
Tanzania, my mother, my two sisters and my brother. We were going from 
one refugee camp to another, looking for better conditions. Then, we 
succeeded to establish ourselves in Dodoma in Tanzania, but still the living 
conditions were not good at all. We could not go back home because of the 
war so we came to Zambia. From Zambia I came here in 2000. (Rwandese, 
Johannesburg, 29 March 2005) 
 
Economic and social deterioration is the second most common reason pointed out by 
refugees and extra-legal respondents. These factors often push the migrants to cross 
national boundaries without required documents:  
 
My friends and I decided to leave Congo to Gabon. We were five. We passed the 
border during the night for fear of being arrested by Gabonese soldiers. Two of 
our friends knew how to cross the border without being arrested because they 
often came to Gabon. After the border, we slept all day, we walked the night, we 
arrived in a village and we had a transport which brought us to Bakoumba. 
(Congolese, Libreville, 29 July 2004).  
 
Social capital is the third main common reason given by refugees and extra-legals to 
justify their move. Some migrants have been heavily influenced in their decision by a 
friend or a relative already abroad.  
 
My brother was here for a while. He invited me to come to join him and to see 
how life is going on. I have been in Nigeria, in Cote d’Ivoire, in Gabon and in 
Senegal. After, I went back home and then came here. (Guinean, 
Johannesburg, 22 2005)  
 
Social capital is closely related to the achievements of preceeding migrants. For 
people living in a region with a high culture of migration, potential migrants definitely 
make up their mind by the money send my migrants.  
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When I was in Cote d’Ivoire, I was living with a family which was regularly 
receiving money from one of their relatives who came to Gabon a long time ago. 
With part of that money he succeeded to build two beautiful houses. People were 
renting those houses, so he was making more money. The situation in Cote 
d’Ivoire was far better than in my country. I came to a conclusion that if an 
Ivorian could improve his situation by living in Gabon, therefore the situation 
could be better for me. This is how I had the idea to come to Gabon. (Malian, 
Libreville, 27 July 2005). 
 
4.3 The reasons for choosing South Africa  
4.3.1 South Africa and Francophone Africa 
The arrival of different categories of migrants from the rest of the continent also 
depends on the history of relations between South Africa and the sending countries. 
Since the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, South Africa has 
been a major importer of labour for the exploitation of the country’s mineral wealth 
and for farms. South Africa has relied on its neighbouring countries, such as Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Swaziland and Malawi. According to Crush (2000: 14), between 1920 
and 1940 the approximate number of foreign workers in the mines was 100 000 to 
200 000. As noted by Southall (2006: 1), during the apartheid era, South Africa 
symbolised a white power nation which established its economic authority over the 
southern part of the continent. However, this sub-regional foreign policy was also 
based on its military objective to crush anti-apartheid fighters who found refuge in the 
surrounding countries. This foreign policy was simply focused on South African self-
interest. 
 
4.3.1.1 South Africa’s historical links with Francophone Africa 
During the apartheid era, the Pretoria regime also had military, political and economic 
relations with some African countries further afield, despite the ban of South Africa 
from the international community, with Côte d’ Ivoire, Gabon and the DRC, then 
known as Zaire, being the most notorious in Francophone Africa (Pfister, 2003). 
South African engagement soon after the Congo gained independence was mainly 
based on its involvement in the exploitation of mineral resources such as diamonds in 
Mbuji-Mayi by De Beers or South African mercenary involvement in the Kasai and 
Katanga crisis (Pfister, 2003: 78). South Africa viewed itself as playing the role of 
 143 
containing the communist advance on the continent. The South African support of the 
Kasai and Katanga rebellions was considered the best way to show that commitment, 
although South African involvement remained limited because the Pretoria regime did 
not want to be exposed.  
 
However, with the isolation of the apartheid regime, South Africa kept its relations 
with the rest of the continent through developmental projects. In reality, the country 
needed other African countries because of the international ban of South Africa. On 
the other hand, African countries were aware of South Africa’s advanced technical 
standards. As pointed out by Pfister (2003: 91), relations with the rest of the continent 
were undertaken in four phases: Outward Movement, Dialogue, Secret Diplomacy 
and Détente. The Outward Movement was linked with the activities initiated after 
1967 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) towards other African countries 
beyond the surrounding countries. Madagascar was the Francophone African country 
that benefited from the Outward Movement through mining and tourism investments 
until 1972, when President Tsiranana was toppled by a coup d’état. Francophone 
African countries were also used by France as stopovers to sustain its relations with 
South Africa.  
 
Francophone African countries became the target of the Dialogue phase which started 
in 1966 for military reasons. These relations between South Africa and Francophone 
African countries were conducted with France’s involvement, particularly under the 
influence of Jacques Foccart, the man once in charge of the African Affairs at the 
French presidency. It started with military assistance to Chad to prevent the spread of 
communism from Libya. South African military relations with Francophone African 
countries in the western and central part of the continent were broadened to Gabon 
and Cote d’Ivoire during and after the Biafra civil war. In Gabon, apart from military 
assistance, South Africa brought its technical cooperation in the agricultural sector.  
 
During the Secret Diplomacy phase, South Africa took a further step by establishing 
presidential contact with Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal, when Prime Minister Vorster 
visited Cote d’Ivoire in September 1974 and met Felix Houphouet-Boigny and 
Leopold Sedar Senghor (Pfister, 2003: 164). Apparently, the choice of these two 
countries lies with the charisma of their leaders. During the Secret Diplomacy phase, 
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South Africa succeeded in securing landing rights for South African Airways (SAA) 
in Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles islands. The president of Zaire, Mobutu, was 
also regarded as an influential leader in Francophone Africa, as he was viewed as a 
loyal ally of some of Western countries. Therefore, his support was fundamental. 
Although opposed to the Dialogue policy, Mobutu was linked with the South African 
government during the phase of Détente, when his attitude changed with the Angolan 
civil war. The two sides were backing the western-oriented National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) opposed to the communist-oriented Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The cooperation between the two 
strengthened through economic interaction, developmental projects and military 
collaboration during the second part of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s. 
 
However, these relations received harsh criticism, particularly from the rest of the 
African countries on behalf of solidarity with the struggle of Black South Africans 
against the apartheid policy. Beyond these military, political and economic ties, a 
selected migration from Francophone African countries to South Africa took place 
before the end of the apartheid regime. According to Bouillon and Morris (2001: 39-
42), two waves of Francophone African migration occurred before 1994. The first 
wave happened between 1986 and 1991 and it was the direct outcome of South 
African diplomatic policy related above. Bouillon and Morris (2001: 40) point out 
that, in return for its technical assistance in Francophone Africa, South Africa was 
highly regarded as a destination of priority by political and economic elites. Those 
elites usually visited South Africa during that period. Apart from political and 
economic elites, the South African government allowed medical doctors and teachers, 
particularly from Zaire, to settle in homelands like Ciskei and Bophuthatswana where 
they filled up the skilled labour shortages. 
 
In 1990, after the release of Nelson Mandela and with ongoing negotiations between 
the government and the liberation movements, South Africa had already established 
air links with other countries like Rwanda, Mauritius, Madagascar and Morocco, and 
had formal diplomatic relations with Rwanda, Morocco, Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon 
(Bouillon & Morris, 2001: 41). The second wave of Francophone African migration 
to South Africa lasted from 1991 to 1993. During that period, the stream of migrants 
from Francophone Africa was dominated by victims of armed conflicts, with Zairians 
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being the most numerous. South African authorities were obliged to establish an 
expensive visa fee in order to curb the flow of Zairian nationals.  
 
4.3.1.2 South Africa leadership on the continent 
Since the readmission of South Africa to the international scene, the country has 
claimed a leadership role on the continent because of its economic and political status. 
The discourse of South African leadership in Africa has been undertaken through 
African Renaissance and NEPAD initiatives. The idea of a unified and strong Africa 
was first launched soon after the independence of most of African countries in the 
1960s, with the likes of the former Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah as the initiators 
of Pan-Africanism. The motive behind this early attempt at African unification was to 
free Africa from both colonialism and neo-colonialism. The new idea of African 
unification at the beginning of the new millennium was to give the continent a fresh 
start after the failure of dictators to take Africa to the path of development. The 
rejuvenated concept was viewed as a symbol of the arrival of a new generation of 
leaders in the continental arena. Nelson Mandela, during the OAU meeting in 1994, 
criticised the way African states were running. He appealed for a “new birth” 
(Meredith, 2005: 677). Moreover, Thabo Mbeki made African Renaissance his most 
valuable concept on his crusade to give South Africa and the whole continent a place 
on the international scene. Mbeki urged that Africans themselves could resolve 
African problems. He wanted the rest of the world to see Africa not only as the theatre 
of plights like wars, corruption and HIV/AIDS, but also as a place of opportunities 
capable of reaching tremendous achievements (Gumede, 2005: 201). The concept of 
African Renaissance was drawn up around the implementation of a real democracy 
and good governance into a global map influenced by democracy and globalisation. 
Mbeki defines his vision of the African Renaissance as follows: 
 
The African Renaissance, in all its parts, can only succeed if its aims and 
objectives are defined by Africans themselves, if its programmes are designed 
by ourselves and if we take responsibility for the success or failure of our 
policies … We believe that it is important that the international community 
should agree that Africa constitutes the principal development challenge in the 
world (Meredith, 2005: 677). 
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In order to concretise the concept of the African Renaissance, the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) project was officially launched during the OAU 
summit held in Lusaka in July 2001. Formerly known as the New African Initiative 
(NAI) until October 2001, NEPAD is basically a merger of two economic 
developmental plans proposed by the presidents of Senegal (Abdoulaye Wade), 
Algeria (Abdelaziz Bouteflika), Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo) and South Africa 
(Thabo Mbeki). The first president was the author of the Omega Plan, while the three 
others presidents were responsible for the Millennium African Plan (MAP). NEPAD 
promotes a partnership between international donors and African countries for the real 
development of the continent. The international community’s support should not be 
viewed as a form of aid but as investment. In 2003, NEPAD became the economic 
part of the African Union. The ten themes which sustain the Nepad are good public 
governance, good economic governance, energy, infrastructures, education, health, 
technology of information and communication, agriculture, environment and access to 
developed countries’ markets and the diversification of products.  
 
The new concept of development on the continent urges cooperation among African 
states. At first glance, one notes that the Nepad in particular carries in itself the roots 
of a new form of migration in Africa. Indeed, NEPAD intends to develop 
communication and transportation infrastructures for better economic and political 
integration. This basically means more movements of goods and people across 
national borders, one the one hand, and, on the other, a cooperation of immigration 
laws and regulations to ease these movements. The response of each state to these 
measures of integration remains to be seen, as noted by Crush and Williams (2004: 4), 
who state that the impact of the implementation of NEPAD’s recommendations on the 
“strident and xenophobic” South African migration policy remains ambiguous. As the 
first economic power on the continent, South Africa should expect more migrants’ 
arrivals from all parts of the continent if the Nepad recommendations are fully 
implemented.  
 
Beyond the marketing of the Nepad, particularly during the different G8 summits, 
South Africa has been active on the continental scene by its willingness to resolve 
conflicts. It has also extended its economic presence beyond southern Africa. Since 
1994, South African foreign policy, particularly on the continent, has passed from the 
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unilateralism under the presidency of Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki’s 
multilateralism (Southall, 2006: 4). If the former concept had a strong human rights 
orientation, the second one has brought new commitment to market-based economics 
into the picture. In Francophone Africa, South African peacemaking initiatives have 
focused mainly on Burundi, the DRC and Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
4.3.2 South Africans’ pull factors 
The arrival of thousands of Francophone African migrants in South Africa is the 
result of the country’s political and economic status. South Africa has attracted 
Francophone African migrants because of its educational infrastructures and its 
language factor. Finally, social capital could also be a factor in attracting migrants.  
 
4.3.2.1 Political achievements 
With the demise of apartheid in 1994, the country entered into a new era of 
democratisation. As indicates by Nest (1999: 76) the democratisation of South Africa 
after 1994 was characterised by the transformation of both state and civil society 
institutions. The transformation of state institutions is symbolised by changes in 
accountability and representativeness, while transformation in civil society is evident 
in the reversal of economic and racial inequality. Among the first major steps of this 
transformation was the adoption of a new constitution. The first draft of the new 
South African Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution of 1996 were designed 
under intensive mass political upheaval and violence.  
 
The South African constitution distinguishes itself as taking into consideration South 
African realities, unlike most of constitutions of Francophone African countries, 
which are mainly the replicas of the French constitution, that of former colonial ruler 
(Rossantaga-Rignault, 2000: 83). The South African constitution is considered one of 
the most liberal in the world (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004: 235) because of its federal and 
unitary characteristics (Butler, 2004: 90). To avoid an accumulation of powers to one 
man or one institution, the principle of the separation of powers establishes three 
powers of government into the executive, the legislature and the judiciary at the 
national, provincial and municipal levels (Butler, 2004: 88).  
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The executive is the political body and it is represented by the President, the Cabinet 
and the senior public service. The president is the chief of the executive. Unlike in 
Francophone African countries in which he is directly elected by popular vote, the 
South African president is elected by the National Assembly as the head of his party 
or national list during the general elections. As head of the state and head of the 
government, he can appoint or dismiss ministers and directors general. The assembly 
can remove him from office by a vote of no confidence or after he has been the 
subject of impeachment. In assenting to laws and promulgating regulations, as well as 
having some authority in pardons, the president retains both some legislative and 
judicial powers. Cabinet is composed of 29 members. The ministers are collectively 
and individually responsible to the legislature, with the latter responsibility being 
predominant because ministers should defend government positions rather than 
individual ones. The South African cabinet system obliges the implementation of “a 
committed system based on clusters of related departments” (Butler, 2004: 94). 
Different departments have to organise and coordinate their actions as others 
departments can be affected by the actions of one or many.  
 
The constitution has also established a number of independent offices with the duty to 
protest against illegal actions or abuses of power. Among these offices, there are the 
Auditor-general’s Office, the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the 
Commission for Gender Equality, the National Language Board and the Independent 
Electoral Commission (Butler, 2004: 94). The degree of independence of these offices 
confirms the liberal feature of the South African constitution in particular and its 
democracy in general.  
 
The legislature consists of a bicameral system with the National Assembly of 400 
members and the National Council of Provinces of 90 members. The members of the 
National Assembly are elected from both national and provincial lists. The members 
of the National Council of Provinces are the representatives of each province (ten per 
province) and are from the National Assembly. Taljaard and Venter (quoted by Van 
der Nest, 1999: 84) distinguish the roles, particularly their characteristic as 
“watchdogs”, of both chambers by pointing out that, on the one hand, the National 
Assembly is given responsibility to “monitor, investigate, inquire into and make 
recommendations relating to any aspect of the legislative programme, budget, 
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rationalisation, restricting, functioning, organisation, structure, personnel, policy 
formulation or any other matter it may consider.” On the other hand, the main duty of 
the National Council of Provinces is to watch over provinces’ interests at the national 
level of the government. In reality, the South African legislature system could be 
designed as a parliamentary system in the sense that the Cabinet depends on the 
parliament from which it is derived and because the Cabinet can be removed by the 
parliament. The South African parliamentary system is characterised by the fact that 
the president is also the head of government. It is clear that the leading party could 
easily pass projects and laws because the same party controls the executive and the 
legislature.  
 
The judiciary system is in charge of the application of the law under which all citizens 
are equals. The judicial entities, i. e. different courts, ensure the resolution of conflict 
between the state, citizens and different institutions, and guarantee the 
constitutionality of some laws (Van der Nest, 1999: 98). There are two categories of 
courts of law in South Africa, with the lower courts, such as magistrate courts, and the 
higher ones, with the Constitutional Court being the apex of the judiciary system 
(Butler, 2004: 97). 
 
4.3.2.2 Economic opportunities 
For many decades, the economic opportunities offered by South African farms and 
mines attracted thousands of migrants from various regions, around the whole 
southern part of the African continent. The farm and mine industries were the main 
features on which the South African state modeled its labour policy, with the 
recruitment of non-South African workers at the core of that labour policy.  
 
The ANC, the ruling party, has focused its economic policy on the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR), which followed the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was released before 
the 1994 elections and was conceptualised by the ANC and its allies, the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party 
(SACP). The RDP highlights colonisation and apartheid as the main causes of 
political, economic and social injustices that South African society suffers. The RDP 
also single out five major points to correct those injustices through the adoption of 
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programmes, including the implementation of programmes to meet the basic needs of 
the poorer part of the population, to develop the neglected human resources of the 
population, to stimulate a fundamental restructuring of the economy, to democratise 
society and the state and to implement the RDP.  
 
However, GEAR has been viewed as a move forward, as its macroeconomic 
characteristic enhances industrial policy, as well as providing more sufficient welfare 
systems, as the intervention of the state has been more effective (Butler, 2004: 50). 
The main policies of GEAR are listed in three major categories, including the 
improvement of macroeconomic balance and fiscal discipline, the increase of 
competitiveness and greater openness to the international flows of goods and services 
and the implementation of greater market liberalisation (Roux, 2002: 235). While 
GEAR expectations are still to be fully realized, and despite some threats such as the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and the spread of poverty, the South African economy has 
shown “a great deal of progress since the country’s full first fully democratic election 
in 1994” (Roux, 2005: 172).  
 
The first sign of success of the implementation of the economic policies by the ANC 
government has been the significant economic growth from 1994. Prior to that year, 
South Africa’s economic growth declined from the 1970s. As the figures in the UNDP 
report (2003: 12) show, the average annual real per capita growth was 2.9% during 
the 1960s and 0.7% during 1970s. The decrease continued in the 1980s with 0.6% 
before becoming negative (-1.5%) between 1990 and 1994. However, the average 
annual real per capita growth was positive soon after the arrival of the ANC to power. 
Over the first decade of the ANC government, the South African economic growth 
has an average of 2.7% annually (Roux, 2005: 172). Ironically, the trend of economic 
growth contrasts with the evolution of the economic and social wellbeing of the 
population. During the first decade post-apartheid, South Africa had moved down 
from the 90th to the 119th position according to the Human Development Index (HDI). 
Moreover, the South African index (0.666) is below the average of the index of 
developing countries (0.684). 
 
The success of the South African economy is characterised by the combination of 
three factors (Maurice, 2004: 280). The first major factor is the abundance of 
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agricultural and natural resources, which are the consequences of a variety of climate 
and the capacity of human beings to transform those natural resources. The influence 
of a tropical climate in the north and the northeast regions of the country explains the 
exploitation of some products such as tropical fruits and vegetables, as well as 
sugarcane in KwaZulu-Natal. A Mediterranean climate in the Western Cape for 
instance supports the wine industry. South Africa also has one of the most important 
mineral deposits in the world, as the country detains respectively 80% of manganese, 
56% of platinum, 35% of gold and 68% of chrome of world reserves (Maurice, 2004: 
282). The South African economy is also sustained by a high level of industrial 
transformation, unlike the rest of the continent. This is ranged from the extraction and 
transformation of mineral resources as well as the production of energy and other 
resources such as aluminum, iron ore or steel. Along with these industrial activities, 
economic sectors such as tourism have witnessed a genuine growth since 1994.  
 
Human resources are the second major factor explaining the success of the South 
African economy. The high profile of human resources in South Africa is illustrated 
by the importance of the tertiary sector, which more or less represented, as pointed out 
by Jeune Afrique (2004, 232), about 65.2% of the GDP in 2004. Financial services, 
for instance, are the best on the continent. Indeed, they are well developed and 
contribute approximately 20% of the GDP (Maurice, 2004: 288). Three major 
institutions lead financial activities. Firstly, there is the JSE (Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange), the financial market. Secondly, the South African Reserve Bank, which is 
in charge of containing annual rates of inflation and to maintain the stabilisation of 
prices. Finally, there is a well-developed banking network. Most of banks’ resources 
come from savings or investments from both local and foreign companies.  
 
The last major factor behind South African economic achievement is the quality and 
the quantity of economic infrastructure. The country possesses a good communication 
network with roads, railways, ports and airports nationwide, which link to the rest of 
the world. Telecommunications are also developed, with actors such as telephone and 
internet operators and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which 
has expanded its coverage beyond South African borders. 
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The South African economy has performed better than the rest of the continent. 
Described as a great nation in the making (Jeune Afrique, 2005: 232), South Africa is 
an economic giant on the continent. Its GDP represents 40% of the whole continent. 
Likewise, of the 50 first African companies, 40 are South Africans. In reality, South 
Africa appears to be an island of prosperity within an ocean of destitution, in contrast 
with the disastrous economic features of the rest of continent. Unlike the rest of 
African countries whose economies still depend heavily on the exportation of raw 
materials, South Africa presents a more diversified economy, although for some 
scholars (Butler, 2004; Castells, 2000; Roux, 2002) mineral resources remain at the 
core of the economy. According to Butler (2004: 49), the diversification of the South 
African economy is illustrated by the domination of the services sector (65% of the 
GDP), followed by the secondary and the primary sector with respectively 20% and 
13% of the GDP. The South African economy is viewed as a combination of both a 
low-wage dependent economy and a high-skilled, competitive emerging economy 
(Castells, 2000: 122), with high technology business contrasting with extreme 
poverty. Because of these performances the South African economy was ranked the 
twentieth largest economy in the world (Roux, 2002: 2003).  
 
Furthermore, South African economic indicators and environment have increased 
foreign investors’ confidence. As regards evaluation of investment risks, South Africa 
was considered in the same category as Thailand and Malaysia (Jeune Afrique, 2004: 
232). However, South African economic growth has yet to be accompanied by large-
scale jobs creation. It is estimated that the unemployment rate is more than 25%, if 
one considers the strict and official definitions (Butler, 2004: 62). Unemployment 
rates are different from one province to another and from one race to another, as well 
as gender specific. One of the consequences of this lack of job creation is the 
importance of the part played by the population involved in the informal sector (20% 
in 2004, according to Jeune Afrique). 
 
4.3.2.3 Academic reasons 
After the demise of apartheid, South Africa had a double task as far as education was 
concerned. Apart from redefining a new academic system by bringing all racial 
components of the society into it, the ANC government was obliged to draw up an 
academic system able to allow the country to respond to the challenges of 
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globalisation and able to be the driving force behind the economic development. It 
was a question of designing and implementing research and teaching programmes 
with the main objective of producing a competitive labour force in the globalised 
world. By doing so, the country would also be able to commercialise its academic 
system in the global market and to attract international students. 
 
Higher education in South Africa is a national government competency that the 1996 
Constitution puts under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education (DoE). The 
DoE is also mandated to lead the higher education institutions to complete national 
policy goals by ensuring and providing those institutions plans and funding as stated 
by the Higher Education Act of 1997 (Cloete et al., 2004: 5). Along with the DoE, the 
Council on Higher Education (CHE) is also a major actor in higher education. It is a 
statutory and independent advisor to the DoE. The CHE has constitutional missions, 
including “monitoring the achievements of policy goals, reporting to the Parliament 
the state of higher education, … contributing to the development of higher education 
generally, and ensuring quality assurance (programmes accreditation, programmes 
reviews institutional audits and quality promotion” (Cloete et al., 2004: 6).  
 
The South African higher education system nowadays comprises public institutions, 
including universities, universities of technology and comprehensive universities, as 
well as private institutions. The number of public universities and technikons has been 
brought down as a consequence of the merger of higher institutions. The merger of 
higher institutions was one of the major measures undertaken by the government to 
allow students from all social origins to gain access to higher education, and to 
enhance opportunities for research and responsiveness for higher institutions. As a 
result of the merger, the country counts eleven universities, five universities of 
technology and six comprehensive universities.13 The country also has a number of 
private higher institutions.  
                                                 
13
 The new institutions after the merger are: eleven universities (University of Cape Town, Rhodes 
University, University of the Free State, University of KwaZulu-Natal, University of Limpopo, North-
West University, University of Pretoria, University of Fort Hare, University of Stellenbosch, 
University of the Western Cape and University of the Witwatersrand), five universities of technology 
(Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Central University of Technology, Durban Institute of 
Technology, Mangusuthu Technikon, Tswane University of Technology and Vaal University of 
Technology) and six comprehensive universities (University of Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela 
Metroplitan University, University of South Africa, Walter Sisulu University of Technology and 
Science, University of Venda for Science and Technology and University of Zululand) 
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The government has committed itself to ensure and maintain a financial backup to 
enable higher institutions to achieve their mission. Government spending for higher 
institutions was about 2.6% (approximately ten billion rand) of its total budget for the 
academic year 2004-2005. Generally, universities’ funds come from three different 
origins. Firstly, there are government allocations, which represent about half of their 
resources. Secondly, there are students’ fees which count for about 25% of their 
income. Lastly, private funds are provided by investments, fund-raising donations or 
entrepreneurial activities. However, government has redefined its funding framework 
which is both goal-oriented and performance related. It is goal oriented in the sense 
that government looks at the universities which are keen to achieve national policy 
goals. The new funding framework is also performance related because it emphasises 
teaching and research outputs. The teaching output grants are awarded for the 
numbers of full-time students, their field of study and their course level, whilst the 
research output grants are set to encourage research and publications.  
 
South African higher institutions are a key factor within the government policy on 
research development. Multidisciplinary fields of research aim to overcome the 
challenges on the path of South African development. Those fields of research are 
generally “characterised by excellence and generation of high-quality fundamental 
and applied knowledge for scientific publishing in local and international 
publications” (Cloete et al., 2004: 20). Research fields are roughly framed into four 
main sectors: higher education (21% of the total of the research is undertaken in this 
sector), the private sector (56%), the government sector (22%) and the non-profit 
sector. Government spends approximately ten million rand on research and 
development or 0.81% of the GDP for 2003-2004. Because research and development 
spending is considered as one of the indices to appreciate an economy’s 
competitiveness, the South African government has targeted to increase the country’s 
research and development expenditure to one per cent by 2008. The percentage of 
research and development of the South African GDP is below the percentage of the 
wealthiest countries (approximately 2.3%). Furthermore, out of the 72 countries most 
advanced technologically, South Africa was rated at the 39th position in 2001, as far 
as the technology achievement index is concerned, ahead of the countries such as 
Brazil and China. Moreover in the same year, researchers in higher education in South 
Africa realised 5 311 publications. Another increase as far as research is concerned 
 155 
has been the amount of income from contract research, which increased from 288 
millions rand to 637 million between 1996 and 2000. However, South Africa still 
lacks researchers. As a matter of fact, the 14 129 registered in the country represent a 
number of 2.2 researchers for 1 000 people. In comparison, Sweden has 10.6 
researchers for 1 000 people and Russia 7.4. However, the South African average is 
superior to the Brazilian or the Chinese ones.  
 
In contrast to most countries on the African continent, South African higher education 
is characterised by its ability to produce highly rated graduates, with knowledge, 
competencies and skills (Cloete et al., 2004: 20). South African higher education is 
likely to play a central role in the satisfaction of political, economic and social needs 
of the country and the continent. South African higher education institutions have 
proven themselves at the international level with new forms of information and 
communication technology and are part of the international higher education market. 
One of the other distinctions of South African higher institutions on the continent is 
their reputation. The first four African universities according to the Academic 
Rankings of World Universities are on the continent South Africans.14 The reputation 
of South African universities is the reason given by some students to explain their 
choice of South Africa as a destination to study: “My parents knew that UCT was 
internationally recognised and they wanted me to have more options” (Congolese 
student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004). 
 
These are the reasons why foreign students have been increasingly enrolled at South 
African public universities and private institutions. Foreigners come to teach and 
                                                 
14
 Alumni and staff winning Nobel Prizes and field medals, highly cited researchers, articles published 
in Nature and Science, articles indexed in major citation indices and the per capita acdemic 
performance of an institution are the academic or research performances that the Academic Rankings 
of World Universities considers criteria to rank the top 500 universities. For the 2004 edition, the first 
African universities are University of Cape Town, University of Witwatersrand, University of Pretoria 
and University of KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
Aduda and Matumba (2005) point out another university ranking by Intern Lab, a European 
organisation on science, technology and higher education. The Intern Lab ranking takes into account 
university’s outputs, quality of graduates, facilities and general contribution to new knowledge, as well 
as the level of application of science and technology, the universities’ presence on the internet and their 
use of information and technology. The top 10 of the ranking lists 9 South African universities with the 
University of Cape Town, the University of Stellenbosch, the University of Pretoria, the Universty of 
Rhodes, the University of Witwatersrand, the University of Western Cape and the University of South 
Africa occupying the first 7 places.  
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conduct research in South Africa because of the quality and the quantity of the 
infrastructure the country possesses.  
 
4.3.3 Summary of pull factors in South Africa 
4.3.3.1 Language factor 
Along with the reasons already mentioned, Francophone African migrants often point 
out the language factor as the motive for their arrival in South Africa. Many migrants 
believe that mastering an international language, particularly English, other than 
French is a major boost toward satisfying the demands on the international market: 
 
My mother left Congo twenty years ago with my father to Japan because my 
father got a bursary in Japan to finish his doctorate. And now he is working 
there. And the reason why we came here, my mother, my sister and me, it is 
because she wanted us to be able to speak another language rather than 
Japanese because we could only speak Japanese. It was either between 
Belgium and South Africa. Because it was difficult to start studying in French, 
we chose to come to South Africa where English is used, it was quicker to 
adapt (Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004). 
 
4.3.3.2 South Africa as a stopover 
The choice for coming to South Africa could be interpreted to a lesser extent as a 
consequence of failure to move to Europe or America. South Africa is viewed as an 
alternative to European or American countries. The country is considered a stopover 
because South Africa is closer in terms of transportation and communication links to 
European, American and Asian countries. In the meantime, migrants can make and 
save money for future moves elsewhere. In a few cases, arrival in South Africa is 
unexpected:  
 
My focus was to leave Congo and to go to a refugee camp in Malawi. And 
eventually from there, look at green pastures. Probably thinking of the United 
States or going to Australia or something like that. But while in Zambia, I was 
presented an opportunity for going to Mozambique rather than Malawi. This is 
why I went to Mozambique. I got another opportunity for coming to South 
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Africa. This is why I came to South Africa. Of course with no intention to stay 
at all, just to move on (Congolese refugee, Cape Town, October 30 2004). 
 
4.3.4 Perceptions of potential migrants about South Africa 
For many Africans who are outside the country, South Africa is well known because 
of its political history. The country became famous in Francophone Africa during the 
apartheid era, when news and images received from Western media portrayed South 
Africa as the place where the Black majority was oppressed by the White minority. 
For many Francophone Africans, South Africa therefore remains primarily, the 
country of apartheid:  
 
I heard about South Africa when I was at primary school. On the blackboard 
of our classroom in Saint Louis the schoolmaster had written: Apartheid is a 
crime against humanity, especially in South Africa. Since then, it has stayed in 
my mind (Senegalese man, Libreville, 21 July 2004).  
 
South African history is perceived as showing political resistance to the penetration of 
Europeans. The broadcast in the 1980s of the movie Chaka Zulu in most Francophone 
Africa countries popularised the country’s history in Africa. Nowadays, the country is 
seen through the struggle history of the country:  
 
South Africa is a great country which has a long history with great names like the 
king Chaka Zulu. It is also a country which has a great culture with beautiful 
traditional dances like the Zulu dances. But people of South Africa have suffered a 
lot because of the policy of apartheid. Fortunately God gave them sons like 
Nelson Mandela to free them. And the destiny also helped them a lot because at 
the right moment on the other side, Whites had an outstanding leader, who wanted 
the well-being for his country, De Klerk (Malian man, Libreville, 27 July 2004). 
 
Migrants’ perceptions about South Africa rely on the media and social capital. From 
the media, South Africa is seen as a new and growing economic powerhouse on the 
continent, a country able to show other African countries the path of development: 
“South Africa is a good country according to what I get from media. It is a country 
with more opportunities than here.” (Nigerian migrant, Libreville, 23 July 2004). 
 158 
Friends and family members who are already in South Africa often confirm the idea 
of South Africa as a country of opportunities more than most of the other African 
countries. The idea of migrating to South Africa is a real possibility for some, but 
many factors are taken into account:  
 
I must sufficiently prepare myself, to see if first I must go alone and thereafter 
to call my family. These are all the questions that it is necessary to solve 
before undertaking any departure. Going to South Africa will be useful for me 
in that sense that I will go to perfect my speciality in better conditions. I 
believe that they have good hospitals because many Gabonese who have 
money go there to be looked after. I will also go to learn a new language, 
because mastering English almost becomes an obligation in these days of 
globalisation. Finally the other reason of going to South Africa will be to 
discover a new culture (Cameroonian, Libreville, 27 July 2004). 
 
However, South Africa is also perceived as a home for xenophobia and the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. As far as these issues are concerned, media and social capital also play a 
major role in building popular perceptions. These issues therefore contribute to 
consideration of South Africa as somehow not an ideal destination:  
 
Frankly, I hate South Africa because some of brothers who are there tell us 
that people are racists and xenophobes. I think that racism is not over yet and 
even through the media we see how dogs are let loose on foreigners. How can 
Black leaders of an African country tolerate such things on Black brothers of 
other African countries, who also helped them when they were struggling 
against apartheid? And there is much AIDS there. It is not a good country 
(Senegalese man, Libreville, 21 July 2004). 
 
Lack of social capital also is viewed as inconvenient for migrating. Few people 
outside South Africa consider coming to the country if they are not part of a 
community network:  
 
South Africa appears to be a good country, but I do not know anyone there 
who can help me. This is why I prefer to go to France. And France is more 
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developed than South Africa. Otherwise if I knew people, I could first go there 
to have more money and sure that from there, it may be easier to go to Europe 
than here (Congolese, Libreville, 29 July 2004). 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The departure of Francophone Africans from their countries of origin relies on a 
combination of several factors. The evolution of political life since independence in 
Francophone Africa with some consequences such as the implementation of the 
single-party regime, the arrival of soldiers as heads of state, the long-term reign of 
some presidents, the expansion of numerous conflicts, the collapse of the economies 
of these countries, the spread of poverty, socio-cultural context, environmental 
catastrophes and the collapse of academic system have also created a range of 
migrants to various countries, including South Africa. South Africa attracts people 
from other parts of the continent and beyond by its political achievements with the 
organisation of democratic elections, freedom of the press and the implementation of 
several institutions of regulation, as well as the country’s economic leadership on the 
continent and its academic infrastructures. These push factors in Francophone Africa 
and pull factors in South Africa define the features of migrants and their modes of 
arrival, which are different from one category to another as well as from one migrant 
to another within each category. 
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Chapter Five 
                   
                  THE ARRIVAL AND THE LIFE OF FRANCOPHONE  
               AFRICANS IN CAPE TOWN 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The prime focus of this chapter is the analysis of Francophone African migrants in 
Cape Town, especially their modes of arrival and living conditions in the city. In so 
doing, the chapter identifies the categories of migrants considered for the study and 
discusses their differences and singularities; where relevant, aspects of South African 
state policy towards migrants are described with each category. This chapter first 
summarises the cosmopolitan quality of the city as a consequence of various historical 
flows of migration. Secondly it gives a profile of legal migrants, students, refugees 
and extra-legals. The profile of refugees and extra-legals is less detailed quantitatively 
than the profile of legal migrants and students because less official data is available.  
 
5.2 The arrival of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town 
In this section, the relation between Cape Town and the arrival of Francophone 
African migrants is considered. Firstly, the section outlines Cape Town as a city with 
a historical legacy of migration. Secondly, the section discusses the reasons why 
migrants view Cape Town as a destination of their extended migration. Lastly, the 
profiles of the categories of migrants considered in this study are presented. 
 
5.2.1 Cape Town a city of migration 
Considered the oldest city in the southern part of the continent, the mother of cities 
has seen itself transformed from a mere station supplying goods for sailors during the 
exploration era at its beginning in the middle of the seventeenth century to a 
multiculturalist city at the beginning of the third millennium. Cape Town is primarily 
the outcome of the history of the migration of people from various regions.  
 
The station at the Cape, created after the arrival of Jan Van Riebeck on 6 April 1652, 
was viewed first of all as a stopover for the supply of fresh water, fruit, vegetables, 
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and meat, as well as for ship repairs for ships en route to Asia. The station was the 
property of the Vereenigde OostIndische Compagnie or VOC in other words the 
Dutch East India Company. Although the Company allowed independent settlers to 
establish themselves beyond the limits of the station era, due in part to the 
overpopulation within the station area (Terreblanche, 2002: 155), the supplies in 
agricultural products were not sufficiently forthcoming. The arrival of European 
settlers was followed by the arrival of the first forced immigrants to the Cape, slaves 
needed by both the Company and the private farmers to be used as farm workers and 
domestic servants.  
 
Terreblanche (2002: 157) defines three phases of the arrival of slaves in the Cape. 
During the initial phase (from 1652 to 1717), slaves already outnumbered the settlers 
as the slave population counted for about 2000 people. Up until the second phase, the 
slave population kept growing and reached 29 000 when the British suspended the 
slave trade. The need for more slaves during the last phase (which ended in 1838) was 
dictated by economic expansion. The slave population in the Cape was particular 
because of their cosmopolitan composition, as the slaves were from such diverse 
origins as Western Africa, Angola, Mozambique, the Indonesian archipelago and the 
Indian subcontinent. Martin (1999: 51) notes that 26.4% of the slaves in the Cape 
came from the African continent (expect Madagascar, which supplied 25.1%) and of 
25.9% were from the Asian continent.  
 
Over the years, the Cape was transformed by a “creolisation process” because of 
“extensive miscegenation between slaves and whites, and between slaves and 
Khoisan” (Terreblanche, 2002: 158). The creolisation process resulted in a mixed 
society within which each part brought its own culture and interchanged it with 
another to build a unique one. That mixed society also distinguished itself from the 
world of the masters of the slaves. Language, religion and music were among the 
cultural elements which characterised the creolisation of the Cape society. Apart from 
the language used by the Khoikhoi people and the Dutch spoken by Europeans 
settlers, other European languages such as French, Portuguese, Portuguese Creole and 
various Asian languages were also spoken in the Cape (Martin, 1999: 57). Dutch also 
became creolised and a new language emerged known as Afrikaans. 
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As pointed out by Martin (1999: 55), Christianity was not fully adopted by slaves or 
the Khoikhoi populations because Europeans settlers decided not to Christianise the 
slaves. The Asian slaves developed and spread Islam across the Cape under the 
guidance of Sheik Yusuf of Macassar (Martin, 1999: 55).  
 
The interaction between different cultures resulted in a large repertoire of music and 
dances. European settlers developed a habit of having slave orchestras. Apart from 
entertaining their masters, the slaves also played and danced for their own pleasure in 
the taverns or on the streets. Later, the expression of joy, celebrated through music 
and dances, particularly during the New Year, gave birth to Cape Town’s New Year 
festival (Martin, 1999: 64).  
 
The evolution of Cape Town has been characterised by its transformation into one of 
the main entries of European imperialism into the continent. Thereafter, the city was 
remodelled according to apartheid policy which separated areas according to races. 
Relocations were undertaken through legislative tools such as the Native Land Act of 
1913, the Group Areas Act of 1948 and the Natives Resettlement Act of 1954 
(Hofmeister, 2001: 1819). The redeployment of the population of District Six to the 
Cape Flats is one famously tragic relocation. In 1966, District Six which was 
considered too close to the centre of the city was declared a white area according to 
the law. District Six was viewed as the epicentre of the coloured culture, with 
coloured secondary schools and high quality intellectuals (Ross, 1999: 136). 
 
The configuration of Cape Town is still dominated by the legacy of fragmentation and 
segregation (Turok, 2000: 4). Cape Town, like other cities in the country, was 
organised along racial lines to keep the population separated. As pointed out by 
Planact (quoted by Liebenberg, 2002: 36), the apartheid city was characterised by 
“racial division of residential areas, buffer zones between residential areas, racial 
separation of amenities, separation of the poor from social facilities, informal 
settlement on the urban fringe and urban sprawl.” One of the major consequences of 
apartheid city planning is the importance of physical mobility, especially for low-
income workers from their zones of habitation to their workplaces. Considering the 
results of the 1996 census, Turok (2001: 6) points out that “The Cape Town CDB, 
together with the northern and southern arms, houses some 37% of the population but 
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contains over 80% of all jobs in the CMA.” A real urban integration has been 
proposed as one means to develop the city. In fact, the construction of low- income 
housing closer to established employment centres and the development of an 
economic base in the township are ways to a solid integration of the city.  
 
The economic development of Cape Town has been dominated by important 
investments in economic zones such as Tyger Valley, Milnerton, the Waterfront, the 
CDB and Claremont. According to Turok (2001: 14), decentralisation, 
deconcentration, northern drift and differentiation are the four keys points of those 
operations of investment. He argues that decentralisation has been effective by 
moving away some economic activities from the CDB to the suburban centres. 
Although not a new pattern of development in the city, decentralisation has in the last 
twenty years been prominent by its acceleration. Decentralisation has also been 
effective for office rents, which is lower in some zones such as Tyger Valley or 
Claremont than in the CDB. Turok also admits that through deconcentration economic 
activity has been moved away from established centres to a more dispersed pattern of 
development. Service providers such as accountants, lawyers and IT suppliers have 
established their offices in higher-residential areas, mainly in the northern suburbs. 
This has put them closer to suburban customers. Deconcentration has also been 
illustrated by siting business parks and office buildings on under-utilised land outside 
the economic zones. That is the case for parts of school playgrounds in Camps Bay 
and Rhodes, the racecourses in Kenilworth, golf courses and sports clubs.  
 
As far as northern drift is concerned, property development has allowed private 
investment, jobs and resources to move northwards. Between 1999 and 2001, 72 
major projects were undertaken in the northern suburbs with 35 in the central city 
districts, 24 in the southern suburbs and nine in the southeast. Finally, Turok points 
out that differentiation has seen “economic centres to specialise in different market 
segments.” Environment, prices and residential segregation are the driving forces 
behind the targeting of specific groups of the population by retailing and consumer 
services. Shopping malls such as Sanlam Centre in Bellville and N1 City in 
Goodwood are close to lower income and mainly non-white consumers, while 
Cavendish Square in Claremont and the Waterfront are upmarket shopping malls. 
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Differentiation can be viewed as an obstacle to integration of the city since it 
enhances segregation and spatial separation.  
 
Since 1994, the administrative boundaries of Cape Town have also changed. The first 
change occurred in 1999, when the 39 local authorities and 19 administrations were 
transformed to seven councils. After the local elections of December 2000, the seven 
councils were demarcated into a unique council called the Cape Metropolitan Area 
(Eva: 2002: 1). According to the 2001 census, the racial makeup of the city was 
represented by 48.13% Coloured, 31.68% Blacks, 18.75% White and 1.43% Indians. 
Meanwhile, the most spoken language at home was Afrikaans with a percentage of 
41.4%, followed by isiXhosa with 28.7% and English 27.9%. According to Eva 
(2002: 1), the population of the Cape Metropolitan Area was approximately 3 million 
in 2002, a number expected to rise to 3. 4 million by 2005. 
 
South Africa in general and Cape Town in particular have been reintegrated into the 
world economic and political arena after the demise of apartheid. The city, as well the 
whole country is now part of the integrated and globalised world, mostly because of 
the technological innovations and information technologies which have made the 
world a shrinking place. Within the integrated world, some cities, called world cities, 
play a pivotal role as they are hubs of international finance and business, corporate 
and communication services, as well as carriers of mass information and culture (Van 
der Merwe, 2004: 1). World cities, because of infrastructures, facilitate the flows of 
capital, people, information and commodities, and focus on the relationships and 
connections between them. According to the seven hypotheses described by Sassen 
(2001: 1810), Van der Merwe proposes to take into account the unique context of 
historical, geographical, cultural and developmental settings before conceptualising, 
analysing and integrating any global feature in Africa. He has come out with a 
recommendation that puts Johannesburg as the strongest contender in sub- Sahara 
Africa to satisfy international recognition as a world city. Two other African cities, 
Cape Town and Nairobi come behind Johannesburg.  
 
These cities attract highly skilled people to satisfy the needs expressed by the role and 
profile of world cities which also are favourable destinations for thousands of 
unskilled workers to be domestic servants, waiters or drivers of the highly skilled 
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people. If one considers Cape Town a world city regarding Africa or as a contender to 
be a world city according to international expectations, it will become obvious that 
Cape Town is also attracting thousand of migrants, especially from all over the 
continent. 
 
5.2.2 The reasons for coming to Cape Town 
5.2.2.1 Cape Town as an alternative 
Johannesburg has been the main South African gateway to the rest of the world since 
the readmission of the country into the international arena. The arrival of thousands of 
foreigners in Johannesburg did not begin with the reintegration of South Africa into 
the international community, because Johannesburg had in fact been one of host cities 
for mine workers since the discovery of gold when the Witwatersrand main reef was 
uncovered in 1886. The creation of the city itself was the outcome of the need of 
migrant workers. In fact, one of the constraints on the gold industry in the Transvaal 
was that the price of gold was fixed in London. It was therefore vital to minimise the 
costs, especially wages, as low as possible in order to maximise profits. The outcome 
was the recruitment of thousands of unskilled and cheap workers throughout the 
southern part of the African continent.  
 
Nowadays, Johannesburg in particular and the Gauteng Province in general remain 
the primary destination for migrants within South Africa as showed by the Figure 4 
and as illustrated by Jacobsen and Landau (2003: 3). Of the population of the Gauteng 
Province, 5.4% was foreign born in comparison to 2.3% for the whole country. For 
many people, as for its Executive Mayor, Amos Masondo in 2004, Johannesburg has 
been considered as a lure for South African nationals as well as for people from the 
rest of the African continent and beyond (Landau, 2004: 13).  
 
Johannesburg is the first African city likely to be considered a global city (Landau, 
2004; Van der Merwe, 2004) offering economic, educational and cultural possibilities 
to a diverse, dynamic and heterogeneous population. Johannesburg is also the most 
well known city outside South Africa (Bouillon & Morris, 2001: 35). It is therefore 
the first choice of Francophone Africans coming to South Africa. “Honestly speaking, 
the only city I knew before coming here was Johannesburg. “When I came to South 
Africa, it was to Johannesburg” (Cameroonian man, Cape Town, 22 October 2004).  
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By being the most well known city in South Africa for many Francophone Africans, 
Johannesburg is considered the first choice to satisfy their reasons for arrival in the 
country. In comparison, in many Francophone African countries, most economic, 
cultural and educational activities are centralised in the main cities, especially the 
capitals. This is the case of Dakar in Senegal, Libreville in Gabon, Bamako in Mali 
and Brazzaville in Congo. In Gabon, for instance, more than half of the total 
population lives in Libreville (Pambou-Loueya, 2003: 334). Many Francophone 
African main cities have transportation links with Johannesburg, as Francophone 
African airline companies have considered Johannesburg to be the main South 
African city to serve. In this case, the choice of Johannesburg, the biggest the South 
African city, as port of entry into South Africa is merely a matter of convenience .  
 
For many Francophone African migrants the choice of coming to Johannesburg is an 
individual initiative. 
 
I did not have any choice because the most important thing to do was finding 
any kind of way to make a living. While in Zambia, we paid money to 
someone to organise the trip for us and we did get help in Johannesburg when 
we arrived. This is why we came to Johannesburg; we did know that much 
about South Africa (Rwandese refugee, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005). 
 
The choice of coming to Johannesburg by Francophone African migrants also 
depends on social capital implemented by migrant communities in Johannesburg to 
enhance further arrivals. Various familial, religious and trafficking networks are the 
main reasons why many Francophone African migrants prefer Johannesburg as port 
of entry into South Africa:  
 
Fortunately for me, I had a friend who was also a student. He arrived two 
years before my arrival in Johannesburg. We kept in touch by exchanging 
letters and he told me about South Africa, about the situation here. When I 
came, I already knew what I was expected (Cameroonian man, Cape Town, 20 
October 2004). 
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However, migrants often do not reach the objectives they expected before their arrival 
in Johannesburg. In general, African migrants are confronted with several obstacles. 
One of these is the lack of economic opportunities. Many migrants are unable to find 
a decent work position despite their level of education. In Johannesburg, the migrants’ 
first experience in South Africa is their inability to make a livehood or achieve their 
expectation due to “prohibitions on work, lack of identity documents or papers 
demonstrating professional qualifications, and discriminatory hiring practices” 
(Jacobsen & Landau, 2003: 6).  
 
It is almost impossible to find a descent job when you are a refugee. They will 
ask something impossible of not hiring you such as a South African ID or a 
work permit. How a foreign refugee can have a South African ID? I know 
some friends of mine who had a chance to get a job. Yes there are some 
refugees who are working and earning money allowing them to live decently, 
but the percentage is too low (Congolese refugee, Johannesburg, 28 March 
2005). 
 
In Johannesburg, migrants are also confronted by administrative hurdles from the 
Department of Home Affairs, particularly regarding the issue of acquiring documents. 
Although the fact that possessing required documents does not guarantee social 
integration, documents could facilitate migrants’ lives by giving access to social or 
banking services for instance. The waiting period often lasts longer than the six 
months stated by law:  
 
When I arrived, I went unsuccessfully to Home Affairs for two months to try 
to get proper documents. Then I was introduced to someone, an interpreter, 
who could help me. I gave him money and few days later I got my documents. 
And we get the documents for a month or three only. When your documents 
are expired, you have to go back to Home Affairs. But you do not often get a 
chance to have the documents through the official channel; you do not have 
any choice than going to see the same person who helped you before. And to 
get the refugee status, the process is even longer and difficult. You have to 
give more money (Congolese refugee, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005). 
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The last major obstacles faced by migrants in Johannesburg are safety and the issue of 
xenophobia. 
 
One of the reasons I found myself here is because South Africa is an African 
country. I told myself better going to an African country than going overseas 
because there, people make your life more difficult. This is an African country 
but the police make you like you do not belong here. My worry and my 
questions are: why they only arrest black illegal migrants, black Africans? 
What about Chinese, European, Arabs? Why only Black Africans? This is 
where xenophobia comes out because they look at the colour of your skin to 
judge you (Cameroonian man, Johannesburg, 28 March 2005). 
 
One of the main reasons behind the interest in Cape Town was the growing number of 
foreigners in Johannesburg, which was already considered overpopulated by 
foreigners. Considered, along with the Nigerians, as the most important African 
community in Johannesburg, Zairians were estimated by Bouillon and Morris (2001: 
70) to be around 23 000 in 1995. The search for other cities with better opportunities 
was therefore the cause of the move of thousands of Africans down to the Western 
Cape. By being a port of entry, Cape Town gave the opportunity to some migrants to 
take the first chance and start their settlement in the city before moving around the 
country.  
 
The growing number of Francophone Africans in Cape Town could also be viewed as 
the consequence of the first settlements in the city. Arrivals might have been 
encouraged by the success of “the pioneers” who thereafter either asked others to join 
them or motivated others to do so. In this case, “the pioneers” contribute to spreading 
knowledge about Cape Town back to their own countries or their last residence. 
Therefore, as pointed out by Olaleye (2000: 133), “the information becomes crucial in 
understanding the factors underlying the decision of African immigrants to move to 
Cape Town.” The search for a safer place could be the reason, at first glance, for the 
increase in the number of migrants in Cape Town between 1996 and 2001. 
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5.2.2.2 Cape Town as the first choice 
Some migrants interviewed arrived in Cape Town straight from their countries of 
origin. As far as the categories considered, mostly legally employed migrants and 
students consider Cape Town the first choice when they migrate to South Africa. The 
outcomes of this study reveal that the choice of Cape Town is made when the 
migrants are still in their countries of origin. By applying for work and student 
permits in their home countries, these two categories of migrants are aware of Cape 
Town before their arrival in South Africa.  
 
Yes I knew back home that I was going to Cape Town and I came straight to 
Cape Town. I just spent one night in Johannesburg because when I landed it 
was very late. So, I took another plane to Cape Town the following morning 
(Ivorian man, Cape Town, 19 October 2004). 
 
Apart from the reasons mentioned above, the choice of Cape Town as a destination in 
South Africa is because of its reputation and the opportunities the city can offer. It 
must be emphasised that the preference of Cape Town by some migrants over 
Johannesburg does not mean that the Mother City offers more economic or academic 
opportunities than Johannesburg. The number of the foreign population is larger in 
Johannesburg than in Cape Town, if one considers the results of the 1996 and 2001 
censuses or other figures on Francophone African migrants in South Africa (see 
Appendix). However, for many interviewees Cape Town could offer a better chance 
of getting a job than Johannesburg: 
 
When I arrived in Johannesburg for the first time, I succeeded to get a job. 
When my contract expired, I decided to go to Cape Town because people had 
been saying that it was easy to find a job there. I left Johannesburg by train on 
Friday night. On Saturday I arrived in Cape Town and on Tuesday I found a 
job (Congolese, Cape Town, 29 March 2005). 
 
The arrival of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town can also be interpreted as 
a no-choice situation. Students who are already in the country especially fall into this 
category because they generally go where their applications are accepted: 
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First I contacted some Congolese who were already at UCT for a while but 
things did not go well because they wanted to spoil my money. Fortunately for 
me, my uncle helped me a lot. And I was in touch with a German lecturer who 
agreed to supervise me. Then I decided to come down. After a discussion with 
the head of the department, everything seemed fine. However, with the rest of 
the staff of the department, it was difficult because they wanted to be sure that 
there would not be a lack of funding as far as my sponsorship is concerned. 
Then I chose another department and my uncle step up as my sponsor 
(Congolese student, Cape Town, 22 March 2005). 
 
The comparison of some indicators between Johannesburg and Cape Town can also 
help to better understand some of the reasons why some migrants prefer to move to 
Cape Town. The indicators give some benchmarks of conditions and performance 
over time. The indicators outlined here are those considered by the South African 
Cities Network, which aims to define a City Development Index (CDI). The index is 
intended to measure the state of the development of cities through five sectors: 
education, health, waste, infrastructure and city-level gross geographic product (South 
African Cities Network, 2004: 174). 
 
Table 9: Comparison of the population and employment rates between 
Johannesburg and Cape Town 
Indicators Johannesburg Cape Town 
Percentage of 
population growth 
between 1996 and 2001 
22.33 12.86 
Percentage of employed 
people 
70.85 (1996) 
62.65 (2001) 
80.45 (1996) 
70.84 (2001) 
Source: South African Cities Network. 2004. State of the Cities Report, 2004. 
 
 171 
As shown by the table above, the growth of the population is more prominent in 
Johannesburg than in Cape Town between the two years considered. One could 
conclude that the availability of resources then becomes rare, especially if the creation 
of wealth does not follow the same path as the growth in the population. The 
percentage of the employed population could corroborate this trend. The percentage 
of employed people is larger in Cape Town than in Johannesburg in both 1996 and 
2001, although there is a decrease in both. However, the decrease is even more 
evident in Johannesburg. Although Table 5 does not specifically highlight the features 
of migrants, it nevertheless gives an indication of the situation in the two cities and 
could in some extent justify the belief that there are more chances to get a job in Cape 
Town than in Johannesburg, although the latter city has more job opportunities. 
 
5.3 Profiles of Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town 
Legal African migration to South Africa was remodeled soon after the demise of 
apartheid. As far as the labour market is concerned, for instance, South African 
companies have been able to recruit further afield and outside the framework of 
contract migration which had regulated the arrival of the mine and farm workers from 
surrounding countries. The numerous migration acts have given a legal framework for 
Francophone Africans to enter South Africa. As described in Chapter 3, entering 
South Africa legally occurs through the various permits issued by the DHA as stated 
by the Immigration Act of 2002. 
 
As defined by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2004: 20), legal 
migrants refer to documented people and their families authorised to enter a specific 
country, to stay and, if applicable, engage in a remunerated activity in the state of 
stay. Legal migration in South Africa is characterised by the dichotomised features of 
both emigration and immigration. 
 
5.3.1 Legal migration to South Africa 
Along with the emigration of thousands of South Africans (shown in Section 3.7 of 
Chapter 3), the other side of the dichotomy of legal migration in South Africa is the 
position adopted by the government towards immigration by strengthening the 
immigration policy since 1994. By choosing to restrict its immigration policy, South 
Africa has not attracted as many skilled migrants as possible. The dichotomy of legal 
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migration in South Africa is therefore illustrated by the departure of skilled South 
Africans overseas, while these departures have not been compensated by a large 
number of immigrants.  
 
The country has not fully compensated for the departure of thousands of people 
abroad by the arrival of a more competitive or innovative labour force which South 
Africa desperately needs. Meanwhile emigration, along with the shortcomings in the 
education system, has allowed the country to face a shortage of higher skilled 
workers. The lack of skills is the main concern for the South African economy, as 
argued by the Minister of Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin: “in every sector of our 
economy, highly skilled labour is in demand and vacancies cannot be filled” (CDE, 
2002: 7). The labour market is threatened by the rapid spread of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, which creates more questions than answers, particularly concerning the 
future of labour force in South Africa. According to the United Nations estimations 
quoted by Akokpari (2002: 237), South Africa will lose approximately 25% of its 
labour force by 2020 as the bulk of this labour force, i.e. young people aged between 
20 to 30, are either infected or at risk of being infected. Thus, in order to avoid facing 
a labour crisis in the near future, the South African government should reshape its 
immigration policy and making the country a more attractive place for thousands of 
migrants. South Africa could be a home for skilled migrants among the 7.1 million 
Africans who are economically involved in other countries on the continent (IOM, 
2005: 40). Surely Africans will be more interested in coming to South Africa because 
the country is among the few that can offer more opportunities on the continent. 
However, foreigners could be reluctant to invest in a country with such a shortage of 
skilled workers. 
 
Since 1994, South Africa has witnessed the arrival of thousands of foreigners who 
come to the country mostly for tourism, business or visits. According to Crush (2003), 
it is estimated that from 3.7 million of people entering to the country in 1992, the 
number has increased to 9.9 million in 1999. Apart from people entering South Africa 
for the reasons mentioned above, data realised by Statistics South Africa gives an 
insight into documented immigrants entering South Africa annually over a decade as 
shown below.  
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                Table 10: Documented immigrants in South Africa from 1993 to 2003 
Years Number of immigrants 
1993 9 824 
1994 6 389 
1995 5 064 
1996 5 407 
1997 4 103 
1998 4 371 
1999 3 669 
2000 3 053 
2001 4 832 
2002 6 545 
2003 10 578 
Total 63 844 
Source: www.statssa.gov.za 
 
The data does not take into account migrants who have regularised their situation 
despite entering into the country previously under another status. Nevertheless, the 
table highlights the decrease of documented immigrants in the country up to 2000. 
This could be explained by doubts raised outside the country following the taking 
over by the ANC government in 1994. Another reason might possibly be violence and 
safety, which have put Johannesburg among the most violent cities worldwide for 
some years. The HIV/AIDS pandemic and the low levels of the country’s currency 
could complete the reasons which demotivate many people about possible to South 
Africa. However, the trend was reversed from 2001 to 2003, when the number of 
immigrants was greater than in 1993. The increase in the flow of migration is caused 
by the combination of several factors. The success in tourism has boosted the South 
African image worldwide. The success of the South African economy, the value of 
the currency, which is one of the strongest on the continent, and South African 
opportunities have also attracted foreigners. One can expect more newcomers in the 
future, especially with the forthcoming Soccer World Cup in 2010. 
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For a better understanding of the types of migrants coming to South Africa, it is 
important to establish their origins, especially the origins of African migrants and the 
places of their settlement inside the country. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of foreign African migrants in South Africa in 1996  
(N= 271 943) and 2001 (N= 345 151) 
 
Source: statssa.gov.za 
 
According to both the 1996 and the 2001 census, a large number of Africans migrants 
in South Africa comes from the neighbouring countries of the SADC region. Despite 
a slightly decrease from 96.27% to 92.76% from 1996 to 2001, the bulk of 
immigrants still come from the sub-region. Besides the geographical proximity, South 
Africa has been the main destination in the southern part of the continent since the 
nineteenth century. Since 1994, the country has also attracted Africans coming from 
further afield. The table clearly shows the increase of people coming from outside the 
SADC region from 3.73 to 7.24% between the two years.  
 
The end of apartheid opened the country’s doors to many immigrants, especially 
Africans, because the number of mine and farm workers recruited throughout the sub-
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region has decreased. Consequently, the percentage of people coming from the 
neighbouring countries has also decreased relative to the flow of African migrants 
coming from further afield. The end of armed conflicts in some countries such as 
Angola and Mozambique has also contributed to the decrease in the number of 
immigrants from the SADC countries. SADC countries are still the main providers of 
African migrants in South Africa, but other African migrants coming from outside the 
SADC region have increased between 1996 and 2001.  
 
The results of both the 1996 and 2001 censuses provide an indication of the residence 
within the country of foreign African migrants as far as provinces are concerned, as 
described by the two figures below. 
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Figure 4: Provincial percentage of foreign African migrants in South Africa in 
1996 (N=271 943) 
 
Eastern Cape, 1.86Free State, 18.63
Gauteng, 42.14
KwaZulu-Natal, 3.29
Mpumalanga, 7.55
Northern Cape, 
0.47
Northern Province, 
9.52
Western Cape, 2.46
North West, 14.08
 
Source: www.statssa.gov.za 
 
The figure clearly shows Gauteng as the main receiving province in South Africa with 
regard to the residence of foreign African migrants in 1996. Gauteng is followed by 
provinces located on the borders of the country (with the exception of Northern 
Cape), namely Free State, North West, Northern Province and Mpumalanga. With 2.4 
%, Western Cape is among the least attractive provinces as far as the foreign African 
migrants are concerned.  
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Figure 5: Provincial percentage of foreign African migrants in South Africa in 
2001 (N=345 151) 
 
Eastern Cape, 2.41
Free State, 7.86
Gauteng, 44.74
KwaZulu-Natal, 
5.83
Limpopo, 11.16
Mpumalanga, 9.05
Northern Cape, 
0.44
 North West, 14.41
Western Cape, 4.1
 
Source: statssa.gov.za 
 
The overall trend shows an increase of the percentage of foreign African migrants in 
all provinces, with the exception of Free State and Northern Cape. These two 
provinces are also the least attractive border provinces. North West, Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga followed Gauteng in hosting foreign African migrants. Al though its 
percentage increases between 1996 and 2001, Western Cape remains among the least 
attractive provinces as far as the foreign African migrants are concerned. 
 
The prominent economic role of Gauteng, particularly the importance of 
Johannesburg and the country’s capital city (Pretoria) are among the reasons Gauteng 
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hosts most of foreign African migrants. Moreover, the proximity of neighbouring 
countries, including Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and 
Lesotho could be a major factor behind the importance of North West, Limpopo, 
Mpumalanga and Free State (in 1996), in hosting foreign African migrants. 
 
5.3.2 Francophone African legal migration to Cape Town 
In this sub-section, I will focus on two types of migrants to describe the arrival and 
the lives of Francophone Africans in Cape Town, legal migrant workers and legal 
economic migrants. The term legal migrant worker is applied to those who occupy a 
remunerated activity in a private or public company. These are professionals such as 
doctors, lecturers, accountants and administrative assistants. Legal economic migrants 
are those who are self-employed by running their own businesses, especially in the 
informal sector, those considered in this study are mostly street sellers.  
 
5.3.2.1 A demographic profile of Francophone African legal migrants in Cape 
Town 
As is the case at national level, an attempt to quantify Francophone African migrants 
in Cape Town is not an easy exercise. Several estimations have been released without 
giving the exact number. Roughly, Boaden (2002) points out a scale estimation from 
30 000 to 50 000 foreign Africans living in the entire Western Cape. 
 
The demographic profile of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town will be 
analysed through two categories of sources. I firstly consider the official data based 
on the 1996 and 2001 censuses. 
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Figure 6: Repartition of the foreign African population in Cape Town in 1996 
(N=6683) 
SADC
83%
Rest of Africa
12%
Francophone 
Africa
5%
 
Source: www.statssa.gov.za 
 
As far as Cape Town is concerned, the large number of foreigners in Cape Town 
came from the neighbouring countries, while Nigeria is the provider of migrants 
coming from the rest of the continent. At 5% Francophone Africans were the least 
populous migrant community residing in Cape Town, according the results of the 
1996 census. Only a few years after South African readmission into the international 
political arena, Cape Town found itself invaded by Africans coming from further 
afield, some without any knowledge of the city. As illustrated by the figure below, the 
bulk of Francophone African migrants came from the countries that are members of 
the SADC, such as Mauritius and the former Zaire. The rest of the migrants were 
from the two countries involved in armed conflicts.  
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Figure 7: Percentage of Francophone Africans in Cape Town in 1996 (N=353) 
 
Source: www.statssa.gov.za 
 
Zaire (now DRC), surely and due in particular to political, economic and social 
problems, coupled with geographical proximity, was largely the provider of French-
speaking Africans in Cape Town. The same problems plus armed conflicts which 
occurred after the implementation of democracy in Congo could be viewed as the 
motives behind the arrival of many Congolese in Cape Town. The presence of 
Algerians and Mauritians could be explained primarily by political and religious 
tensions (for Algerians) and geographical proximity (for Mauritians). 
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Figure 8: Percentage of African migrants in Cape Town in 1996 (N= 6 683) and 
2001 (N=12 103) 
 
Source: www.statssa.gov.za 
 
Although the SADC countries remain the main source of foreign African migrants in 
Cape Town between 1996 and 2001, the percentage of migrants from these countries 
drops significantly between 1996 and 2001. This is mainly because the portion of 
foreign African migrants coming from the rest of Africa increases from 17.04 % to 
35.78% between the two years. 
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Figure 9: Repartition of the foreign African population in Cape Town in 2001 
(N=11914) 
SADC
64%
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Africa
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Rest of Africa
14%
 
Source: www.statssa.gov.za 
 
The change between the two dates is due to the increase in the number of 
Francophone Africans in the tally of African migrants. By 2001, they represented 
22% of African migrants, even more than migrants coming from the rest of African 
countries. However, the percentage of French-speaking Africans in Cape Town 
remains far less important than the percentage of people from the SADC countries. As 
far as their nationalities are concerned, from five countries in 1996, by 2001 migrants 
were coming from 13 different countries on the continent, as shown the figure below. 
It is also interesting to note that countries involved in armed conflicts, such as Congo, 
DRC, Rwanda and Burundi were the greatest suppliers of Francophone African 
migrants to Cape Town in 2001. Francophone African countries, such as Senegal, 
Mali and Cameroon, known as countries of emigration, were also represented. 
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Figure 10: Percentage of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town in 2001 
(N=2462)
 
Source: www.statssa.gov.za 
 
Overall, Francophone African migration to Cape Town followed the general trend of 
African migration to South Africa between the years considered. As far as the volume 
of migrants is concerned, the flows of Francophone Africans, including migrants from 
the rest of continent, increased tremendously in Cape Town, Gauteng Province and 
the entire country. Although their volume also increased, the value of migrants from 
neighbouring countries dropped in the tally of African migrants in Cape Town, 
Gauteng Province as well as in the whole country. Except from the countries in the 
southern hemisphere of the continent, French-speaking Africans also came from 
Central and Western Africa and the northern part of continent.  
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I would like now to give a guesstimate the demographic profile of Francophone 
Africans in Cape Town by considering the data realised by three non-official sources, 
which highlight Francophone African migration to South Africa. Bouillon and Morris 
(2001), Fall (2004) and Letourneux and Zemmouri (2005) estimate that there were 
respectively 20 00, 250 000 and 110 000 French-speaking Africans in South Africa. 
From these figures, and as detailed in Appendix 2, I estimate the number of 
Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town was 13 500 in 2005. 
 
5.3.2.2 The lives of Francophone Africans legal migrants in Cape Town 
Studying Francophone African migration to Cape Town primarily involves looking at 
the reasons behind their decision to leave their respective countries and their 
migration histories, i.e. their trip down to the southern tip of the continent. Despite 
being on the African continent, Cape Town is for many another world in the sense 
that it is far away from their home countries in distance and in their minds. For 
instance, it is easier for Moroccans, Algerians, Senegalese and Malians to reach Paris 
than Cape Town in term of distance.  
 
As far as both legal migrant workers and legal economic migrants are concerned, 
there are two ways of reaching Cape Town. For 66% of the interviewees, their 
journey was straight from their countries to Johannesburg. “I took a flight from Dakar 
and we make a stop over in Libreville in Gabon for four hours before coming to 
Johannesburg.” (Senegalese man, Cape Town, 22 June 2004). For others, the trip to 
Cape Town looks more like multiple adventures. Here is the journey of a 
Cameroonian who spent almost three years between Buea in his country to Cape 
Town: 
 
I left Cameroon in 1994, the 2nd of December. I went to Gabon where I was 
repatriated because I did not have a visa. They asked me to pay 175 000 F 
CFA but I had only 100 000 F CFA. I went back to the border, where I was 
beaten about two days. After three days in Yaoundé, I went to a town called 
Sangmalima. I travelled by foot about 600 kilometres from Sangmalima in 
Cameroon to Ouesso in Congo with two other guys during two weeks. One 
guy was sick on the way and he died in Brazzaville. In Ouesso, in the north of 
Congo, we travelled for a month to Brazzaville. I was locked up about seven 
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days because I did not have visa. I gave all money I had in my pockets, my 
last 25 000 F C F A. Because of the police I ran away to Pointe-Noire and I 
could not go to Luanda because in Angola there was a civil war. I was selling 
some dresses or bread just to survive. I stayed in Congo until 1997 when the 
civil war in Congo broke out. Finally, I took a visa and I came as a Congolese 
citizen and I arrived in Johannesburg on the 22nd of November 1997. 
(Cameroonian man, Cape Town, 9 November 2004). 
 
A small portion of legal migrants interviewed applied for the work permit in their 
home countries of origin before coming to Cape Town. The others obtained a work 
permit once in South Africa and after finding a remunerated job. For those in that 
latter category, some were obliged to find a way of making a living after their arrival. 
Despite their qualifications many sold curious on the streets while looking for a job. 
Most of these migrants found a job through networks established by those in Cape 
Town before them or through their own connections. The common point for all legal 
worker migrants is their level of instruction. All interviewees in this category have a 
tertiary education degree and some have long professional experience in their 
respective countries or in Europe. “I worked for almost 10 years in Belgium before 
coming to Kinshasa where I stayed for two years. Finally I came here” (Congolese 
men, Cape Town, 5 October 2004).  
 
For legal economic migrants, there are two sub-categories. The first sub-category is 
represented by those with qualifications and who arrived in Cape Town hoping to find 
a decent and remunerated job. Unable to do so, they sell curios on the streets or work 
for another “brother” migrant. After a certain period and if they are still unable to find 
a remunerated job, they will consider their involvement in the informal trade as their 
permanent economic activity. They will then become self-employed and diversify 
their businesses to create more sources of money. Besides looking for a decent job, 
75% of the respondents came to Cape Town to pursue their studies. 
 
In 1999, I had only R300 when I started selling on the street. While selling, I 
gathered to open my shop. My aim of coming to South Africa was to continue 
studying. I thought that South Africa is like European countries where you can 
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study and work, where you can have part time job (Cameroonian men, Cape 
Town, 9 November 2004).  
 
Many cannot fulfil their desire of pursuing their studies because of a lack of sufficient 
financial support. Not well informed, they discover the realities of the South African 
educational system as a shock. 
 
The second sub-category of legal economic migrants is those who do not have a 
specific qualification or have none at all. They are the ones who encounter more 
difficulties after their arrival. Determined to find a way of making a living, their 
businesses grow after difficult moments and long periods of patience or loans from 
compatriots or other connections. They are the largest sub-category of legal economic 
migrants because many do not have another way of making a living. Most of them 
enter South Africa as students, refugees or asylum seekers before regularising their 
status. Many of them also spent several years in other countries before arriving in 
South Africa:  
 
I came here to follow my husband. By the time I came, I had the status of 
refugee. But since last year I had a legal status and I decided to open this 
business in order to increase our incomes because my husband cannot afford 
all our needs by his own (Congolese woman, Cape Town 26 December 2003). 
 
Not only migrants’ objectives and arrivals different, but their choice of Cape Town 
also depends on the category to which each belongs. For legal migrant workers, 
especially those who came straight from their countries, Cape Town gives them the 
opportunity to work in the same conditions as their colleagues in Europe. However, 
for those who succeed in obtaining a work permit once in South Africa, as well as for 
legal economic migrants, their arrival in Cape Town could be interpreted as the result 
of their failure to reach their objectives in Johannesburg. Of the interviewees, 75% of 
the respondents did not have any idea of Cape Town, or what exactly the city could 
offer in terms of opportunities when they arrived in South Africa. Many of them 
learnt about the city once they arrived in the country. “Honestly I did not know 
anything about Cape Town. I found myself in Cape Town by accident.” (Senegalese 
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man, Cape Town, 22 June 2004). Therefore, Cape Town represents a new destination 
in their sojourn in South Africa. 
 
5.3.2.3 Explaining Francophone legal migration to Cape Town 
In their analysis of theories of migration, Kok and his counterparts (Kok et al., 2003: 
18) describe one of the reasons perpetuating migration through the institutional 
theory. The fundamental reason is the imbalance between the large number of people 
seeking to enter into capital-rich countries and the limited number of immigrants’ 
visas these countries typically offer. One of the consequences of these imbalances 
could be the creation of niches in developing countries from which entrepreneurs will 
recruit. Therefore, developing countries are viewed as perpetual suppliers of migrants. 
On the other hand, the neo-classical economics theory highlights “geographical 
differences in labour supply and demand and by the resultant wage differentials” as 
the cause of the individual movements (Kok et al., 2003: 13).  
 
Considering these theoretical frameworks, it seems that migration in South Africa 
conforms to that explained by the institutional theory. Firstly, South Africa is a highly 
rated destination for thousands of Africans. However, an imbalance is evident by the 
decrease in the number of work permits granted to foreigners over time due to the 
restrictive policy on migration adopted by the government. Thus, although having a 
potential supply of workers, South African entrepreneurs cannot recruit freely in the 
African labour market. Some respondents admit that the hurdles encountered in the 
process of acquiring a work permit discourage many employers from recruiting 
foreigners. 
 
The move of Francophone Africans to Cape Town is therefore based on individual 
decisions taken after measuring differences, especially the wages, between Cape 
Town and the areas where the migrants come from, on the one hand, and between 
Cape Town and Johannesburg, on the other hand. Considered as “human capital” 
(Stalker, 1994: 22), migrants move to Cape Town by expecting higher financial 
returns through remuneration because they offer their skills. Cape Town offers more 
job opportunities, not that there are more jobs in Cape Town in comparison to 
Johannesburg in terms of volume, but in the sense that the Francophone African 
migrants population is less significant in Cape Town than in Johannesburg. Therefore, 
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it could increase the chances of getting a job, especially if their French abilities are 
required. The reason for moving away from Johannesburg to Cape Town because of 
security appears to be a secondary aspect. 
 
However, in some cases an individual initiative for moving to Cape Town is possible 
only if it coincides with the community context. Many migrants have moved down 
following the advice of countrymen who have requested that specific people help in 
Cape Town. It is the case of a Rwandese who came to Cape Town after having a 
harsh time in Johannesburg:  
 
In Johannesburg it was very difficult. I was sharing the same flat with my 
sister and our mother. All of us were doing all kinds of jobs like plaiting hair 
or selling goods to survive despite having qualifications. Then, a countryman 
who was aware of our situation and my qualifications gave me the address of 
another Rwandese woman here in Cape Town who told her boss was looking 
for someone with my profile for the job. Obviously, she looked within the 
Rwandese community here before sending the news to Johannesburg 
(Rwandese women, Cape Town, 12 November 2004). 
 
A well-organised community network is important to spread news around the country 
or abroad in order to integrate as many as possible into the community by helping 
them to settle. The community network then creates channels for further movements. 
One of the well-known community networks among French-speaking African 
migrants is without any doubt the Mourides Brotherhood, which is well-established in 
Cape Town and some of its members are sellers at the Cape Town train station.  
 
The economic impact of Francophone migrants on Cape Town is a challenge to 
measure due to the lack of data. However, an attempt of estimating the benefits of 
legal Francophone African migrants for the city can be described, followed the 
interviews held with migrants.  
 
One of the issues for migrants is the fear expressed by native citizens of losing their 
jobs to foreigners. At first glance, the expression of that fear could be real in the sense 
that many Francophone Africans in Cape Town have high educational degrees, 
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accompanied by experience. In theory, they could compete or come ahead of many 
South Africans to some extent by fulfilling the needs expressed by enterprises. But in 
reality, things are quite different. Because of the education implemented in almost all 
Francophone African countries, people who studied Arts are not specialists yet up to 
the Honours level. Besides, English proficiency is often required. Many are fluent in 
English only after spending a couple of years in the country, attending intensive 
language courses. Therefore, getting a decent job is a difficult task for them. Some 
migrants explain that difficulty by referring to the difference in the academic systems. 
They find that the academic system implemented in many English-speaking countries 
is more practical than the one in French-speaking countries, which emphasises theory. 
For former scientific and technical students, the situation is a bit different because of 
the more practical aspects of sciences. Potential fear of native citizens of losing out to 
foreigners can also be contested in another way. It is widely acknowledged that a job 
acquired by a migrant does not necessarily mean a job lost by a citizen of the host 
country.  
 
One also could point out that a job offer in Cape Town does not necessarily go to 
Francophone Africans. Two reasons can explain that argument. The first reason is the 
hurdles imposed by legislation. A document released by the Centre for Development 
and Enterprises (CDE, 2002: 13) shows how difficult it is for a foreigner to obtain a 
work permit in South Africa. The Immigration Act of 2002 sets up a system of both 
quotas and qualifications in order to get a work permit. Annually, numerical quotas 
based on skills and qualifications are created by the Department of Trade and Industry 
and the Department of Labour in collaboration with the Department of Home Affairs. 
Foreigners are invited to apply for work permits under those quotas. If anyone fails to 
fit those quotas, her/his application can still be examined through skills certification 
of the Aliens Control Act of 1991. These procedures of legislation take a long time 
and sometimes the bureaucratic hurdles amplify the slow pace. At the end, the work 
does not guarantee that work is ensured. Anyone else can get the position while the 
migrant is still busy looking for a work permit. The affirmative action policy 
implemented in South Africa is another hindrance for foreign African migrants 
seeking a descent job. 
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In general, the contribution of migrants is underestimated in Cape Town and 
throughout the country. Legal migration is frequently confused with other types of 
migration in the sense that they are more a burden than a resource for the South 
African economy. Meintjies (quoted by Maharaj, 2004: 13), defines the contribution 
of migrants to the economy of their host countries as follows. 
  
Studies have shown that immigrants are, in fact, net contributors, not parasites. 
Immigrants are, on average, healthier, more energetic and better educated 
…Consequently, they draw comparatively less on social welfare and other 
social services. Many pay tax and, through their entrepreneurship, make a 
positive injection to local economic development. 
 
So, how could the contribution of Francophone African migration to the Cape Town 
economy be acknowledged? The contribution of Francophone African migrants 
appears to be the same than other categories of African migrants involved in the same 
activities.  
 
The contribution of legal migrants can be appreciated through the various taxes they 
pay and money they spend in the city. A rough estimate of the contribution made by 
Francophone African migrants, with acknowledgement of limitations imposed by the 
uncertainty about the exact number of migrants (from the 2001 census) and 
guesstimate made in Appendix 2, could give some indication. I must also note that all 
migrants are not legal migrant workers.  
 
Considering for instance that a migrant earns approximately R10 000 monthly (like 
one of the respondents) and his/her salary is cut down by 20% to pay taxes, his 
monthly contribution will be R2 000 as far as paying taxes is concerned. Considering 
that in 2005 there were 13 486 Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town, 
this means that their contribution as far as taxes are concerned was R26 972 000 
monthly and 323 664 000 annually. Moreover, here are the monthly expenditures of 
an employee: 
Rent: R2 500 
Electricity: R300 
Car maintenance: R700 
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Miscellaneous: R2 000 
The tally is more than R7 000. The migrant has some R3 000 left that he might save  
or send back home.  
 
It is difficult or impossible for migrants, upon arrival, to have access to credit from 
local banks without being an employee of a public or private company and without 
spending some time in the country. The bulk of the migrants’ capital is made by 
money they brought from their origin countries. Another part of their capital comes 
from loans provided by their fellow countrymen or different associations. Lastly, 
there is a part that stems from their first earnings in South Africa. Therefore, from the 
beginning when they launch their activities, legal economic migrants inject more 
money into the local economy than they earn in the city.  
 
Once their business is set up, legal economic migrants obviously earn a lot of money, 
sometimes more than those who have a remunerated activity. Even though they start 
selling on the streets with the purpose of finding a way of making a living while they 
are looking for a remunerated job, many remain in the informal trade because they are 
earning a lot money from such businesses.  
 
Their earnings are managed according to two main aspects: the profit and what they 
call the turnover. The turnover is part of the money the money they must reinvest to 
keep on running their activities. The profit is the sum of what they have to keep for 
themselves after all expenses. As argued by a Cameroonian, the two aspects, profit 
and turnover, are defined according to the influx of customers: 
 
Weekly, I make about R24 000 for the turnover. It means that is good, because 
for the street business, a month and a week are different. For example, this 
week there is no customers. The turnover is going to be about R3 000. It 
means I can expect a profit of R15 000. I must also include costs 
(Cameroonian, Cape Town, 22 October 2004). 
 
It means that when there are many customers, some legal economic migrants can 
make R12 000 profit weekly. The whole sum of turnover is to buy goods and to 
compensate for needs of the business. As far as the profit is concerned, they must 
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deduct money to pay the daily tax, which is in general R20 for street traders. Thus, 
they contribute R120 weekly if one considers that most of them are off on Sundays, 
their contribution is about R6 580 annually. 
 
Apart from taxation, all street traders are unanimous that their contribution is more 
important that people think because they have brought employment opportunities. “I 
get a business which I employ South Africans and somehow, I have changed their 
lives. And they are not the first. I encourage some to study and their lives also have 
changed” (Cameroonian, Cape Town, 22 October 2004). When they start their 
business, migrants often employ their fellow countrymen. After a short period and 
when their business starts growing, they will open another one to give an opportunity 
to a countryman to find a way to make a living by being in charge of the first 
business. In some cases, they keep the same business and begin to employ South 
Africans. The number of employees can vary from one to ten according to the size of 
the business and the profitability.  
 
A trader at the Cape Town station, who also attends some courses in at a local college, 
summarises his financial expenses as follows: 
Tax: R20 daily 
Employees: R50 daily 
Fuel for the car: R20 daily 
Rent: R700 monthly 
School fees: R8 000 a year 
Books R3 000 to R4 000 a year 
We must also include expenses for food and clothes 
By paying taxes, spending the bulk of their earnings locally and especially employing 
South Africans, the contribution of migrants is a real source of wealth for the local 
economy. However, this contribution is quite overshadowed by the fact that 
foreigners are viewed as a threat to employment for local citizens. 
 
There is a kind of distribution of occupation according to nationalities, although this 
distribution of occupation is not rigid. Indeed, it appears that many migrants are 
involved in the selling of curios of various sorts, with Senegalese oriented towards 
leather products and watches from Asia, Congolese to skin-lightening creams and 
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cassette and video tapes of Congolese music, as well as parking-lot attendants and car 
guards (Sichone, 2003: 131). 
 
5.4 Profiles of Francophone African students in Cape Town 
Students have become a large part of people flows worldwide. The movements of 
international students have gradually increased and in 1997, it was estimated that 1.5 
million people travel overseas for educational reasons (Ramphele, 1999: 10). In 2000, 
the number of people who were outside their countries of origin for educational 
reasons was 1.8 million. Estimates project the number of 7.8 million international 
students (OECD, 2001: 111). The increase of the number of students has been 
accompanied by the rise of economic benefits generated by students’ flows. In the 
United States alone, the enrolment of foreign students engendered $7 billion in 1997 
(Ramphele, 1999:10).  
 
More and more, students’ movements are also regarded as a new form of migration, 
which can be framed into the internationalisation movement. Internationalisation is a 
movement which includes not only students but also the exchange of higher qualified 
personal.  
 
The purpose of students’ movements is to acquire knowledge and professional 
experience of countries other than their countries of origin. Furthermore, the 
movement of many African students is to acquire knowledge and professional 
expertise in better educational conditions. Moreover, the comparison between costs of 
studies and the conditions offered might explain the reasons for the arrival of many 
Africans to pursue their studies in South Africa, which offers almost the same 
conditions as some European and North American countries. Students therefore 
represent an important part of migrants in South Africa. For instance, according to the 
Gabonese embassy, 96% of Gabonese citizens in South Africa are students (Gabonese 
official embassy. Pretoria, 22 February 2004).  
 
5.4.1 Conditions of studying in South Africa 
For this study, all tertiary institutions in the Western Cape, including the three 
universities (University of Cape Town, University of Western Cape and Stellenbosch 
University) and the two technikons (Cape Peninsula and Peninsula Technikons) that 
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have merged into a unique institution called Cape Peninsula University of 
Technology, have been considered. After the demise of apartheid, the new 
government reformed higher education to an equal system for everyone to address 
historical inequalities. It was a question of shifting from an elitist and exclusionary 
system to a mass one, by allowing as many students as possible to enter higher 
educational institutions. By enrolling as many students as possible, the government 
was expected to support the extra charges (Ramphele, 1999: 17). The two strategies 
implemented by the Department of Education (DoE) and described by Goastellec 
(2005: 13) were, on the one hand, the amalgamation of higher educational 
establishments in order to reduce their number and, on the other hand, the redefinition 
of the access to universities and technikons. The outcome of the DoE strategy has 
allowed South African tertiary education to keep the balance between elitist and open 
doors. The elitist feature mainly focuses on the formation of the best students and the 
pursuit of excellence. Meanwhile, the government has to increase its commitment as 
far as financial support is concerned. The elitist features of South African higher 
education, as well as its search for excellence, have made South African tertiary 
education attractive on the international scene. From 1994 to 2004, the number of 
international students at the Univesity of Cape Town (UCT) alone has increased by 
34%. Goastellec (2005: 13) argues that this increase of international students has been 
made possible by the commitment of some institutions to go beyond the level of 10% 
of international students required to be registered in some courses.  
 
Two categories of international students, as described by Ramphele (1999: 8), 
comprise the clientele of South African higher educational institutions. On the one 
side, there are students from developed countries who are supposed to be more 
financially secure because some currencies used in their countries are stronger than 
the rand. On the other hand, there are students from developing countries with 
relatively less financial security due in particular to the weakness of currencies used 
in their countries in comparison to the rand. However, both these categories still have 
to satisfy a number of criteria to be admitted to study in South Africa. 
 
In 1995, South African policy on the admission of foreign students in tertiary 
institutions was revised, allowing undergraduate or pre-diploma students to study in 
South Africa (Ramphele, 1999: 11). The change was significant because it became 
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possible for some international students to come after completing high school. 
However, the quota of 10% restricted the admission into South African tertiary 
establishments for foreign students of the total admitted in specialised or selected 
courses. But in some cases, this quota is not implemented. At Stellenbosch University, 
for instance, because of the language policy of the institution which made Afrikaans 
the first language particularly at undergraduate level, the requirement of 10% of 
international students in specialised or selected courses is difficult to reach 
(International Office administrative, Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005). 
 
International students are permitted to enter on one of the 14 temporary permits 
allowing foreigners to enter into South Africa. It is the duty of the Department of 
Home Affairs (DHA) to also deal with international students. The DHA defines 
international students as those who are not South African citizens, not permanent 
residents and do not have any diplomatic exemption. They are required to apply for a 
study permit while they are still in their own countries by providing a letter of pre-
admission from the institution they want to study at, as well as proof of medical 
coverage. Besides, students from certain countries have to pay repatriation fees at 
South African embassies in their countries of origin. Proof of support funds during 
his/her sojourn in South Africa and proof of one year’s tuition fees are also required. 
Visa costs vary from one country to another. As far as fees are concerned, all 
international students registered for a full a degree pay the same amount of tuition 
fees as South Africans. However, international students are required to pay an 
additional premium fee; which amount differs from one country of origin to another. 
For students coming from the SADC region, the amount is R1 600. Rwandese 
students are included into and pay the same amount as students from SADC because 
of a South African educational policy which treats Rwanda as a SADC country. For 
students coming from outside the SADC region, the amount of the additional fee is 
R2 750. The amount differs from one institution to another. The examples given here 
are from Stellenbosch University (International Office administrative, Stellenbosch, 2 
August 2005). 
 
5.4.2 The reasons for coming to the Western Cape universities 
The principal question asked in this section is the same as the main problem 
considered in this thesis, which is to ask why Francophone African students come to 
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study in a non-French-speaking country and why they choose institutions in the 
Western Cape.  
 
The reasons for the arrival of French African students in South Africa in general and 
the Greater Cape Town in particular are divided into two categories according to the 
types of students in the higher tertiary institutions. The first category is composed of 
those coming under the sponsorship of their governments. The agreements signed 
between their governments and the tertiary educational institutions are the outcome of 
political ties established between different governments and their South African 
counterpart. The standard of South African infrastructure represents an alternative to 
the European or North American universities in the sense that it is cheaper for African 
governments to send their students to South Africa. South Africa is widely viewed as 
the leading African country, not only economically, but also in other sectors including 
the level of education. For the sending countries, the aim is also to have qualified 
specialists in specific disciplines, since the domestic supply of such disciplines is 
unable to reach the critical mass needed to achieve a satisfactory quality of education. 
 
The second category of African students in South Africa is composed of students who 
come on their own; they have to support financial charges by themselves. The reasons 
for the arrival of individuals in this category are more complex and various. The first 
reason is similar to the one behind the arrival of students sponsored by their 
governments. For many students, coming to South Africa is a better option financially 
than pursuing their studies elsewhere in the developed countries. 
 
Apart from the fees, the proximity of South Africa to their respective countries, 
especially those within the SADC region, is a bigger factor in their choice of South 
Africa. “My parents decided to send me to study to South Africa because it is the 
place they can afford while I am studying in good conditions” (Burundian Student, 
Pretoria, 29 March 2005).  
 
Furthermore, the arrival of many French African students in South Africa is manly 
explained by the language factor. The desire to learn and master English is one of the 
principal reasons given by the respondents explaining their arrival. 
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The reason why we came here, my mother, my sister and me, it is because she 
wanted us to be able to speak another language. It was either between Belgium 
and South Africa; we chose to come to South Africa where English is used 
(Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004).  
 
For many Francophone African students, studying in South Africa means being able 
to master another international language, especially English, which is widely regarded 
as the most used language in administrative, corporate and, to a large extent, academic 
circles. For many students, mastering of both English and French is a major advantage 
for those students to be capable of responding to the requests formulated in companies 
anywhere within the globalised world. In these conditions, Francophone African 
students are motivated by economic reasons, linked to exploiting language skills once 
they will be on the labour market. The language barrier therefore will be turned into a 
professional advantage (OECD, 2001: 111). 
 
Another reason explaining the arrival of French-speaking African students in South 
Africa is the academic system used in the country. In many Francophone African 
countries, the higher educational system used is duplicated from the French system. 
The two first years are rewarded by obtaining the Diplôme d’ Etudes Universitaires 
Générales (DEUG), then the following degrees are Licence a year later and Maitrise 
at the end of the fourth academic year. The standardisation of the higher educational 
system of the European Union countries has obliged many Francophone African 
countries to do the same. Fortunately, it is the same system implemented in South 
Africa.  
 
The impossibility of going elsewhere is another reason for the arrival of Francophone 
African students in South Africa. It has become more and more difficult for many 
young Africans, even students, to get visas to go to Northern countries, especially 
France, due to restrictive policies on migration. The choice of South Africa as the 
second option is described by a student at Cape Town University of Technology as 
follow:  
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“I did try to go to France, even to the United Kingdom, but they actually 
refused me. Then, I tried South Africa; it was easier than the other ones. This 
is why I decided to come here (Ivorian student, Cape Town, 28 October 2004).  
 
The choice of South Africa becomes clear when these factors are combined with those 
related to finances and the hope to study in good conditions. South Africa appears to 
be one of the few countries on the continent to offer good education, apart from those 
in the Northern part of the continent, which are however not highly regarded by some 
students because they are not English-speaking countries. 
 
Lately, the desire to escape from the French influence also pushes Francophone 
African students to come to South Africa. France is considered by many Francophone 
Africans to be responsible for the underdevelopment of their countries due to its 
backing of many dictators who did not care about the populations, but rather about the 
protection of French interests. French influence extends even to academic circles. 
Therefore, for many Francophone Africans, studying in South Africa means being 
outside the French influence and being able to bring alternative vision and ideas to the 
development of their countries. 
 
Within South Africa, the choice of Cape Town higher educational institutions is also 
the outcome of students’ own research as far as individual initiatives are concerned. 
Generally, students apply to many institutions at their arrival. After comparing the 
conditions set by the institutions, such as financial issues, they make their decision by 
choosing which university they would like to go to. In this context, the reputation of 
Cape Town’s tertiary establishments is a major factor. A Congolese explains her 
arrival at UCT following her parents’ knowledge about the university’s internationally 
rated reputation.  
 
I applied for both University of Witwatersrand and UCT because my parents 
knew that they are internationally recognised and they wanted me to have 
many options once I will finish (Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 October 
2004). 
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The choice of Cape Town educational establishments is also made according to the 
specialisation that the student would like to pursue. The highly rated reputation of 
Cape Town as a tourism destination was the motivation which pushed an Ivorian 
student to come to study at Cape Town University of Technology. 
 
For me doing tourism, it is about learning more than one or two languages. 
And I wanted to be trained in a very good city with a very developed tourism 
industry (Ivorian student, Cape Town, 28 October 2004). 
 
However for many, the choice of Cape Town and the city’s tertiary educational 
institutions is made after their arrival. Due to the lack or the shortage of money, many 
migrants are firstly preoccupied with a way to make a living. After a certain period, 
when they are more financially secure and more aware of the educational system and 
the access to institutions, they finally register for special courses, especially if their 
aim of coming to South Africa was to further their studies. After arriving in South 
Africa as a refugee and working in different restaurants in Cape Town, a Congolese 
migrant is now a student at UCT:  
 
It was quite funny because my first aim was looking for a job. So I 
went to UCT, I was looking from one door to another saying that I was 
looking for a job. And then I met a lady with whom I had a chat. She 
realised that I had some academic trainings. And then they opened a 
door for me by giving me that opportunity of studying (Congolese 
student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004). 
 
Many Francophone African students, especially those from the DRC, Rwanda or 
Burundi, arrived in South Africa as refugees and applied thereafter for higher 
education institution. 
 
Despite the willingness expressed by many Africans from all over the continent to 
study in South Africa, students coming from the Francophone African countries are 
largely the least populous category of students in Western Cape tertiary educational 
institutions. 
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5.4.3 A demographic profile of Francophone African students in Cape Town 
 
Figure 11: Evolution of Francophone African students at UCT, 1994-2004 
 
Source: Planning Department, University of Cape Town 
 
Globally, the numbers of Francophone African students at UCT increased from 1994 
to 1998 by 7.82%, with a considerable jump between 1996 and 1997 which is 
confirmed in 1998. This increase of foreign students at UCT between these years was 
made possible by the enrolments of a large number of Mauritian students. However, a 
diversification of countries of origin is noticeable from 1999. 
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Figure 12: Percentage of Francophone African students at UCT, 1994-2004 
(N=2053) 
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Burundi, 0.17
Rwanda, 0.17
 
Source: Planning Department, University of Cape Town 
 
The dominant nationalities at UCT over the period considered are from the SADC 
region, with students from Mauritius and the DRC leading the numbers. The 
proximity and the advantages granted to students from the SADC countries are the 
main reasons for this fact. Besides, the large number of students from Mauritius could 
be explained by the desire of wealthy Mauritian families in for better private 
education to send their children abroad. Many of those Mauritian students hold the 
highly rated International Bachelor Qualification, which allows them to apply for 
better tertiary establishments abroad. The choice of UCT is also an alternative to 
universities in Europe, especially in France and the United Kingdom. The enrolment 
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of students from countries that are not members of the SADC appears to be 
spontaneous individual initiatives from year to year. 
 
Figure 13: Evolution of Francophone African students at Stellenbosch     
                  University, 1993-2004 
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Considered over a longer period, the enrolment of Francophone African students has 
increased over 10 years. From 1994 to 2004, the number has gone from 4 to 154 
students. Overall, the general trend shows an increase over the 10 years considered, 
despite a small drop between 1995 and 1996. The countries of origin have also 
increased and diversified with students coming from four countries in 1994 to nine 
countries ten years later. 
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Figure 14: Percentage of Francophone African students at Stellenbosch  
University, 1994-2004 (N=521) 
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Source: International Office, University of Stellenbosch 
 
Over the decade considered, the origin of Francophone African students has 
diversified. The origin of Francophone African students at Stellenbosch includes all 
parts of the continent. Contrary to UCT, where many students come from the SADC 
countries, at Stellenbosch University, Gabon is the main provider of Francophone 
African students and was the second African country, behind Namibia, with a large 
number of students at Stellenbosch in 2004. After Gabon, Niger and Rwanda have 
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been other providers of Francophone African students to Stellenbosch University. The 
arrival of a large number of students from Francophone African countries which are 
outside the SADC region could be explained by the different types of agreements 
between the University and its counterparts in these countries. In the case of Gabon, 
for instance, an agreement reached between the International Office of the university 
and the Gabonese government allows students from Gabonese universities to further 
their studies at Stellenbosch. The Rwandese government, via its Ministry of 
Education, also sent sponsored students to Stellenbosch University over a short period 
(International Office administrative, Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005). The arrival of 
students of other nationalities is likely to be viewed as individual initiative. 
 
Figure 15: Evolution of Francophone African students at CPUT, 1994-2004 
0
50
100
150
200
250
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
Source: International Office, CPUT 
 
The extent of the evolution of Francophone African students at Cape University of 
Technologies (CPUT) can be really perceived from 1998. Since that year, the 
enrolment of students has increased continuously. Indeed from 1994 to 1997, the 
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evolution of the enrolment of students from Francophone Africa was fluctuating 
between one and zero annually. However from 1998, the number of Francophone 
African students rose from 3 to 236 in 2004.  
 
Figure 16: Percentage of Francophone African students at CPUT, 1994-2004 
(N=648) 
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Source: International Office, CPUT 
 
During the ten years considered for this study, the origins of students from 
Francophone Africa can be divided into three parts according the importance of 
students. The first group of countries is represented by Seychelles, Benin, Mauritius 
and Chad with a percentage less than 2%. For these countries, more than 3 students 
have not been registered in the same academic year. Central African countries, 
namely Burundi, Rwanda, Gabon, Congo and Cameroon, make up the second group. 
The third group of countries of origin of Francophone African students at CPUT is 
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represented by the DRC, which is the main provider of Francophone African students 
at CPUT. 
 
Figure 17: Evolution of Francophone African Students at UWC, 1996-2004 
 
Source: Planning Department UWC 
 
Like in the other three main tertiary institutions in the Western Cape, the number of 
Francophone African students has increased over the years. The presence of students 
from French-speaking African countries became significant 1996. From that year, 
with three students registered, the number increased gradually and reached the tally of 
83 in 2004. However, one must note that the number of Francophone African students 
at UWC is less important than the other three tertiary institutions. This is because of 
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the reputations of Stellenbosch University or UCT. Indeed, students start by applying 
in those universities and if their applications are rejected, they turn to UWC 
(Cameroonian Student, Cape Town, 12 September 2005). 
 
Figure 18: Percentage of Francophone African Students at UWC, 1996-2004 
(N=276) 
 
Source: Planning Department UWC 
 
Rwanda is the main provider of Francophone African students at UWC. This is 
mainly because of the agreement between the institution and the Rwandese 
government. However, the presence of Cameroonians, Congolese or Burundians is a 
result of individual initiatives. 
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Lastly, the African Institute of Mathematics and Science (AIMS) in Muizenberg has 
also become a provider of students to universities. AIMS recruits students throughout 
the continent and trains them for nine months focusing on postgraduate courses. At 
the end of the nine months, some students do not return to their respective countries, 
but apply to South African universities, mostly those in the Western Cape, i.e. UCT, 
UWC and Stellenbosch University. Over the period 2003 to 2005, 30 Francophone 
African students have arrived at AIMS; with 33% and 23%, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Cameroon are the Francophone African countries best represented. 
 
5.4.4 The lives of Francophone African students in Cape Town 
The first concern of students is the difficulty encountered in their enrolment at 
different institutions due to the non-equivalence of degrees between the South African 
tertiary education system and the one used in most of the Francophone African 
countries. At the end of their secondary education, in most French-speaking countries, 
students pass the final exam called Baccalaureat. The successful completion of this 
exam opens the doors to tertiary education. However, it does not guarantee entry to 
Francophone African students who want to enter higher educational establishments in 
South Africa for the first time. Many students have seen their applications rejected by 
universities merely because they have never been at the higher education level before.  
 
When I arrived after my baccalaureate I first did English courses then I 
applied to UCT in the department of Economics. But I was refused because I 
was coming from another country without any South African degree 
(Cameroonian student, Cape Town, 25 October 2004).  
 
Following their refusal at universities, they do not have any other choice but to apply 
at the different universities of technology. For those who are already at universities, 
although being quite different, the situation remains complicated and complex 
because of the different policies applied in each university and the autonomous 
features of each department. At their arrival at Stellenbosch University in 2001, many 
Gabonese with the same degree found themselves registered at different degree levels 
from department to department (Gabonese student, Stellenbosch, 22 July 2005). 
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Overall, students are not well informed about the South African educational system 
while they are still in their respective countries. Some find out only when they have 
finished their English courses. In many cases, the most important thing for some 
students is to study abroad, whatever the difficulties, because they consider the 
difficulties back home harder to handle. The hurdles encountered on the way to 
admission into the universities are a price they are willing to pay. 
 
The language issue is also relevant to the admission to institutions. As far as 
Stellenbosch University is concerned, English is not an admissions criterion at the 
undergraduate level except for students wanting to register at the Law and Education 
faculties. This is because of the language policy implemented at the University. 
However, the lack of proficiency in English can be an obstacle to admission. On the 
other hand, for postgraduate students, a proficient level of English is required. 
Students are guided through their admission process by the International Office, 
which according to an internal policy, recommends students to different departments 
and faculties (International Office administrative, Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005). In 
other higher education institutions, a good proficiency in English is recommended 
before any application is admitted.  
 
In general, once they have been admitted to different departments, Francophone 
African students have to adapt as quickly as possible. In the beginning they struggle 
as they find it difficult to follow in classes. Many lecturers do take into account the 
fact that they are French speaking, especially at the undergraduate level. More than 
others, Francophone African students at Stellenbosch University encounter a dual 
language struggle due to the use of Afrikaans in lectures, especially at the 
undergraduate level. By being foreigners in another language environment, they feel 
the pressure to work harder than South Africans.  
 
Here is a kind of competition between foreigners and South Africans at 
school. This is not really a disadvantage because you will push yourself to 
work hard and to get a better mark than them (Ivorian student, Cape Town, 28 
October 2004). 
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In order to help each other, especially newcomers, to settle into the new educational 
environment and also to build and keep strong ties with fellow countrymen, students 
from different nationalities have created associations. A member of the Congolese 
student association at UCT explains the aims of the Congolese association named 
Congosoc:  
 
Congosoc started, I think three years ago. The main reason was because there 
were many student associations from other countries except from Congo. 
There were quite a lot of Congolese but it was no chance for us to get together, 
to enjoy our music, our food and so on. So we decided it was time to make 
Congosoc. It was tough in the first year. People did not want really to join 
together; we wanted to do separate things. That was the main problem, but 
now we have about sixty members (Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 
October 2004).  
 
The existence of student networks through such associations reduces the uncertainty 
involved in the arrival of newcomers and facilitates their integration. Beyond the 
desire for togetherness, the associations play an important academic role. In their 
duties, the executive members also play a transmission role between the students and 
the International Office of each institution and between students and departments 
where their members are registered.  
 
The living conditions of students depend on their status. In other words, the living 
conditions of those who are sponsored by their respective governments and those 
paying for their studies are quite different. Students sponsored by their governments 
mostly live in university residences as a result of the clauses of agreement between 
the institutions and the government. The rent is often included in the tuition fees. A 
small number of sponsored students rent in different areas. Students who are paying 
for themselves, mostly stay outside the campuses, apart from a small number who can 
afford to rent on the campuses. The sponsored students in their large majority receive 
a stipend from their government although the amount varies from one country to 
another. Students who are registered as refugees get help from charitable 
organisations, which pay for their studies and provide assistance to them as far as 
social life on the campus is concerned. 
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In its desire to offer more opportunities to South Africans, the government has 
implemented a policy which does not allow international students to be employed in 
areas that do not have direct bearing on their studies. Some of the international 
students are thus employed in their respective departments. However, wages and the 
number of offers are quite limited. Students view the policy as discriminatory because 
it is based on the nationality criterion. Contrary to other countries such as France with 
a large number of Francophone African students where they have proper jobs despite 
being students, some international students in South Africa in general and in Cape 
Town in particular rely on non-declared jobs to earn money to afford their living and 
to pay for their studies. Overall, as far as living conditions are concerned, there are 
two types of students, described as follows: 
 
There are people who are struggling for survival; there are also people who 
have a kind of good life. In a sense that there are people who are working in 
restaurants, in shops and find time to study. Life is kind of easy for them 
because they can provide for their own needs. And on the top of that, you get a 
bursary to pay for your academic fees, and then life becomes happier. But for 
those who do not have any support at all, it is a problem. I know a number of 
students, who are studying during daytime and they are working as security 
guards in various places. Some of them told me that the security job is a 
conducive one because when they are working at night, they can also read 
their courses and prepare for assignments for the next day (Congolese student, 
Cape Town, 27 October 2004). 
 
The sojourn of Francophone African students in academic institutions is viewed 
overall as a benefit for both migrants and for South African citizens. By studying and 
living on the campus, Francophone African students have allowed young South 
Africans to discover another cultural dimension to that “unknown Africa” further 
afield which is different than the ones they are used to in the SADC region. Some 
South Africans have been able to improve their knowledge about the continent, which 
is not often in the academic programme. At this time, nobody can tell exactly or give 
an accurate measure of the capacity of both former and current Francophone African 
students in South Africa to be a helpful asset to South Africa in spreading its 
economic and political influences on the continent. Many factors could explain that 
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feature. Firstly, some of the students interviewed were disappointed because France 
refused to grant visas to further their study there. Secondly, many students regard 
France as being responsible for the underdevelopment of their countries in 
comparison to former English colonies and their wish to escape from France’s 
influence has pushed them to come to South Africa. Thirdly, links and networks that 
students have established in South Africa will be maintained and reinforced once they 
join the labour market. Lastly, students could reflect South African culture in their 
respective countries.  
 
Students could also be a potential source of qualified workers through recruitment 
after their studies. The integration of world trade is encouraging student mobility, 
allowing them to absorb the cultural and social customs of their host country and then 
to act as ambassadors both for their host and their own countries.  
 
The financial aspect is another sector where the arrival of international students in 
South Africa provides a good opportunity for the economy of the country. It has been 
estimated that foreign students contribute about R1, 7 billion to the country annually 
in foreign exchange (Kabeli, 2005). This is one of the outcomes of the study 
conducted by the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) which reveals 
that international students spent almost R57 000 each a year on food, travel, 
accommodation and tuition (Kabeli, 2005). If we try to apply this number to the 
Stellenbosch context, it will be interesting to see how much Francophone African 
students contributed in 2004. During that year, 758 Francophone African students 
were registered at the four major tertiary institutions considered in this study, which 
means that they spent approximately R43 206 000 on tuition fees, accommodation 
and other expenses.  
 
However, Francophone African students acknowledge that those tremendous financial 
expenditures are well spent because education is one of the best investments. Besides, 
the result of coming to study in Cape Town is described as being more lucrative for 
their countries of origins: 
 
It all depends on objectives. In my case, it is not too bad to come and study 
here. More than that, it is good because you will learn another experience, 
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another language, another academic research, another way of thinking and so 
on. So coming here to study, it will be a real advantage when those 
Francophone Africans will go back to their countries in terms of training and 
the background as well (Ivorian student, Cape Town, 28 October 2004). 
 
5.5 Refugees  
A refugee might roughly be considered to be a person who is forced out of his country 
of origin due to any kind of persecution or conflict. Then, he/she receives material 
assistance and protection from the international community and the host country. In 
this new environment, he/she will face issues such as citizenship, race, ethnic origins 
and economic, social, academic and political background (Blavo, 1999: 12). 
 
After the demise of the apartheid regime, South Africa has successfully implemented 
its democracy and has become a home for those who are persecuted in their countries 
of origin. The government has ratified international treaties and improved its own 
legislative tools, with a particular accent was put on human rights (Schreier, 2006: 
42).  
 
5.5.1 International refugees’ legislation 
The movement of refugees has a long history. Indeed, the various armed conquests 
over the centuries drove millions of people away from the regions of residence 
(CIMADE, INODEP and MINK, 1986: 11). However, it is during the twentieth 
century that it became a recognised phenomenon that warranted lasting solutions. 
Some international instruments were adopted in the 1920s and 1930s and applied to 
people who needed international assistance. For instance, under the auspices of the 
League of Nations, a High Commissioner for Refugees was created in 1921 under the 
tutelage of the Norwegian statesman Fridtjof Nansen. Although the High 
Commissioner was mainly set up to give assistance to the Russian refugees under the 
direction of Nansen, it was also used as an administrative and legal tool to help people 
displaced from Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey (Zolberg et al., 1989: 19). The “Nansen 
passport” was considered as a legal document which gave refugees a recognisable 
status (Knox & Kushner, 1999: 9). From the “Nansen passport”, other documents 
were released later on to improve the protection and assistance to refugees, 
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particularly the 1951 Geneva Convention and the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969 
as far as African refugees were concerned. 
 
5.5.1.1 The 1951 Geneva Convention  
The 1951 Geneva Convention was a consequence of several international efforts 
under the auspices of the United Nations seeking to solve the problem of refugees 
after World War II. The War and its aftermath forced the movement of at least 40 
million persons in Europe (The United Nations, 2004: 167). In order to tackle the 
phenomenon, the international community firstly created the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943 followed by the International 
Refugee Organisation (IRO) in 1947. It was the IRO which improved the definition of 
refugees in order to specify these types of migrants. According to that organisation, a 
refugee was “any person who, in complete freedom and after receiving full 
knowledge of the fact … expressed valid objections to returning to his/her country of 
origin” (Klaaren, 1999). Although limited in Europe, these organisations were the first 
to provide protection, assistance and the pursuit of durable solutions for refugees.  
 
International attention spread from Europe with the displacement of thousands of 
people, mostly Palestinians, following the conflicts between the Arabic countries and 
Israel. In December 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations mandated the 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) to find a lasting 
solution to the conflict as well as to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and the 
economic and social rehabilitation, including the payment of compensation, of the 
refugees. Some twelve months later, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) was created, initially for three years, to grant refugees legal 
protection. Following this statement, in 1951 the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees was adopted. The 1951 Convention distinguished itself from the previous 
instruments in that it extended the concept of refugees from the mass displacements to 
individual cases. Additionally, the 1951 Convention expanded the term refugee to 
apply not only people from Europe and the Middle East, but also those in other parts 
of the world. The Convention has since been considered the regime governing refugee 
protection. 
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The 1951 Convention was adopted a few years after the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. This has resulted in the shift from the individualisation 
to the generalisation of the definition of the term refugee. The IRO’s definition of 
1947 was replaced by the one included in the 1951 Convention and which situates 
refugee law as part of international human rights law. Accordingly, a refugee is seen 
as any person who, 
 
…as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well 
founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political option is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it. 
 
The convention was criticised for being an excessively Eurocentric document because 
of its focus on the refugees in Europe traumatised by World War II (Klaaren, 1999; 
Solomon, 2003). It is only with the implementation of the 1966 Protocol to the 1951 
Convention that the protection of the rights of refugees was universalised. By the end 
of 2004, approximately 140 countries have accepted the 1951 Convention and the 
1966 Protocol (The United Nations, 2004: 170). 
 
The definition in the 1951 Convention on refugees revolves around four core legal 
principles. The first is the principle of asylum, which entitles anyone under the 
definition of refugees to be granted shelter anywhere. The second principle is non-
refoulement, which forbids states to return refugees out of their frontiers or into their 
countries of origin where they might be persecuted. The third principle is non-
discrimination, which requires that refugees should be accorded equal treatment. 
Lastly, it is the principle of protection which grants refugees protection according to 
international legal instruments and international laws. The 1951 Convention also 
considered the notion of burden-sharing between the states (Boswell, 2003). It is a 
principle of international solidarity and of sharing responsibilities with the states 
receiving refugees. The notion of burden sharing has been illustrated by financial 
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assistance to countries confronted by a mass arrival of refugees and has also assisted 
in the dispersal of refugees over many countries. 
 
5.5.1.2 The OAU Refugee Convention of 1969 
Many African countries adopted the 1951 Convention after their independence in 
1960. Displaced people were a major preoccupation for those newly independent 
countries due in particular to the wars of national liberation from colonial powers, 
which forced thousands of people to escape from the zones of conflict and look for 
refuge elsewhere.  
 
However, because of the Eurocentricism of the 1951 Convention and the 
shortcomings of its 1966 Protocol relating to the singularities of African refugees, 
African countries decided to update the framework for the protection of refugees 
according to the African context. They implemented the 1969 Organisation of African 
Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 
The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention was adopted on 10 September 1969 by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The first task 
was to reconsider the concept of refugee. If on the one hand African countries took 
into account the definition of the 1951 Convention they on the other hand updated it 
by adding the concept of African forced migration to it. The definition of refugee was 
reshaped and viewed as follows: 
 
The term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing 
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, 
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality. 
 
The OAU definition emphasises the consequence of African calamities, such as civil 
conflict, bilateral wars, famines and insurrections, which were not taken into account 
at the time the 1951 Convention was set up. The 1969 OAU Convention arose from 
the continental historical experience with colonialism and the traditional hospitality 
and solidarity of Africa. As described by Mulugeta (2002), African leaders did not 
hesitate to adopt an ‘open door policy’ to people fleeing their countries due in 
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particular to the struggle for liberation that many of them were involved in. The 
enthusiasm of the adoption of the Convention was perceptible in the sense that this 
first generation of refugees in an independent Africa were not even called refugees. 
However, Muguleta (2002) also recalls that:  
 
The responses and reactions to the refugee crisis were based on an almost 
euphoric African solidarity and political collective identification often 
embellished with pan-African rhetoric, and were distanced from judicature and 
legality. Although the Convention was designed to systematise and 
institutionalise earlier ad hoc African responses, it failed to guarantee 
predictability and coherence in the way refugee problems have been dealt 
with. It was only in the political arena that the Convention was forceful and 
coherent. 
 
Forced migration has always been one of the main components of people movements 
in Africa. Zlotnik (2003: 7) highlights the evolution of the number of refugees on the 
continent since 1960. During that year and following the riots in Congo, the country 
was hosting 95% of the 79 000 refugees on the continent. A decade later, 95% of 
refugees in Africa were found in eight countries, whereas in the 1980s the number of 
countries hosting refugees increased to 11. In the 1990s, the number of countries 
increased to 15 and then to 18 in 2000. The evolution of the number of host countries 
was accompanied by the growth of the population of refugees. The number of 79 000 
African refugees in 1960 increased by 92.04% ten years later. The next decade saw 
the numbers rising by 75.50% from the previous decade, followed by 32.58% 
between 1980 and 1990. However, the number of African refugees decreased by 
49.71% from 1990 and 2000.  
 
Over the years, Eastern, Central and Western African have been consecutively the 
main provider regions of refugees. The 1980s and 1990s were the decades that 
Southern Africa counted the most important number of refugees in its history, but it 
represented only two to three per cent of African refugees. Refugees in this region 
were essentially escaping from the repressive governments, such as in South Africa, 
or they were victims of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. ` 
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5.5.2 South African legislative instruments 
After its readmission into the international community, South Africa rapidly ratified 
the international instruments relating to the protection of refugees. This is also to give 
an international legislative framework to thousands of South Africans who were 
returning to the country after years of exile. On 15 December 1995, South Africa 
ratified to the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969. This was followed by the adherence 
to the 1951 Convention and its 1966 Protocol on 12 January 1996. At the regional 
level, within the framework of SADC the country, reaffirmed regional commitments 
to the 1951 Convention and its 1966 Protocol, as well as the OAU Refugee 
Convention of 1969. The regional organisation undertook to seek regional solutions to 
the flow of refugees inside this part of the continent. 
 
Apart from adopting the definition of refugee inscribed by the 1951 Convention and 
the OAU 1969 Refugee Convention, South Africa drew a distinction between people 
recognised as refugees and those seeking asylum although the two categories were 
placed under the term “forced migrants”. The difficult task was to distinguish genuine 
refugees and asylum seekers from other types of migrants. As pointed out by Harris 
(2001), these definitions of refugees are characterised by two levels of consideration 
of the status of refugees. First, the individual level involves assessing whether an 
asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution in the home country, without 
much consideration of social and political conditions in his/her country of origin. 
Second, the collective level involves assessing the refugee status of those who come 
from a “refugee-producing country” engaged in civil war or general mass violence. 
 
Prior to 1994, the whole Southern Africa region was already a home for thousands of 
displaced people. One of the reasons for these forced movements was upheavals 
caused by the apartheid government. Ocaya-Lakidi (quoted by Kotze and Hills, 1997: 
11) singles out three categories of refugees at that time. Firstly, there were South 
African refugees pushed out of their country by the apartheid policy. Secondly, there 
were refugees from other Southern Africa countries fleeing their homes due to the 
involvement of South Africa in civil wars. Lastly, there were economic refugees who 
were the outcome of the deterioration of the economic system throughout the region. 
If the two first categories of refugees fit into the definition of the 1951 Convention, 
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the last category of refugees is taken into account by the definition of the 1969 OAU 
Convention.  
 
After the collapse of apartheid, fear of persecution has been emphasised as far as the 
definition of refugee is concerned. However, it remains difficult to draw a major 
distinction between involuntary migrants who are forced to flee from persecution or 
serious disruptions to public order and voluntary migrants who want to escape 
economic difficulties in their countries of origin (Landau, 2004; 16). The difficulty is 
to determine the kind of persecution behind the movement of refugees. 
 
In 1998, South Africa endorsed the principles of a national instrument to protect 
refugees. The Refugees Act, also known as the Act 130 of 1998, became an effective 
law in April 2000. Since then, the Act has been the country’s primary piece of 
legislation relating to refugees and has replaced the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991, 
that used to deal with refugees.  
 
The aims of the Refugees Act were highlighted by Lindiwe Sisulu (Majodina, 2001: 
7):  
Among other things, it (The Refugees Act) gives effect to international legal 
instruments, principles and standards relating to refugees. It also provides for 
the reception of asylum seekers into the Republic; regulates applications for 
and recognition of refugee status; and provides for the rights and obligations 
which emanate from such status. 
 
The Refugee Act (passed in 1998) is generally considered to be a more progressive 
piece of legislation and has been extensively revised since its first drafts were 
completed. The Act allows any person to apply for asylum and states that no person 
should be denied the right to apply for an asylum-seeker’s permit or “Section 22”, as 
it is known. This document grants newcomers the right to study and work legally 
while their applications for permanent refugee permits are processed. A Section 22 is 
issued free of charge, but the process can take weeks or months. The document also 
gives refugees legal status as it protects them from being arrested. Without a Section 
22 they face the constant fear of being arrested on charges of being in South Africa 
illegally. 
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Since its transition to majority rule in 1994, South Africa has become one of the main 
destinations on the continent for refugees who have arrived by tens of thousands from 
the continent and even beyond. According to Crush and Williams (2000: 2), one of 
the peaks of arrivals was registered between 1995 and 1998 with an average of 20 000 
people annually. The sending countries were mainly the DRC, Congo, Angola, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Fewer people came from countries 
such as Nigeria and Cameroon. Senegalese and Ivorians completed the list of 
nationalities of those looking for asylum in South Africa.  
 
From 1994 to 2003, according to Landau (2004: 39), the Department of Home Affairs 
had received 152 414 asylum applications. The number of applications approved went 
exponentially from 383 in May 1995 to 17 198 in April 2001 (Crush & Williams, 
2002: 3). As far as Francophone Africans are concerned, the asylum seekers were 
mainly from the Democratic Republic Congo (7 677 applications), then Senegal (4 
507), Burundi (2 031), Congo (1 618) and Rwanda (1 203). In the same period and 
from the same applications, the most approved were of Congolese (DRC, 68.90% of 
Francophone Africans), Burundians (13. 27%), Congolese (Congo-Brazzaville, 
9.32%) and Rwandese (8.52%) of approximately 7 092 applications approved. 
However, some 3 686 applications of Senegalese were rejected. 
 
It is interesting to notice that a large number of asylum seekers were from countries 
involved in armed conflicts in the 1990s and 2000s decades, with the DRC, Burundi, 
Rwanda, Congo and Rwanda leading the numbers. The geographical proximity of 
South Africa and its standards of protection of refugees have been seen as the reasons 
behind the arrivals of those refugees in South Africa. Besides, fewer Francophone 
African refugees were coming from countries which had political trouble, such as 
Cameroon. The reasons explaining the rush of Francophone African refugees to South 
Africa could therefore be related to the fear of persecution for political reasons, as 
stated in the 1951 Convention. Francophone African refugees were also forced to 
leave their countries, which the OAU took into account with its broader definition of 
refugees. 
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5.5.3 The settlement of Francophone African refugees in Cape Town 
The first path of the process of the settlement of a refugee, and as outlined by the 
Refugees Act of 1998, is the acquisition of proper documentation. As described by 
Schreier (2006: 45), an asylum seeker is granted a temporary permit valid for fourteen 
days within which the holder must present himself or herself at the Refugee Reception 
Office. After the two interviews (the first to determine the identity of the interviewee 
and the reasons for his application, while the second interview is to establish the 
refugee status), the applicant can be granted the Section 24 permit and the ID 
document that Francophone African refugees in Cape Town called “the gounda”.  
 
However, that process of settlement and thereafter of integration is handicapped by 
several hurdles relating to the difficulties encountered in acquiring proper 
documentation. Among these hurdles, Schreier (2006: 45) notes the incapability of 
Home Affairs to address the issue of backlogs because of insufficient resources. Apart 
from appointment slips on which there are no names, some newcomers do not receive 
any other document legalising their stay in the country, and a non integrated system 
does not allow applicants to renew or extend their permits elsewhere than at the office 
where their the permits were issued. Therefore, applicants are subject to arrest, 
detention, deportation and they cannot gain access to social services, work or study.  
 
The Francophone African refugee population in Cape Town is a heterogeneous group 
as far as nationalities, skills, level of education, experience or language abilities are 
concerned. It appears that there are two types of Francophone African refugees in 
Cape Town. On the one hand, there are some who can be considered economic 
refugees. Many of them are not from countries genuinely involved in armed conflicts. 
Some were not obliged to flee their countries because of natural disasters nor were 
they victims of political or religious discrimination. At their arrival in the country, 
they applied for the refugee status because they took advantage of the ignorance of 
Home Affairs officials on the situation of African countries and because it is the 
easier way to be in the country legally because of the difficulties to get a work permit:  
 
Many South Africans do not know much about the rest of continent, even 
some people from Home Affairs. Many of them think that all African 
countries are involved in wars. So during interviews, some people lie about the 
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situation of their countries of origin and the reasons they come to South Africa 
or why they are applying for refugee status. At the beginning it was common. 
There are even some people who came down to Cape Town because in 
Johannesburg and Pretoria officials had started to be aware of the situation. 
(Cameroonian refugee, Cape Town, 22 February 2005) 
 
According to some of the respondents, the lack of information about other African 
countries of Home Affairs officials is evident by the types of questions during the 
interviews. The respondents have to demonstrate for instance that they belong to 
specific group suffering from any kind of persecution, not that they have suffered 
individually from that persecution.  
 
One the other hand there are “genuine migrants”. Most of them are from countries 
involved in armed conflicts including the DRC, Congo, Rwanda or Burundi. 
According to the results of this study, genuine Francophone African migrants in Cape 
Town are mostly war related victims.  
 
Although Francophone African refugees have not specifically been targeted for killing 
like the Somalians, they still encounter numerous problems with regard to their 
settlement, mostly in accessing and exercising fundamental rights. Among these 
problems, there is the language barrier. Indeed, at their arrival many of applicants for 
refugee status who are still waiting for the regulation of their status are unable to 
attend English classes. Their inability to speak English makes their search for jobs 
even harder. The lack of knowledge of refugees’ rights by employers is another 
problem facing migrants. In their search for jobs, employers are often reluctant 
because they are not aware that refugees have the right to work or study.  
 
One of the refugees summarises the problems encounter as follows: 
 
There are difficulties every day and all the way for a refugee in South Africa. 
Here in Cape Town, it is a bit easier than Johannesburg or Pretoria. For the 
welcome at the Refugee Reception Office is quite better in Cape Town, 
although myself I have never been in those offices in Johannesburg or 
Pretoria, but my friends always tell that in Cape Town is better. Nevertheless 
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there are still difficulties for refugees in Cape Town. It all starts with the 
papers; you spend a lot of time trying to have them. Once you have them, 
especially the gounda, you must come to the office every month to renew it. 
That means you can miss your work for days. Even to find a job itself, it is 
difficult because many employers just want to see a work permit, for them the 
refugee status does not allow to work. And for those who cannot speak 
English properly, it is even harder. Above all of that, many refugees waste 
their talent and experience by being for instance car guards in order to find a 
way of living (Rwandese refugee, Cape Town. 24 February 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, there are many positive aspects regarding the settlement of 
Francophone African refugees in Cape Town. First, there is a crucial interest on the 
part of the City of Cape Town to provide and ensure constitutional and humanitarian 
treatment of refugees. By signing a Declaration on Refugees rights, the City of Cape 
Town acknowledges “to agree and to undertake within its legal and constitutional 
mandate to uphold and recognise the rights of refugees, to strive – within its means – 
to give effect to these rights, and, to support refugees’ local integration into society” 
(Omar, 2006: 82). The city has therefore decided to work in collaboration with 
refugees’ organisations such as the UNHCR or Tutumike (a group of rights 
organisations) to develop programmes of cooperation.  
 
Other organisations also provide assistance to refugees which range from counselling 
regarding legal protection to the integration into the local society. The assistance also 
includes skills training, education or health services. Here are some organisations in 
Cape Town visited during the fieldwork: 
 
-University of Cape Town Legal Aid Clinic offers free legal advice and litigation to 
asylum seekers and refugees, which are illustrated through all legal matters, asylum 
application matters, appeals, interviews on behalf of UNCHR, and assistance with 
family reunification, voluntary repatriation or resettlement. 
 
-The Scalibrini Centre tries to give basic assistance to refugees by providing food, 
clothing, shelter, and counselling. The centre has also launched English and computer 
classes, as well as a platform for artists to expose their paintings. 
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-The Cape Town Refugee Centre proposes to improve the quality of life of refugees 
by meeting their short-term needs and to facilitate them to become self-reliant and self 
sufficient through capacity building. 
 
-The Trauma Centre is a human rights organisation specialising in the healing of 
survivors of violence and torture.  
 
-The Institute for Healing Memories presents workshops on individual, communal, 
national and international levels to find psychological, emotional and spiritual healing 
which is able to show the way to reconciliation and transformation of relationships 
between members of society. The Institute has also a programme which intends to 
improve the knowledge of youth in particular encouraging them to understand and get 
more involve in the shaping of human rights. 
 
-ARESTA intervenes on refugee rights, providing lobbying and advocacy, and offers 
awareness and education, English classes, income generation activities, vocational 
training, and self-sustainability programme initiatives. 
 
The implementation of the Refugees Act of 1998 which followed the ratification of 
international legislation on refugees, notably the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 
OAU Refugee Convention of 1969, guarantee refugees protection according to 
international norms by taking into account the South African context. However, the 
implementation of these laws encounters several problems, due in particular to lack of 
resources by Home Affairs. This has lead to difficulties for a number of refugees in 
Cape Town (see Appendix). Nevertheless, a network of organisations in Cape Town 
provides assistance to refugees regarding integration and the protection of their 
human. Their settlement could be easier to a large extent by tackling the issues of 
xenophobia and the use of refugees’ skills.  
 
5.6 Extra-legals 
Illegal immigration is a major concern in South Africa. Illegal flows to the country 
already occurred during the apartheid era (Hough & Minaar, 1996: 33). During that 
period, repatriation was one of the means considered to combat illegal entries. The 
new authorities also adopted repatriation after 1994. According to Adepoju (2004: 
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71), 91 000 illegal immigrants were deported from South Africa by the new 
government soon after the arrival of ANC to power. However, repatriation has not 
been successful since then, as the number of illegal immigrants in South Africa seems 
to have increased over the years.  
 
Neighbouring countries, especially Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as well as other 
African countries further afield, Nigeria in particular, are viewed as providers of 
extra-legals to South Africa (Hough & Minaar, 1996; Bouillon and Morris, 2001). 
From these sources, it appears that Congolese form the largest group of illegal 
Francophone African immigrants in the country. The issue of illegal immigration in 
South Africa is, in many cases, related to the numbers of extra-legal foreigners living 
in the country. It has been estimated by some sources that up to eight million 
undocumented immigrants were already living in South Africa just a few years after 
the demise of apartheid (Hough & Minaar, 1996: 126). Speculation on the number of 
undocumented immigrants simply indicates the impossibility of measuring exactly 
how many extra-legals are in South Africa. It is a question of “playing the numbers 
game” (Solomon, 2003: 90). Indications are often given by the reports of the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) on the numbers of deportation of illegal immigrants or 
the numbers of the overstayers. The former method is used following simple control 
routines or bigger deployments of police forces in the likes of Operation 
Crackdown.15 The numbers of deported illegal immigrants has grown over the years. 
According to Bouillon and Morris (2001: 30), more than 700 000 people were 
deported between 1988 and 1996. In 1994, the DRC and Senegal were the most 
notorious Francophone African countries with 20 and 69 deported nationals 
respectively. The figures have kept on growing. South Africa deported 173 000 illegal 
immigrants in 1997 at the cost of R200 million (Solomon, 2001: 108), while the 
2000-2001 and 2003-2004 annual reports of the Department of Home Affairs point to 
the number of 156 123 and 164 294 foreigners removed from South Africa 
respectively. Some illegal immigrants are overstayers. Bouillon and Morris (2001) 
argue that some 724 897 foreigners extended their sojourn in South Africa unlawfully 
between 1990 and 1995. However the guesstimate made in this study points out that 
                                                 
15
 Operation Crackdown was launched in Hillbrow, Johannesburg, in March 2000. More than 1 000 
police and military forces were deployed and some 10 000 suspected illegal immigrants were arrested, 
before being taking to Lindela Repatriation Centre for deportation.  
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the number of Francophone African extra-legals in Cape Town could be between 20 
940 and 37 714 in 2004/2005 (see Appendix 2).  
 
It appears that the more restrictive measures are taken, the more people movements 
have become more clandestine and spontaneous. Many Africans do not hesitate to risk 
their lives to find a refuge with better economics opportunities. Every year, people die 
in the Mediterranean Sea because they want to join Europe from Northern Africa.  
 
The modes of entry into the country are various, including entering the country with 
false papers, staying in the country beyond the time set out by visas or crossing the 
border without papers. The porosity of South African borders is viewed as one of the 
major indirect causes of the illegal flows of migrants to South Africa. The removal of 
electrified fences on the northern border after political and human rights organisations 
pressure following the demise of apartheid made it a challenging task to control 
people’s movements. Sabela (2000: 111) argues that the borders between KwaZulu-
Natal and southern Mozambique are the longest open section of the South African 
northern border. He describes the 21 kilometres separating Kosi Bay and Tembe 
Elephant Park as containing several “infiltration routes and well-defined footpaths.” 
Moreover, some points at the Komatipoort border and on the Crocodile River are used 
by migrants to cross illegally to South Africa. Sabela describes the frequency and the 
success of illegal crossings: as follows:  
 
In a staged demonstration by the South African Defence Force … a fence 
jumper was timed at one minute seventeen seconds for crossing an eight-foot-
high game fence, under the three layers of razor coils by means of forked 
sticks pushing the coils up, and over the second game fence. 
 
Illegal entries to South Africa also represent a lucrative activity for transporters and 
smugglers. A well-developed network, which includes officials at the border points, 
has been developed from the sending and stopover countries to South Africa. “I did 
not have documents such as visa or a specific permit to come to South Africa. I paid 
around $300 for my trip up to South Africa. People were helping me to travel by their 
cars” (Congolese extra-legal, Johannesburg, 21 March 2005).  
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One could argue that Francophone African extra-legal immigrants who enter South 
Africa unlawfully by road are mostly Congolese because of the geographical 
proximity. To a lesser extent nationals from countries further afield consider 
neighbouring South African countries as stopovers. The lack of financial resources 
and bureaucratic hurdles in their home countries are the two main reasons pointed out 
by extra-legals to justify their entry into South Africa with no documents or with false 
ones. In the DRC, for instance, someone living in Lumumbashi in the south of the 
country needs to go to the capital Kinshasa to obtain a passport and to apply for a visa 
at the South African embassy. The trip to Kinshasa from Lumumbashi sometimes 
lasts longer and it is more costly than travelling to Johannesburg, which is 2000 
kilometres from Lumumbashi. Therefore, the choice of coming illegally to South 
Africa is often based on the availability of financial resources and migrating illegally 
is then the only solution, as explained below: 
 
Back home, getting a passport is not easy at all. You must have many 
documents and it will take many weeks to get a passport. Then you must apply 
for a visa at the South African embassy. There the conditions are draconic as 
well because there are many obstacles and you have to pay a caution of $1 000 
at the embassy to be sure that you will come back and collect your money. 
This is the official procedure. Here is an unofficial procedure which you have 
to pay people who would organise the trip for you (Congolese extra-legal, 
Johannesburg, 22 March 2005). 
 
The porosity of the borders of other SADC countries and the bribery of officials at 
different border posts are also encouraging factors to migrate illegally to South 
Africa. Crossing some points at the border between the DRC and Zambia is explained 
as follows: 
 
Yes, officially people need documents but it is easy to cross without having 
the official documents. For instance if someone goes for the first time, he/she 
must show a document that customs will just stamp on it. Now, someone told 
me that people have to pay but it is not that much (Congolese, Johannesburg, 
26th March 2005). 
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The journey to enter to South Africa mainly depends on financial resources and the 
degree of connection. Apart from the plane, in the case of those who later become 
overstayers or those who use false documents, road, train and even foot are the 
common means used by extra-legals to enter South Africa. As far as these latter 
means of travelling are concerned, the DRC plays a pivotal role in the illegal 
migration to South Africa, as shown by Cabane (205: 51) and which corresponds to 
respondents’ stories: 
 
-The first itinerary highlights the key role played by the city of Lumumbashi. From 
that point, migrants are conducted by bus or private vehicles to Zambia, Zimbabwe or 
Namibia. 
-The second itinerary links the eastern part of the country to some countries eastward, 
particularly Tanzania, Burundi or Malawi. 
-The last itinerary from the DRC leads to Angola in the Southwest of the country.  
The second part of the journey is organised from the main cities in the stopover 
countries, including Windhoek in Namibia, Maputo in Mozambique and Lusaka in 
Zambia.  
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Map 3: Southern African migration routes 
 
 
Source: Cabane, 2005: 51 
 
The reasons behind the move of many extra-legal migrants from Johannesburg to 
Cape Town are almost similar to the ones described above for the other categories, 
especially legal migrants and refugees. However, the issue of police harassment 
seems to be more prominent in determining why extra-legals end up in the Mother 
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City. As far as police harassment is concerned, a Congolese who has lived in both 
Johannesburg and Cape Town compares the two cities by stating:  
 
I did not come across with police officers during my stay in Cape Town. The 
police did not bother at all. In Johannesburg it is completely different. You 
have to carry your documents every time. Police officers are everywhere. You 
can get arrested anytime and anywhere in Johannesburg, then being deported. 
I was living with other foreigners who did not have documents in Cape Town, 
and nothing happened to them. Home Affairs is almost the same thing than 
police. When I went to Cape Town, my documents were expired six months 
ago. But I did not have any problem when I went to Home Affairs; they 
renewed them and extended it for two years. It cannot happen in Johannesburg 
(Congolese, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005). 
 
5.7 Settlement and social capital 
This section examines the strategies used by Francophone African migrants to 
facilitate their integration in Cape Town. The section therefore sets out to identify the 
means of the integration and the exchanges of Francophone African migrants in Cape 
Town through the language factor and the transnationalism issue.  
 
5.7.1 The determinants of the settlement 
The settlement of migrants into a new environment is often related to a whole process, 
which includes the steps of adaptation, acculturation and assimilation. There are some 
disagreements among scholars concerning the process of settlement of migrants in a 
new environment. According to DeFay (1998: 18), the settlement of migrants in a 
new environment starts with the process of acculturation. For Martin (1986: 24), the 
process of the settlement in a new destination is the consequence of the process of 
assimilation. She refers to Johnston and separates external from subjective 
assimilation. As far as external assimilation is concerned, migrants accommodate 
themselves within the receiving countries as time goes on, while the subjective 
assimilation entails the identification of migrants with the members of the group of 
the same countries or regions of origin. The concept of assimilation is the latest stage 
of the processes of adaptation and integration by which migrants are included into the 
culture of the receiving countries (DeFay, 1998: 18). The process of assimilation 
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therefore includes cultural or behavioural assimilation, marital assimilation, 
identification assimilation, attitude receptional assimilation and behavioural 
receptional assimilation.  
 
In her study, Martin (1986: 27) distinguishes two ways of assimilation in a host 
country. One the one hand, she admits that migrants who leave their countries of 
origin due to harsh economic conditions and on a voluntarily basis are keen to settle 
down and be assimilated easily in the receiving regions. On the other hand, she points 
out that those who are forced to migrate encounter the most difficulties in the regions 
of arrival. In involuntarily departures, migrants suffer from problems such as family 
disorganisation, mental disorders, delinquency or extreme level of poverty. In their 
first months or years in some cases, the latter category of migrants often encounters 
serious social and psychological problems.  
 
The other means to ease assimilation at the time of arrival include the level of 
education and the degree of qualification, family ties and migrant associations, age 
and language differences. The level of education and previous training experience, as 
well as age, could be a major factor for migrants responding easily to challenges such 
as learning a new language. Family ties and friendship provide a variety of assistance 
which ranges from sources of economic security to mutual aid or moral support, 
which nevertheless have shortcomings such as the slowdown of the process of socio-
economic assimilation due to intensive interaction.  
 
Some schools of thought have framed the explanation of the settlement of migrants in 
a new environment in theoretical models. Early theoretical models of assimilation 
were developed through examining the massive immigration to the United States of 
America at the beginning of the twentieth century (DeFay, 1998). One theoretical 
analysis is the Anglo-conformity version of assimilation. It highlights that migrants at 
one stage or another abandon by force or through the process of assimilation their 
ethnic and national allegiances. One of the most notorious illustrations of the Anglo-
conformity was “Americanisation”, whereby migrants from Germany for instance 
were forced to adopt American identities, following World War I (DeFay, 1998: 14).  
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Another school of thought sums up two groups of theories of assimilation (Martin, 
1986: 32). Firstly, segregationist and conservative models of assimilation outline the 
early modes of assimilation through the melting-pot theory. The massive immigration 
to the United States of America is also used as a good example to describe this 
theoretical model. New arrivals isolated themselves from other groups and formed 
ethnic enclaves which allowed them to keep their traditions and cultures. Migrants 
found their assimilation difficult because they were excluded from some spheres of 
activities and this resulted in the creation of norms and differences between new 
arrivals and communities already established. The melting-pot theory considers the 
full adoption of behaviours, beliefs and practices, particularly in the United States of 
America later on (DeFay, 1998: 15). Secondly, cultural pluralities theories mention 
that the greater the gap between local communities and migrants, the longer the 
process of assimilation will take. The later generations of arrivals are keen to easily 
incorporate the norms of the receiving countries.  
 
As mentioned by DeFay (1998: 17), a new and contemporary orientation on theories 
of assimilation is given by Portes and Rumbaut (1996) and Portes and Zhou (1993) in 
the debate focusing on the outcomes of the process of assimilation with a regard to the 
dynamic of process of migration. The mastering of the language of the receiving 
country is one of the main tools used to explain the whole process of assimilation 
(DeFay, 1998). At their arrival, migrants are at the stage of acculturation which allows 
them to get used to the cultural behaviours and beliefs of the receiving country. 
During that stage, their language abilities as far as the language of the new 
environment is concerned distinguish them clearly as migrants. This stage is often 
composed of the first generation and the first wave of new arrivals. The second stage 
sees migrants, often children of the first generation born in the receiving country, 
mastering the language very well. However, they retain the cultural characteristics of 
their parents, and their countries of origin. The third stage sees migrants fully 
assimilated to the culture of the host country. 
 
Along with language abilities, the process of assimilation can also be determined by 
socioeconomic success, their mode of incorporation into the host society and the 
economic and cultural factors offered by the receiving country.  
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Transnationalism is regarded as one of the fundamental factors in the current patterns 
of migration (DeFay, 1998). In the contrast to the theoretical model of assimilation 
described above, which point out that migrants either abandon or lose their original 
cultural characteristics gradually, transnationalism puts a particular focus on the fact 
that migrants maintain, sustain and enhance social and economic relationships with 
their countries of origin, and also with other migrant communities in other parts of the 
world from the same countries of origin. As mentioned by Portes and emphasised by 
DeFay (1998: 28), the development of the means of telecommunication, the modes of 
transportation, the restriction of the psychological distances which previously 
separated both the regions of departures and arrivals have enhanced the rise of 
transnationalism. In the new patterns of migration, migrants create a dual cultural 
identity which sees them not fully embracing the culture of the host country. Instead, 
migrants appear to be members of the cultural identities of both the countries of 
departure and the countries of arrival. Therefore, according to DeFay (1998: 23), the 
essence of the assimilation paradigm becomes meaningless as migrants do not utterly 
abandon their original cultures. Transnationalism is illustrated by regular visits of 
migrants to the countries of origin, the periodical sending of remittances back home or 
the involvement in the development of projects in local communities in the countries 
of origin. It has been shown for instance that the amount of money from the cash 
remittances of migrants in developing countries is more important than economic aid 
received from international donors (DeFay, 1998: 25).  
 
5.7.2 The language factor and the settlement in Cape Town 
If one considers the theoretical analysis of the central-pluralists theory, the different 
stages of assimilation through language can only be applicable to two groups of 
Francophone African migrants. The first group is mostly made up of people from 
Francophone African countries close to South Africa, for instance Mauritius. The 
Mauritian migration to South Africa was already well established before the end of 
the apartheid era. Martin (1986: 115) demonstrates that there was already an 
established Mauritian community in the late nineteenth century. The reasons for these 
early arrivals included environmental catastrophes such as cyclones and the lack of 
arable land, which forced people to look for better opportunities elsewhere. Economic 
reasons, particularly job opportunities, underline the reasons for the arrival of 
Mauritians in South Africa. Along with the search for job opportunities were political 
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changes which led to the end of the French colonial rule and the independence of the 
country in 1968. Many white people left the country as they could not accept working 
under other races’ domination or they lost their jobs with the arrival of the socialist 
party in power in the 1980s. Other reasons such as family reunification, academic 
reasons, medical treatment or personal adventures also contribute to Mauritian 
migration to South Africa other the years.  
 
Migrants who settled in the former homelands, particularly from the former Zaire 
(Chapter 3), are the second group of Francophone Africans in South Africa that the 
cultural-pluralist point of view in language can be applied to.  
 
The first generations of these two groups arrived more than two decades ago at least. 
The following generations have been able to incorporate themselves into the South 
African society as far as language is concerned. For many of those who have been 
arriving since the demise of apartheid, the proficiency in English remains 
problematic.  
 
The linguistic background of Francophone African migrants plays an important role 
in their settlement. Although these migrants are from French speaking countries, for 
most of them French is not their first language. In some of these countries, local 
languages are widely spoken by major parts of the populations. In the DRC for 
instance, Swahili is even used beyond the borders of the country. In Mali, Bambara is 
used in academic and corporative circles, even though in an unofficial way. In sum, 
these migrants can justify their “African Francophoness” by their capability to speak 
French and/or by being nationals of French speaking countries, despite the point 
raised by Bouillon (1996: 10) who admits that it is difficult to consider all those 
migrants as Francophone due in particular to the level of literacy in French in the 
countries considered. Bouillon’s argument is emphasised by some specialists in 
linguistics who wonder whether the fact that migrants speak French can warrant the 
assumption that they belong to the same linguistic entity (Vigouroux, 2001). One 
therefore could ask whether it is possible to talk about a Francophone community in 
Cape Town. In her findings, Vigouroux (2001) points out that Francophone African 
migrants in Cape Town feel they belong to a “Francophone world”. That deduction 
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seems to justify the preference of Francophone African migrants to gather together in 
comparison with those from other linguistic families.  
 
Francophone Africans like to be together because of the language. People who 
speak the same language they usually stay together. But they are not afraid of 
others because we are all foreigners and all Africans. It is also depends on 
your location or your work. If you have to stay with people from other 
countries, what are you going to do?” (Ivorian student, Cape Town, November 
2004).  
 
However, on the other side, the findings of this study reveal that it is difficult to talk 
about a sole organised Francophone African community in Cape Town. Indeed, 
people gather together according to the same interests, especially economic ones, 
even though they are not from the same linguistic background. Instead, migrants from 
the same countries illustrate their citizenship in Cape Town through political, regional 
or national associations and religious organisations. L’Association des Ivoiriens de 
Cape Town (The Association of Ivorians of Cape Town) is one of the examples of the 
numerous associations that exist in the city. The main principles of the association are 
to recognise being Ivorian in a foreign territory and knowing each other. The 
association also aims to facilitate the integration of new arrivals in Cape Town. It 
works in collaboration with its counterparts in the cities where there are many 
Ivorians, such as Durban or Johannesburg. Overall, the main objective of such 
gatherings is to promote the national identity abroad. This is illustrated for instance 
during the organisation of the independence day of each country. However, such 
organisations do not exclude the differences among its members. The ideal to achieve 
is to reflect the social and political lives back home. As far as Ivorians are concerned, 
these differences can be considered through the representations of political parties 
such as the Parti Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire (Democratic Party of Cote d’Ivoire) 
and the Rassemblement des Republicains (Republican Rally).  
 
Apart from national organisations, some migrants from the same country group 
together according to their regional or provincial origins. The aim is to narrow down 
the objectives and the purposes of development at the regional or the provincial level 
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back in the country of origin. Some Cameroonians for instance are members of 
multiple associations.  
 
Cameroon is a bilingual country. There are French-speaking and English-
speaking people,but the French are more dominant. Here in Cape Town, there 
are a French Cameroonian association and an English Cameroonian 
association. Then, you know that Cameroon has a lot of tribes; so there are 
also tribal associations. There are some people who belong to all of them 
(Cameroonian man, Cape Town, 23 October 2004).  
 
Before national pride, the language defines belonging to a social community. 
Consequently, these regional or national associations are primarily pointed out before 
some Francophone African migrants acknowledge being part of a “Francophone 
world”, as admitted by Vigouroux. I therefore prefer to argue that there are several 
distinct Francophone African communities in Cape Town. These distinct communities 
are linked by religious, academic and corporative interests.  
 
The second explanation of the degree of importance given to French by Francophone 
African migrants can be viewed through the category of the migrants and the reasons 
for their arrival in Cape Town. For the legal migrants and the students, French is first 
and foremost an indispensable tool, which goes beyond a mere means of 
communication. It is fundamental to their occupations and studies. Among the variety 
of reasons for leaving their countries of origin, there is the expressed need to add 
another international language to French, which could empower them in the 
globalised labour and academic markets. The capacity of some legal migrants to 
master French, for instance, is one of the major reasons for their recruitment by 
companies in need of their bi- or multi-linguistic abilities. However, for a few extra-
legals particularly the degree of importance of using French is not high. This is 
because they do not really rely on French to determine their living in Cape Town. The 
circumstances are even more dramatic for those who were not fluent enough in 
French before coming to South Africa. They find themselves in a situation where their 
proficiency in French as well as in English is considered poor. Some migrants justify 
their careless of using French as a response to French policy in Africa and towards 
Africans. France is regarded as responsible for the underdevelopment conditions of 
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Francophone African countries through its support of dictators who ruled those 
countries. France is also accused of being disrespectful to Africans by erecting 
unnecessary laws and measures to stop African immigration to France. They therefore 
do not see any need to maintain the importance of French, especially since they are in 
a non French-speaking country.  
 
The integration of Francophone African migrants, as far as the language factor is 
concerned, is also linked to the mastering of languages spoken in Cape Town, with a 
particular focus on English. Of the eleven official languages in the country, the 
Western Cape in general is the home of English, Afrikaans and isiXhosa. This 
linguistic fragmentation is one of the challenges facing Francophone African migrants 
on their arrival in the city, especially some of those coming straight from their country 
of origin. This linguistic fragmentation is also illustrated by the linguistic geography 
of Cape Town (Vigouroux, 2001). In the CBD, English is the prominent language as 
academic, administrative and economic activities are conducted in that language. The 
legacy of the apartheid era has made Afrikaans the dominant language in the Cape 
Flats and isiXhosa in the sprawling Black townships of Gugulethu, Nyanga, Langa 
and Kayalitsha. Despite the national characteristic, these three languages do not have 
the same impact and influence on the city’s society. English remains the main 
language migrants are willing to learn.  
 
Few Francophone Africans are able to cope in English at their arrival. They are 
mainly those who studied English at the tertiary level in their countries or 
professionals who attended English courses. Some Cameroonians are also able to 
handle English because English is the second official language of the country. They 
are particularly those from the northern part of Cameroon, where English is widely 
spoken, sometimes more than French. Except for students and some other migrants 
who attend English classes, the language is assimilated on contact with the local 
population. South Africa in general and Cape Town in particular are for most 
Francophone African migrants, especially those who have never been to another 
English-speaking country, the first places where they are in continuous contact with 
English. However, most of our respondents acknowledged that the accent used by 
South Africans is something unexpected that they have to deal with beyond the fact of 
learning a new language. According to some respondents, South Africans who speak 
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“proper” English, with a good accent are those in contact with other English-spoken 
people from different backgrounds. For the rest of the local population, their accent is 
heavily influenced by Afrikaans and other African languages, isiXhosa in particular. 
But these deductions by migrants about the different accents of the local populations 
are influenced by their comparison with and consideration of the European or 
American accents that they are in contact with in their countries of origin or through 
different medium.  
 
Learning the other two languages used in Cape Town besides English, particularly 
isiXhosa, has been considered for many as a useful mean of the integration into the 
local society, although it does not guarantee professional and economic insertions. For 
some Francophone African migrants, particularly those from the central region of the 
continent, learning isiXhosa is not a very difficult task since it has similarities with 
some languages from that part of the continent. However, Francophone African 
migrants who have managed to speak isiXhosa and who have settled in the townships 
for example are generally still regarded as foreigners by the local population.  
 
5.7.3 Transnationalism and the settlement in Cape Town 
Crush and Williams (2002b) believe that the importance of transnationalism in 
research on migration in South Africa should get further attention, apart from the 
definition of the concept, as already highlighted in this section. They mention that 
transnational activities are part of internationalisation and globalisation, since 
transportation facilities have made the world labour market smaller and enhanced the 
movement of workers. Transnationalism is also viewed as a new approach to explain 
migrant identities in the receiving countries. The authors argue that transnationalism, 
through cumulative causation, perpetuate migration, before suggesting that the new 
components of globalisation such as transportation and communication, plus the 
importance of social capital, offer migrants better legal opportunities to challenge 
their exploitation.  
 
My analysis of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town considers particularly 
the concept of transnationalism as one of the more adequate means to understand the 
perpetuation of migration in South Africa in general and in Cape Town in particular 
after the demise of apartheid. As far as Francophone Africans in Cape Town are 
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concerned, and considering the above guidelines offered by Crush and Williams 
(2002b), the continuous arrivals of these migrants in a relative new destination is also 
a consequence of the participation of South Africa in the globalised economy. This is 
justified by the perceptions of people living outside the country, who consider the 
South African pull factors a major determinant of their choice of destination. The 
revolution of tools of communication and transport allows Francophone North-
Africans to prefer to come to South Africa rather than going to other destinations 
closer to their countries of origin and enables them to keep in touch permanently with 
their family back home. 
 
As demonstrated for the language factor, it will be difficult to affirm that Francophone 
Africans totally abandon or progressively lose their cultural identities to utterly 
embrace the South African culture. As already mentioned above in this section, 
migrants promote their national and regional identities in Cape Town. The mere fact 
of a Senegalese restaurant at Cape Town’s train station, which is always patronsed by 
Senegalese nationals and migrants from other countries, is one among many other 
illustrations of a growing replica of migrants’ cultural elements in Cape Town. 
Another example to point out is the existence of several “foreign shops” throughout 
the city which offer foreign products. The running of these shops facilitates 
permanent exchanges between the owners in Cape Town and people in their countries 
of origin for the supply of products.  
 
Moreover, some migrants consider Cape Town as a pivotal and transitional point for 
their business. South African transport facilities, for instance, are used for exporting 
goods from Asia, before being sent to main Francophone African cities such as 
Abidjan, Dakar, Libreville, Brazzaville, Kinshasa and Lumumbashi. In reality, some 
migrants in South Africa in general and in Cape Town in particular have found 
themselves in worldwide business networks described by Ebin in Koser (2003: 99):  
 
Senior traders travel to New York, Jeddah and Hong Kong to buy wholesale 
goods, generally electronic and beauty products, which they re-sell, both 
wholesale and retail, in Senegal and in other countries. Those with less means 
work as street peddlers and whether in Dakar, Marseilles or New York, they 
deal in whatever they can sell.  
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My findings also reveal that running and development of such networks need more 
committed and trustworthy people. Family members and friends in the countries of 
origin or elsewhere in the world are thus called on, and migration is perpetuated. This 
leads to another major pattern of transnationalism between Francophone African 
migrants in Cape Town and their countries of origin. 
 
One of the major patterns of transnationalism in Africa in general is the importance of 
remittances (Adepoju, 2006; Ghosh, 2006; The United Nations, 2004; Ramamurthy, 
2003). Migrants’ remittances in any Francophone African countries are nowadays 
viewed as a factor of development. In Senegal, for instance, the importance of 
remittances is acknowledged at government level with the Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères et des Sénégalais de l’Exterieur (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
External Senegalese). Indeed, Senegalese migrants like many of their counterparts 
from other countries, contribute a lot to the development of their communities in their 
country. The town of Touba is a typical example in this regard (see section 3.4.1.2 of 
Chapter 3). In many countries, the impact of migrants’ remittances is equal to or even 
more important than export earnings or Overseas Development Assistance (Adepoju, 
2006: 30).  
 
However, the extent of remittances has many limitations. Indeed, Ramamurthy (2003) 
poses some shortcomings of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa. She argues that the 
scale of the flows suffers from the methods used to collect data. In some countries, 
remittances are considered as part of “service payments and receipts”, while others 
they are included in “factor income from abroad” like in Botswana and Lesotho. The 
external and internal sources of flows in Africa are not often separated. And more 
importantly, the figures available do not capture the full amounts transferred, as the 
flows take place outside the official channels. As a matter of fact, many people prefer 
sending their remittances by hand to avoid paying the transfer fees. Other means such 
as informal networks are used, like the Senegalese bank described in Section 6.3 of 
Chapter 6. Lately, remittance flows are also sent as material goods. Nevertheless, an 
estimation of remittances sent by Francophone African migrants in Cape Town can be 
made. As described in section 5.3.2.3 of chapter 5, a legal migrant can send home R3 
000 monthly. Considering that in 2005 there were 13 486 Francophone African 
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migrants in Cape Town, it appears that they would have sent home approximately 
R485 496 000 in that year. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The arrival of Francophone Africans in Cape Town broadly occurs into two ways. On 
the one hand, Cape Town is the first choice for some migrants when they arrive in 
Cape Town. This is the case for most students and some legal migrants. One the other 
hand, the city is the second choice of migrants if they do not succeed to settle in other 
cities in the country, Johannesburg in particular. For many, the success of their 
settlement depends on their categories and their modes of arrival in Cape Town. 
However, the differences between categories are not clear because overlaps and 
complexities allow migrants to change categories and alter the degree of success of 
their settlement. 
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Chapter Six 
                         
         THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE LIVES OF  
        FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN MIGRANTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the complexities of living in Cape Town for Francophone 
African migrants. The chapter emphasises the migration lifetime of some interviewees 
and the challenges presented by Cape Town as a host city. The case studies present 
each category considered in this study and the four case studies describe the process 
of the migration of Francophone Africans, from their reasons for leaving their home 
countries to their settlement in Cape Town, including their arrival in South Africa and 
in Cape Town. The chapter roughly answers the following questions: Why do 
Francophone Africans leave their countries of origin? Why do they choose to come to 
South Africa? And within South Africa, why do they decide to settle in Cape Town? 
The case studies also reveal some issues related to the discourse on migration in South 
Africa, such as the gender issues and xenophobia. For each of these four examples, 
the role of social capital through organisations such as churches, students 
associations, refugees’ organisations or marriages are significant in the overlapping of 
categories. 
 
6.2 A legal migrant 
Samson A. is the owner of a curios crafts shop in Cape Town. He is married to a 
South African woman with whom he has a daughter. He has been entitled to 
permanent residence status and one could consider him as a typical example of a 
success story for a Francophone African migrant on Cape Town. However, his 
settlement and his integration in Cape Town were the outcome of a long and 
unpredictable journey through the southern hemisphere of the African continent.  
 
Samson A. left his native Cameroon with the purpose of pursuing his studies in any 
other country which could offer him better studying conditions than Cameroon. After 
his baccalaureate (the exam which completes high school in most of Francophone 
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African countries), he entered the University of Buea. Although in the central part of 
Cameroon, he was familiar with the northern part of the country, where English is 
widely considered the country’s other official language, along with French. However 
he did not complete his first year. In 1990, Cameroon, like others in Francophone 
Africa countries, witnessed the demise of the single party political system, dominated 
by the RDPC, the Rassemblement Democratique du Peuple Camerounais 
(Cameroonian People Democratic Rally) of President Paul Biya. The higher education 
system was not spared the political, economic and social turmoil of demands and 
freedom of speech. Consequently, the credibility of the Cameroonian university was 
shaken as parents and students particularly did not trust its capability to deliver a 
convincing education. People were not sure that the academic calendar could reach its 
end without disruption or discredit. An example of strikes at the universities, pointed 
out in Section 4.2.6 of Chapter 4, illustrates the crisis of Cameroonian higher 
education. The recurrence of those political, economic and social demands left serious 
damages in tertiary education. It was that crisis which pushed Samson A. to leave his 
country of origin in 1994 to look for places where he could pursue his studies in better 
academic environments.  
 
Apart from the recurrence of the political, economic and social crisis, the lack of 
financial support is also pointed out as the second main reason justifying the decision 
of Samson A. to leave his country of origin. As a matter of fact, his parents were not 
able to afford his fees anymore, because they were victims of the collateral damage of 
the notorious structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) imposed on Cameroon by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1990s to alleviate the country’s economic 
performance (presented in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4). Up to 1994, his father was a 
member of the plethoric Cameroonian administration that the government had to 
reduce to satisfy the requirements of the IMF to become eligible to benefit from 
international aid. Samson A’s father found himself unemployed after serving his 
country for more than two decades, and the family was obliged to survive from his 
wife’s earnings as a domestic worker. A “logical choice” was made between trying to 
afford Samson A’s fees and the survival of the whole family. The situation was even 
more dramatic because Samson A. was not the only child. For him migrating to 
pursue his studies elsewhere was a suitable solution. 
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Some questions could be raised regarding his decision to continue his studies in 
another country, and the incapacity of his parents to afford his fees. The explanation 
goes beyond the push and pull factors. Indeed, how is it possible for someone to 
decide, due to financial reasons, to pursue his/her studies outside his/her country of 
origin where the fees could be more expensive for him/her because he/she is a foreign 
student? It appears that the academic reason is one of the common reasons given by 
the interviewees to justify the cause behind their departure. Indeed, many of the 
interviewees justify migration by their desire the continue their studies, although they 
have found themselves involved in other activities and have forgotten about studies 
even though some have had opportunities to do so.  
 
Nevertheless, Samson A. succeeded in saving a certain amount of money after 
working in a garage and later on as assistant mechanic. The remainder of the money 
necessary for his trip was loans from other people, including his parents and some 
close friends who trusted him and they received his guarantee to be refunded. The 
choice of the country of destination depended on the amount of money at his disposal 
and the academic opportunities he could have in the country of destination. It is 
obvious that he had preferred to migrate to European, North American or some Asian 
countries which have the necessary infrastructures. But he did not have enough 
money and time to apply for a study permit and to satisfy to all the requirements to be 
accepted by those countries. He had no other choice than opting for a country close to 
Cameroon. 
 
A combination of three factors contributed to his decision to go to Gabon as the first 
step. His plan was to enter the country first and then to apply to the Department of 
Economics at the Gabonese main university once in Libreville, the capital. He was not 
quite sure that his application could go through while he was still in Cameroon. As 
described in Section 3.4.2.2 of Chapter 3, Gabon presented relatively good economic 
opportunities, which attracted people from the Central African region and beyond. 
Gabon also offers the same academic system as Cameroon and the geographical 
proximity could be viewed as the last factor explaining the choice of Gabon by 
Samson A. as the first country to migrate to. However, he entered the country 
unlawfully because, for financial reasons; he did not first go to Yaoundé, the 
Cameroonian capital to apply for a visa at the Gabonese embassy.  
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He does not have a pleasant recollection of his stay in Gabon. He witnessed the 
horrors of migration when his money was stolen, he was arrested and deported to the 
south of Cameroon, far way from his region of origin. He nonetheless attempted 
migration abroad rather than returning to his hometown. He then was driven into an 
illegal migration network, and he found himself in the northern region of the 
neighbouring Congo after several days of walking through the Equatorial forest. 
During the trip, one of his fellow travelling companions lost his life due to the 
combination of hunger, fatigue and malaria. The crossing of borders between Central 
African states is easy; the immigration officials of these countries are insufficient and 
unequipped to watch over the few border points. However, without an appropriate 
guide, it is also easy to get lost in the forest.  
 
At this point, the idea of looking for a better environment to further his studies could 
be challenged. Indeed, without the required documents to enter Congo and without 
considerable financial resources, Samson A. could have opted to return to his 
hometown. A critical consideration suggests that, although the main aim of many 
migrants like Samson A. is to further their studies, the push-pull factors at this point 
seem to involve only a straightforward search for a better life. 
 
His sojourn in Congo lasted almost three years. After encountering a lot of problems, 
like a short stay in prison in the capital Brazzaville because of his illegal status, he 
decided to move to Pointe-Noire, a coastal city in the South-West of Congo, which 
has a reputation of presenting less harassment from police and which is also regarded 
as the economic capital of the country. In his mind, Congo was always viewed as a 
stopover where he could make enough money to continue “his journey”, wherever the 
destination, but with better opportunities than Congo, Gabon and Cameroon that he 
had already experienced. In Congo, he was unable to achieve his objectives because 
the country, like his country of origin Cameroon, was hit by a severe economic crisis. 
Samson A. found himself trapped, as he was not ready to go back to his country 
without making enough money for himself to invest back home. He also saw himself 
trapped because he did not have enough financial resources to attempt to migrate to 
Europe or North America. He did not even see himself moving to Angola due to the 
civil war which was tearing that country apart for many years. The situation was even 
more dramatic for him, as he was witnessing Congo nationals leaving their own 
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country due to political, economic and social difficulties. With a small capital, he 
succeeded in getting into the informal sector and selling all sort of products, including 
clothes and bread on the streets.  
 
One of the main causes of migration in Africa pushed Samson A. away from Congo. 
In 1997, a rift surfaced between the main actors in the Congolese political arena, 
including Pascal Lissouba, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Bernard Kolelas and Yombi 
Opango. Each leader established his domination over a specific region, controlled by 
his own militia. According to Samson A., he had no choice but to look for greener 
pastures elsewhere. He enquired about the illegal channels that Congolese were using 
to get out of the country. He spent almost all his savings to organise the trip. In reality 
he paid people of a specific network to organise his departure. 
 
For Samson A., the choice to come to South Africa was made according to the 
circumstances of that time and the availability of destinations presented by the 
network in charge of his departure. Unlike previous departures, the ones arranged 
after the beginning of the civil war made things easier for the organisers, because they 
used the armed conflict in Congo as the main reason why Congolese were obliged to 
leave their country. Samson A. received proper documents stating that he was a 
Congolese refugee, forced to look for a safer place. South Africa was viewed as the 
nearest place, able to guarantee protection to thousands of refugees. He travelled with 
other “Congo nationals” by road from Pointe-Noire in Congo to Luanda. In the 
Angolan capital, they were introduced to another intermediate that they paid to drive 
them to Namibia. Finally, by bus they ended up in Johannesburg.  
 
His only knowledge of South Africa was from press releases. He thought before 
arriving in South Africa that the country was at the same level of development as 
most European countries. He was convinced that the South African standard of living, 
comparable with Europe, would change his fate rapidly. He also believed that in 
South Africa, he would be able to work, as possibilities were certainly present and he 
would be able to sponsor his studies with his salary. He did not expect any problem as 
far language is concerned, because he is from the northern part of Cameroon where 
the use of English is common and his bilingual aptitude could only be an advantage 
for him. His objectives before arriving in South Africa were clearly defined. It was a 
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double objective, as on the one hand he was looking forward to completing his studies 
and on the other hand he would be able to save enough money to migrate to the 
United States.  
 
He arrived in Johannesburg in December 1997. He used his “double nationality” to 
settle in Johannesburg. After spending three years in Congo, he was able to speak 
Linguala, a language spoken by most of Congolese. He used his language proficiency 
in Linguala, his knowledge of Congo and his “official documents” to be inserted into 
a part of the Congolese community in Johannesburg. He was also welcomed by some 
countrymen into the Cameroonian community. With the help of those intense social 
capital links, he did not encounter difficulties to get documents confirming his refugee 
status. He was renting with a “colleague” in Yeoville. They contributed equally to pay 
the rent, electricity and food. Above all, using social capital, he replaced another 
“brother” as security guard. However, his sojourn in Johannesburg lasted less than a 
year. The principal reason for his departure from Johannesburg was safety. The area 
where he was renting was cheap but also insecure due in particular to gunshots. 
Everyday he was anxious for his life, especially on his way to or back from work. He 
left Johannesburg and first went to Durban. Unfortunately, he could not settle down in 
Durban and he decided to move to Cape Town. At the time he arrived in the country, 
Samson A. did not have any idea about Cape Town. He knew more about the city 
once in the country. Other migrants told him that Cape Town was the safest big city in 
South Africa. It is the main reason he decided to move down to the Mother City after 
he left Johannesburg and Durban.  
 
Samson A. arrived in Cape Town by train, not so convinced that Cape Town would 
not be disappointing like Gabon, Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire in Congo and 
Johannesburg. He spent his first day walking around and sleeping in the train station. 
During that time he met two security guards from the DRC and he easily introduced 
himself as he was able to speak French. He settled down faster than he did in 
Johannesburg and he also found work as a security guard. After some time, he saved 
some money and with that little capital Samson A. started his own business. In the 
beginning, he was selling on the street. In comparison with his experience of selling 
on the streets acquired during his stay in Pointe-Noire in Congo, he could easily 
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manage to save money, especially because he was earning more in Cape Town and 
the suppliers were around the corners.  
 
In the meantime, Samson A. met his future wife, who was one of his habitual 
customers. They got married a year later, just a couple of months before the birth of 
their daughter. Finally, Samson A. was convinced that his time had come, as a 
combination of factors, particularly the amount of money he managed to save and his 
marriage, facilitated the opportunities for him to open and to grow a serious business. 
Being a South African citizen, his wife did not have any problem using her name to 
register the shop on her behalf. Since then, Samson A. has changed his status from 
entering the country with false documents and being considered a refugee to 
becoming a permanent resident. He proudly recognises that his marriage and the birth 
of his daughter have helped to change his status. However, he did not give many 
indications of the process of acquiring the permanent residence permit. They rent a 
place on Long Street where they sell crafts and curious.  
 
Samson A. has opened another shop in Cape Town train station and he has brought 
his younger brother to manage the second shop. He employs five South African 
women in his two shops and he is hoping to extend his business to other sectors, 
particularly informatics with the opening of two or three cyber-cafés. Samson A. does 
not view himself merely as a foreigner who takes advantages of South African 
opportunities, but as someone who has made many sacrifices and efforts to be where 
and who he is today. And he thinks that his contribution to the country’s economy is 
illustrated by his expenditures and job positions that he provides to South African 
nationals. He will proudly encourage his fellow countrymen or other fellow Africans 
to come to South Africa, but only if they have a concrete plan, are ready to work hard 
and are well prepared academically and financially. Now that he is financially secure, 
Samson A. thinks of achieving the first reason why he left his country. He would like 
to get a degree in Management from any tertiary institution in Cape Town.  
 
Although when he left his country he never though about coming to Cape Town, 
Samson A. concludes that he has learnt more during his experience of migration than 
in school. He sees himself in a couple years, after his degree, managing his own 
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business in his country of origin. He does not think that Europe or America could 
offer him more without jeopardising what he already has.  
 
6.3 A refugee 
Laurent D. is a refugee from DRC and he is a student at UCT. He is married to a 
Congolese woman since 2001. The case of Laurent D. illustrates an example of a 
forced migrant who ends up in Cape Town “accidentally”, because his reasons for 
leaving his country of origin, those explaining his choice of South Africa and Cape 
Town as destinations were not made according to his wishes. His case is interesting in 
the sense that his status can be used for both refugee and student categories. He was 
passionate about English since his early years in high school. It was because of that 
passion that he opted to study English at the tertiary level, before receiving a training 
programme to become an English teacher. Laurent D. had always believed he could 
only leave his country legally and if he was entirely convinced of having a decent job 
to further his teaching career. He was teaching English in a high school in 
Lumumbashi, in the south of the country when the First Congo War broke out in 
November 1996.  
 
The Congolese armed conflict and its collateral damage, such as the collapse of the 
academic system and the fear of being targeted as partisan to the opposite camp were 
the main factors explaining the departure of Laurent D. from his hometown and his 
country. Two of his cousins joined the rebellion factions formed against the regime of 
President Mobutu and grouped under the tutelage of the AFDL, the Alliance des 
Forces pour la Liberation du Congo (the Alliance of Forces for the Liberation of 
Congo). The regime of President Mobutu, in power since 1965, was widely 
considered responsible for the political, economic and social collapse of the country. 
Unlike his cousins, Laurent D. did not manifest any intention to join the rebellion. His 
refusal to do so was interpreted as an act of betrayal and he was categorised as a 
partisan of the MPR, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (Popular Movement 
of Revolution), the party of President Mobutu and the FAZ, the Forces Armées du 
Zaire (Armed Forces of Zaire), the national army. Moreover, his occupation exposed 
him too much and his life was at risk when rumours were spread around that some 
informants of the FAZ were collecting information throughout the region, which was 
mostly occupied by the rebels. In the regions occupied by the AFDL, the 
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governmental partisans were the first to be targeted and many lost their lives; others 
had no choice but to leave.  
 
Laurent D. was obliged to leave his region of origin. He first thought of finding a 
safer place within the country, but the rebel forces were rapidly establishing their 
domination over region after region, and the armed conflict was quickly spreading all 
over the country. He therefore found himself in the large streams of Congolese 
escaping from their country to seek refuge elsewhere. 
 
He first went to Zambia. The choice of Zambia was obvious because of the 
geographical proximity and because he could afford the trip. When he left his country, 
he was hoping to be far away, especially because of the pain of the war. He could not 
find anything interesting in Zambia and he was obliged to move on. He wanted to go 
to Malawi, with firstly the intention to get a position in a high school to teach either 
French or English if possible on a temporary basis. His second intention for going to 
Malawi was to earn money for himself and to further his journey to Australia, Canada 
or the United States of America, like many Congolese or Africans have done. And he 
was rating his chances highly because of his academic background and his 
professional experience. For him, it was a unique occasion to restart his life in a safer 
economic and political environment, with always the hope of returning one day to a 
safe and peaceful Congo. 
 
However, he could not go to Malawi and ended up in Mozambique. During his 
migration process, it was a question of making the most of the offered opportunity. 
With a visitor visa received at the Mozambican embassy in Lusaka, he arrived in 
Mozambique four months after his departure from Lumumbashi. In Mozambique he 
wanted to be granted the status of refugee. At the UNHCR’s office he was informed 
about a refugee camp outside Maputo, the Mozambican capital. Unfortunately, the 
information was false because he did not find any refugee camp. Unexpectedly, he 
was then confronted by two dilemmas: he was broke and he was unable to speak the 
local languages or Portuguese, the official language used in the country. He had to 
find some way to survive in an alien environment, particularly with few job 
opportunities available. He was also looking for ways to move out of Mozambique, as 
his living condition became worse daily.  
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Fortunately, like many migrants in these kinds of situations, social capital plays a 
fundamental role in providing assistance and guidance. He met some of his 
countrymen, who brought him to a religious organisation. He became deeply involved 
in church activities, but he asserts that he did not engage himself in religious activities 
with the intention to receive any help to continue his “journey”. It was only later on 
he was informed through the church that there was a possibility to go to South Africa 
as a refugee. The religious organisation helped him get the required documents for 
entering South Africa. However, the documents he received did not guarantee him 
legal permanent status in South Africa.  
 
The role played by the religious organisation in helping Laurent D. is an illustration of 
the institutional theory. The organisation has over the years offered help and 
assistance to many potential migrants, particularly those with no legal status, with 
social services in Mozambique and proper guidance to enter South Africa lawfully. 
The choice of South Africa was not Laurent D.’s because he had no other option but 
to accept the offer of going to South Africa. Besides, he believed that South Africa, 
because of the economic standard of the country, could offer him better living 
conditions than Mozambique could. He was convinced that in South Africa he would 
be able to get a job and make enough money to migrate to Europe, Australia or the 
United States of America.  
 
Laurent D. travelled by bus and arrived in Johannesburg with the status of asylum 
seeker, with no clear idea where to go. It was far from the situation he had imagined 
when he left his hometown of Lumumbashi, but the bottom line was that he did not 
have any option other than accepting his situation and looking for some ways and 
means to get out of it. Moreover, at that time, with the ongoing conflict in the DRC, it 
was out of question for him to go back to his country. Overall, leaving Mozambique 
was just a matter of going to South Africa and seeing what he could do, with the 
strong belief that he had left the worst situation behind in the DRC, Zambia and 
Mozambique. 
 
Once in Johannesburg, he started calling up the telephone numbers of people he knew 
in the city, hoping that they could come to his rescue in one way or another, but he 
could not reach any of the people he called. Then he called all the people he knew or 
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had some contacts with anywhere in the country. Laurent D. then succeeded in getting 
one of his countrymen in Cape Town, who asked him to go down for a couple of days 
to see what he could do or if he could go elsewhere, depending on the opportunities 
available. He stayed only one day in Johannesburg. Although it was only for few 
hours, Johannesburg also played the role of stopover and was fundamental in Laurent 
D.’s decision to move down to Cape Town because he could not succeed in getting 
any assistance. He therefore failed to settle in Johannesburg and like many other 
Francophone Africans, Laurent D. was obliged to look for opportunities in Cape 
Town.  
 
His friend was a student and welcomed him to Cape Town. During his first days in 
the city, he depended entirely on his friend, who offered him the opportunity to share 
his room, provided food for him and did not hesitate to give money from time to time, 
especially for transportation to move from one place to another while he was looking 
for a job. His friend also introduced him to the Cape Town Refugee Forum, which 
had helped many Congolese before Laurent D, including his friend. Laurent D. had to 
find a way of surviving. He then started looking for jobs, particularly in restaurants 
and shops. After two weeks of searching, he succeeded in getting a position in a 
restaurant. Obviously it was not an enviable position, but for him it was something to 
rely on for the time being, before looking for something better. He considers himself 
lucky that after only two weeks in the country he was able to find a job, especially 
because he met many of his countrymen and other foreigners who spent, more than a 
year in some cases looking unsuccessfully for a job.  
 
In Cape Town, Laurent D. also became more involved in religious activities and 
received support from his fellow religious members, especially from a moral point of 
view. The support from the religious community was fundamental because, during his 
period of searching for a job, Laurent D. claims he was not depressed at all, he was 
not alone, but surrounded by the church community and assured that with the 
guidance of God everything would be alright.  
 
Laurent D. also received some help from the Cape Town Refugee Forum. In the 
beginning, it was basically counselling and money from some individuals. However, 
the most significant help from the Cape Town Refugee Forum came a couple of 
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months after his arrival in Cape Town. From the forum, Laurent D. received a 
recommendation when his situation was dragging at Home Affairs offices. This 
helped him considerably to get the documents allowing him to work and study. 
Lastly, he received help from his boss at the restaurant where he was working. In the 
beginning, he did not have any of the required documents allowing him to work, but 
his boss did not bother at all about his legal status. In reality, for the owner of the 
restaurant it was an opportunity to employ a foreigner with no legal status whom he 
could pay less than a legal migrant or a South Africa national. His boss even 
encouraged him to apply for temporary documents. When his boss became aware of 
his academic and professional background, he also advised Laurent D. to look for 
some ways to empower himself by getting a South African degree, which could make 
it easier for him to look for better living conditions and to fulfil his dreams of having 
a decent career and to migrate overseas.  
 
Laurent D. proudly speaks philosophically about the importance of getting his first 
job in Cape Town in that restaurant. That work in the restaurant was very important 
for the settlement and the integration of Laurent D. in Cape Town. Although wages 
were not much from that work, Laurent D.’s dignity had been restored. His dignity 
was lost since his departure from Lumumbashi., He had not been independent since 
he left his country. Even though Laurent D.’s situation did not stabilise, work was for 
him a way of trying to grow, to make an effort to move forward. It was an 
encouraging result of trying and believing, whatever the circumstances. The job, 
through the stabilisation of income, represents three important steps in the life of 
Laurent D. in Cape Town. Firstly, he got a place to stay and he went to rent on his 
own. Secondly, he could afford to provide food for himself. Lastly, he felt free to 
move around, as far as transportation is concerned. For him it was important that he 
could satisfy his basic needs by himself.  
 
After ensuring the satisfaction of his first needs, Laurent D. started to look for more 
and better opportunities. During his search for better jobs, he found himself at UCT. 
After talking to a woman at the international office who became aware of his 
academic training, he was informed that he could further his studies with the 
assistance of the UCT Legal Clinic as a refugee and a citizen of a country member of 
SADC. He then applied to do a Master’s degree in the Department of English. 
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Overall, Laurent D. acknowledges that his situation in Cape Town has improved in 
comparison with the one in Zambia or Mozambique, where he did not have any 
shelter at all. In Cape Town he has a support structure. However, he admits that 
compared to Lumumbashi, his situation has really worsened, because from being a 
professional, he has become a full-time student. Moreover, he still has not achieved 
his objective of getting a decent job and saving enough money to move to Australia, 
Europe or North America.  
 
6.4 A Student  
The Senegalese Souleymane C. is a student at one the campuses of CPUT in Cape 
Town. He also sells clothes outside the Cape Town train station. His case is an 
example of the desire to pursue his studies because of the opportunities offered by the 
academic conditions of the host city, despite the fact that studying was not the 
principal reason he left his country. Describing his case illustrates the importance of 
social networks between host countries for Senegalese immigrants. 
 
The reasons behind the departure of Souleymane C. from Senegal are complex 
because they range from the disappointment in the Senegalese labour market, as it 
was unable to entirely satisfy job seekers, to the migrant’s desire to emulate 
countrymen. Souleymane C. completed high school in Saint-Louis, a city in the north 
of the country. He also obtained his baccalaureate B, with a specialisation in 
Economics and Social Sciences, in Saint Louis. He then moved to Dakar, the 
Senegalese capital, with the intention to be registered at the famous University Check 
Anta Diop. But he rather opted to look for a job, as he became aware of the degree of 
unemployment in the country and he realised that many graduates from the tertiary 
institutions were unable to find a decent job. He then concluded that the best option 
would be to try to get a job after completing high school rather than “spending many 
years of sacrifice and a lot of money” to end up unemployed. He believed that he 
could use those years efficiently by starting his own business. However, he did not 
escape unemployment. Indeed, after almost a year of unsuccessfully searching for a 
descent job, he found himself assisting someone else selling clothes in the Sandaga 
market, one of the biggest commercial places in Dakar.  
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Almost a year after stopping his studies, and without significant changes in his 
situation, he was determined that going abroad was the best and only option to give a 
new orientation to his life. He was encouraged by the fact that many of his 
countrymen, even those less educated than him, were making a reasonable living 
abroad and they were sending money and goods back home to open businesses, build 
houses and help their families. He initially contacted two or three of the innumerable 
international migration networks in the Sandaga market. But he did not accept the 
idea of refunding those who were supposed to organise his departure with a high 
interest rate because he was not sure that he could succeed rapidly enough to make a 
decent wage to refund his lenders. He therefore decided to organise his departure by 
himself. He wanted to go to Europe, to France particularly, because of the importance 
of the Senegalese in that country, and also because he knew some people in French 
cities who could help him to settle down rapidly. However, the lack of sufficient 
financial resources to pay for the visa and the transport ticket obliged him to 
reconsider his wish. Besides, the unfortunate episodes of repatriation of thousands of 
Africans from France worried him. He received a letter from one of his cousins in 
France, who was ready to help him to migrate to France, but at that time, Souleymane 
C. did not have enough financial resources to satisfy the requirements. He then 
decided to migrate first to another African country in order to save enough money 
before migrating to Europe or America later on.  
 
Souleymane C. prepared his departure for almost a year, but he decided to leave after 
March 1992, because he was hoping to witness the victory of the Senegalese national 
team in football at the African Cup of Nations, organised in the country that year. 
Unfortunately, the Senegalese failed to win the trophy. When he left his country, 
Souleymane C. wanted to go to Brazzaville to join his older brother, who had been in 
the Congolese capital for more than five years. He received 300 000 CFA francs from 
his parents to finance his journey. He added that amount to his savings. Even though 
his own money was insignificant in comparison to the amount given by his parents, 
he was glad he could contribute to his own departure. Souleymane C. succeeded in 
acquiring the ECOWAS visa, which allowed him to travel around the member 
countries of the Western African organisation. He decided to travel from one country 
to another, where he could meet people he was in touch with. He wanted to self-
finance his trip by doing odd jobs on his way to Brazzaville, because he spent a part 
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of the initial money preparing his departure. By traveling from one country to 
another, he also wanted to look for interesting opportunities, so that his departure to 
Brazzaville could be unnecessary.  
 
Souleymane C. travelled from Dakar by plane to Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire, with a 
stopover at Bamako, the capital of Mali. In Abidjan he met some Senegalese he 
knew. They advised him to stay for a while to see if an opportunity would come 
along. He found himself in the same situation as in Dakar, working for another 
Senegalese immigrant in a market. After approximately four months in Abidjan 
without real improvement to his situation, he decided to move on. He received 
another amount of money from his parents. He then went to Ghana by car. He did not 
arrive in Accra, the capital, but passed by and spent three days in Foulao, near the 
Togolese border. He did not stay long because he could not speak any language used 
in that country, including English, the official language. He did not have much time 
to stay in Ghana to learn English and look for a job. Souleymane C. then went to 
Lomé in Togo, but at his arrival, the country was in political turmoil, between 
President Gnassingbe Eyadema and his principal opponent Gilchrist Olympio. The 
political crisis obliged him to spend only a few days in Togo. He pursued his journey 
and transited in Benin for a couple of hours before arriving in Nigeria. However, his 
misfortunes continued when he was robbed, just after passing the Nigerian border. 
Unable to speak English and without money Souleymane C. preferred to return to 
Benin. He hoped that in a French-speaking country his chances of survival would be 
higher than in Nigeria. From his first passage in Benin, he was accompanied by a 
Malian, who was also looking for better economic opportunities. They came back to 
Benin together. Once in Cotonou, the Benin capital, he was determined to join his 
brother in Brazzaville as soon as possible. With his Malian companion, he did “small 
jobs” for a couple of months. This allowed them to save some money. Souleymane C. 
once again asked for help from his parents who sent his money. He then bought a 
plane ticket from Cotonou to Brazzaville.  
 
When Souleymane C. arrived in Brazzaville his brother advised him to become a 
photographer. He helped him to buy the necessary material for photography. 
Basically, the bulk of the material was a camera. Souleymane C. did not have a 
photographer’s studio. He was taking pictures all over the city and having the film 
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developed at a professional studio. His earnings were not high, but he could manage 
to make a living in Brazzaville through photography. Once again he was forced to 
look for another opportunity when the Congolese civil war broke out in 1997. One of 
their countrymen was killed at the beginning of the conflict and he and his older 
brother decided to leave Congo. His older brother went to Angola, but Souleymane C. 
did not follow him, because Angola was also involved in a civil war. He instead 
preferred to move to Gabon, which was presented as better than Congo as far as 
economic opportunities are concerned. 
 
Souleymane C. managed to get a visa from the Gabonese embassy before the structure 
closed due to the armed conflict. He reached the border of the two countries by car. 
However, at the control post on the Gabonese side, he was asked to pay additional 
money in order to enter the country although he had a visa. He arrived in Franceville, 
the biggest Gabonese city in the eastern part of the country, where the Senegalese 
community welcomed him. Before leaving Brazzaville, he was already in contact with 
them via the Senegalese association in Brazzaville, as many Senegalese had used the 
same connection to enter Gabon. In Franceville, he spent less than a week because his 
ultimate point of arrival in Gabon was Libreville, the capital of the country. He was 
convinced that in Libreville he could get help from a cousin, who had been 
established in the city for years. The Senegalese community in Franceville helped him 
to pay the train ticket to Libreville.  
 
During his first year, he was living with his cousin and selling cigarettes every night. 
After a couple of months, he managed to save enough money to buy a camera and he 
then restarted his activity of photography like in Brazzaville. He attended a special 
training course on photography and became “professional”. He even regularised his 
status and he was continuously sending money back home through the “Senegalese 
bank.”16 
                                                 
16
 It is a financial network with representatives worlwide, especially where there are big Senegalese 
communities. Western Union, a representative of the network in a specific city receives money from 
someone who would like to send it. The sender also gives details of a person who must receive it at 
home. The representative of the network then calls his colleague where money must be received, and 
gives all relevant details. The network retains 10 per cent of the amount transferred. The network has 
the advantage of reaching rural areas in Senegal in particular. Many nationalities have developped 
these kinds of financial networks worldwide. Apart from reaching rural areas, for instance, transfer fees 
retained by these networks are less significant than those of international companies such Western 
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According to Souleymane C., although his financial situation was far better in 
Libreville in Gabon than in Brazzaville in Congo, things were not quite fine. 
Confronted by the economic crisis, Gabon nationals considered foreigners to be 
scapegoats and blamed them for economic scarcity. He however points out that he 
could not imagine it being worse in South Africa. He made his choice for coming to 
South Africa also because he believed that, as the most advanced economy on the 
continent, it would be better for him to migrate to South Africa, and later on to further 
his journey to Europe or North America. Moreover, he had a former classmate who 
kept him informed about South Africa. He decided then to come to continue his 
studies in South Africa, as his former classmate told him that he was a student in a big 
university in Johannesburg. 
 
Souleymane C. arrived in Johannesburg in June 2000 and the only person he knew at 
that time was his former classmate. He stayed with him for about a week and he had 
to look for another place because his friend was living in a university residence. He 
finally got a Congolese roommate for about six months. Without enough financial 
resources, he could not register to any tertiary institution. The Congolese was 
studying part time at a college and was also a security officer. His former classmate 
introduced him to a member of the Mouride community in Johannesburg. The 
representative of the religious organisation was concerned when Souleymane C. told 
him his story and let him know that he also sold at the Sandaga market in Dakar. 
Souleymane C. was helped by the man to sell fruit and vegetables for about two 
months. With the help from the Mouride community, he opened his own small store 
and a year later he registered with the University of South Africa. He was studying 
part time.  
 
He then had an opportunity to visit Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. In Cape Town he 
met other Senegalese who encouraged him to move down because the situation was 
better than in Johannesburg. When he arrived in Cape Town, another Senegalese was 
on his way to Italy. Souleymane C. then bought his stand at the train station, where he 
has been selling clothes since 2002. At the same time, he has been able to pursue his 
                                                                                                                                            
Union or Money Gramm. Besides, trust put in these network is also important because people see 
financial networks are part of the entire migrants’ networks. 
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studies part time. But in the near future he would like to go back to Johannesburg 
because he believes that business opportunities are better there. 
 
6.5 An extra-legal 
Cecile A. is a woman from Pointe Noire, the second largest city of Congo and it is 
also considered the economic capital of the country. She makes her living by plaiting 
hair at the Cape Town train station, with two other women from the same country. 
The case study of Cecile A. reveals an example of a failed migration.  
 
Cecile A. was living with her companion and their two children in the economic 
capital of Congo before coming to South Africa. Unfortunately, she could not go 
further in her study than the second year of high school because of the lack of 
financial resources. Before meeting her boyfriend, she was living at the family house 
with other siblings and her mother. She was selling fruit and traditional Congolese 
food at the main market place in Pointe Noire. She did not stop her activity when she 
moved in with her boyfriend because it was her only way to make money, and her 
boyfriend’s salary from a company at the city harbour was not enough to satisfy all 
their needs. She even increased her selling products when she gave birth in order to 
earn more money to support her children’s demands.  
 
In the beginning, leaving Congo was not her dream because of her children. She did 
not want to leave them. Unfortunately, her thoughts drastically changed after the 
Congolese civil war which took the lives of two of her brothers. The armed conflict 
added more painful living conditions to those the economic crisis had already brought 
to the country. Many families were surviving from the important remittances received 
from members of their families living in Europe, France in particular, as well as some 
African countries such as Gabon and South Africa. Going to South Africa was 
fashionable at that time because it was a new destination, and because of the 
difficulties encountered in reaching Europe and Gabon no longer offered the same 
financial advantages. In her area in Pointe Noire, two families were living from the 
rent money of houses built in less than two years by the members of their families 
living in Johannesburg.  
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Living conditions in her house worsened when her boyfriend lost his job. A couple of 
months later, he chased her and the children away from his house. It was painful for 
her to be unable to provide a proper home for her children and to be unable to send 
them to school. Because she could not find a decent job, she opted to migrate to look 
for any job in another country which could allow her to help her children and her 
family as a whole, because she was determined to earn more money. 
 
Her choice of South Africa was influenced by a letter she received from her cousin 
who had moved to South Africa nine months before. She asked Cecile A. to join her 
in Cape Town and together they could look for something to make a living. Cecile A. 
received $200 from her cousin in Cape Town and managed to get $100 from different 
people in Pointe Noire to make the trip down to South Africa. Her cousin gave her the 
contacts of people in charge of organising her trip to Cape Town. Her cousin even 
paid half the amount of the trip money. She therefore did not encounter so many 
problems to reach Cape Town. She knew that she was going to a city in South Africa 
called Cape Town, but she did not have any idea where it was, apart from an 
indication on the map.  
 
Cecile A. arrived in Cape Town in September 2001. Soon after her arrival things did 
not go the way she expected. Two months after she arrived while she was still looking 
for a job, as well as trying to learn how to communicate in English, her cousin 
decided to go to France. She was disappointed about not finding a decent job in Cape 
Town. Fortunately for her, she met a Frenchman who became her boyfriend and 
decided to go to France with her. Cecile A. found herself in an embarrassing situation 
because she was not able to speak English properly, she had no money, no decent job, 
and above all of that she was alone in an unknown city.  
 
What follows is a typical example of the dark side of the feminisation of migration in 
particular. Cecile A. reveals with shame and reserve that the first people she was 
introduced to after the departure of her cousin did not give any option other than 
being involved in the networks of prostitution. She mentions that the choice was 
difficult to make but she had to find a way to survive in Cape Town. Cecile A. did not 
want to say too much about her sexual activities.  
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Cecile A.’s status in the meantime has not been clarified. She has declared herself as 
an asylum seeker, but her application has not yet been approved. She considers herself 
lucky because in Cape Town there is less police harassment compared to 
Johannesburg, according to what she has been hearing from people. She remains 
confident that her situation will get better sooner or latter. But she has been shocked 
by the xenophobic attitudes of South African nationals towards foreigners. She does 
not understand such behaviour because many foreigners are suffering in Cape Town 
and the general belief that foreigners take jobs is not true. She is also disappointed 
that xenophobic attacks are directed specifically to black foreign Africans. However, 
she acknowledges that all South Africans are not xenophobes. 
 
Cecile A. also makes money by plaiting and braiding women hair. She has a small 
stand at the train station and from time to time she sends money home to her family. 
She proudly affirm that the money she sends home comes from plaiting activities, and 
she uses the money from the other activities to try to satisfy all her needs in Cape 
Town. She also tries to accumulate some savings as she plans to open a bigger 
business as soon as her status is regularised.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The crossovers from one category to another by migrants depend on the success of the 
settlement in Cape Town. Economic success in Cape Town dictates the overlapping 
from one category to another after the arrival in the city. The settlement of migrants 
often occurs beyond the expectations they had when they decided to come to Cape 
Town, with the settlement being either successful or unsuccessful. Whatever the 
circumstances of arrival of Francophone Africans in Cape Town, their settlement and 
the evolution of their status depends on their ability to be integrated into the local 
society and help they can receive from their fellow countrymen. 
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Chapter Seven  
                                                CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, an investigation has been made in order to explain increases in the 
arrival of French-speaking Africans in Cape Town, particularly since the demise of 
the apartheid regime. The official figures drawn from the 1996 and 2001 censuses 
show an increase of 632% of documented Francophone Africans residing in Cape 
Town in this period. If one considers that the censuses do not take into account all 
categories of migrants, extra-legals in particular, it would be fair to say that no one 
needs official figures to notice a growing number of people speaking French or other 
African languages, such as Lingala, Swahili, Bambara and Wolof, in areas like 
Mowbray, Sea Point, the Central Railway station or Muizenberg to be convinced that 
there is a large number of people coming from Francophone African countries to 
Cape Town. The guesstimate made in this study suggests that the number of 
Francophone African migrants in Cape Town in 2005 may be between 39 000 and 55 
000 people. 
 
The study centers on three main questions: 
1. Why do Francophone Africans leave their countries of origin? 
2. Why do they choose to come to South Africa? 
3. Why, within South Africa, do they decide to come to Cape Town? 
 
In order to give explicit answers to these three questions, four categories (legal 
migrants, students, refugees, and extra-legals) were considered. With regard to the 
first question, the reasons for departure are various and complex. It appears that a 
certain number can be applied to all four categories. These include the continuation of 
studies, the search for job and economic opportunities, the escape of political and the 
deterioration of economic conditions and the effects of social capital. Indeed, the 
collapse of the academic system due to many years of mismanagement, internal 
shortcomings of the Francophone African University, the political, economic and 
social impact of the implementation of both democracy, and the devaluation of CFA 
Franc have impacted on the quality of higher education. For both students and 
academics, migrating has become synonymous with studying and working in better 
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conditions. The search for better working conditions is not limited to academics. 
Francophone Africans also leave their countries because they wish to work in better 
conditions and for better wages, with a desire to have better offers as far as career 
prospects are concerned. These two conditions are the consequences of political and 
economic paralysis. After more than three decades of domination by military and one-
party regimes, the inauguration of democratic changes, implemented at the beginning 
of the 1990s, has not realised expectations. Likewise, an economy mainly based on 
the exportation of raw materials and agricultural products, has been unable to deliver 
genuine development. This is illustrated by indicators such as the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which lists some of Francophone African countries as the 
worst performers worldwide. Lastly, social capital is among the common reasons 
underlying the departure of migrants in all four categories. Through well-established 
networks or by the exchange of information with migrants, people back in their 
countries of origin are motivated to leave and seek other opportunities. Other reasons 
(which do not necessarily apply to all four categories) are armed conflicts, 
environmental catastrophes and the perception of migration as the last resort to make 
a living. Indeed, natural catastrophes, such as the advance of the Sahara Desert, 
particularly in the Sahel, or floods in the tropical region or armed conflicts have 
forced millions of refugees to flee from their countries of origin.  
 
Accordingly, the departure of categories of migrants depends on specific reasons. For 
most of legal migrants and students, the reasons for departures are influenced by 
political, economic, academic and social paralysis, the continuation of studies and the 
search for career prospects, economic and job opportunities. For refugees and extra-
legals however, the reasons for leaving are based on political crisis, economic 
deterioration, social capital, armed conflicts, environmental catastrophes and 
sometimes basic survival.  
 
These reasons, coupled with others such as the search for fertile lands or the need for 
manpower during the pre-colonial or colonial era, have sustained the flows of people 
in Francophone Africa for years. As shown in various sources (GCIM, 2005: 1; 
Castels & Miller, 1998: 125), large numbers of regional movements have occurred 
between countries. Nevertheless, Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire have been regarded as 
important destinations in Francophone Africa, because of their relative economic 
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success up to the end of the 1980s. The flows of Francophone Africans have also been 
directed to France and to a lesser extent to Belgium, the former colonial rulers. In 
Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire, the arrivals of Francophone Africans have been mainly 
guided by the search for job opportunities. In Europe, the patterns of the Francophone 
African migration to these countries were determined, in the first place, by economic 
demands, especially with the implementation of the “migration of recruitment” after 
World War II. Later, the departure of French-speaking Africans took other forms such 
as families’ reunification, seasonal workers’ migration and illegal flows.  
 
The choice of South Africa as country of destination is based on multiple factors. The 
decision underlying this choice is based on perceptions of potential migrants about 
South Africa while they are still in their countries. South Africa is regarded as a 
country with a rich and painful history, made by great men. The country nowadays is 
labeled the economic locomotive of the continent, and it is perceived as a good tourist 
destination and could be a potential stopover to reach other destinations. However, 
some Francophone Africans also regard South Africa as a racist and xenophobic 
country, with a high proportion of violence and HIV/AIDS.  
 
Yet, many Francophone Africans are willing to come to South Africa. Before 1994, 
there were two migration streams from Francophone Africa: white flows from 
Mauritius and the settlement of Zairians, in particular in the former homelands. Even 
before the arrival of the ANC into power, millions of “aliens” were flowing over the 
South Africa’s borders and were confirming the predictions made by the former South 
African president F. W. De Klerk in 1990.17  
 
South African political and economic achievements during the first post-apartheid 
decade are illustrated by the organisation of free and fair elections, the freedom of the 
press and the respect of the separation of powers of the legislative, the executive and 
                                                 
17
 At the dawn of the inauguration of democracy in South Africa, F. W. De Klerk predicted, during a 
speech, that: 
 
All the evidence suggests that the ending of apartheid will deepen, not weaken, South Africa’s 
attractiveness to the people of the region. This means that when southern Africa’s own Berlin Wall – 
apartheid - finally comes down, a tide of humanity will cross over into this country. To avoid the 
resulting long-term social dislocation, planning for these migrants needs to commence as soon as 
possible (Vale, 2003: 93). 
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the judiciary. The country is an economic giant on the continent. South Africa 
represents 40% of the GDP of the whole of Africa and of the 50 first companies on 
the continent, 40 are South Africans. Jeune Afrique (2005: 232) points out that the 
economic future of the country is promising. Furthermore, the academic institutions 
are better structured than those in other African countries. The prominence of South 
Africa has also been demonstrated by the country’s capacity for resolving conflicts 
(with Burundi, the DRC and Cote d’Ivoire the most famous examples in Francophone 
Africa), as well as its determination to guide the continent towards a new orientation 
of development through structures such as NEPAD or AU. 
 
South Africa has become, because of these aspects, a magnet for millions of 
Francophone Africans in their quest for better economic opportunities, studying 
conditions or a safer place. In order to distinguish the flows of people entering South 
Africa during the apartheid era and those that have been happening since the 
democratic elections, especially from Francophone Africa, it argues that “For the 
immigrants who have arrived from the Congo and other parts of French-speaking 
Africa, the major reason for migrating has been to escape civil war in their own 
countries and to seek a better life, not to serve a limited time as migrant workers” 
(Sichone, 2003: 131). 
 
However, these South African political and economic aspects do not have the same 
effect in attracting other categories of migrants. For legal migrants and students, the 
major reasons for choosing South Africa as a country of destination are economic 
opportunities, political achievements, academic infrastructure, social capital and the 
language factor (being able to master English). For refugees and extra-legals, social 
capital, geographical proximity and South African immigration law are the principal 
reasons for coming. Finally, the country is also viewed as an alternative destination to 
some traditional ones. But, many migrants, or potential migrants, to South Africa have 
a limited knowledge of the country upon arrival. A large number of those migrants 
have received information about the country from the media or from previous 
migrants in South Africa or from those currently residing there. 
 
With regard to the last question of this study, the reasons for the arrivals of 
Francophone migrants also depend on the categories of migrants. Six main reasons 
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emerged from the research explaining the choice of Cape Town. First, Cape Town is 
viewed as a first choice, especially by some legal migrants and students. By applying 
for work and study permits from their countries of origin, migrants know, at their 
arrival, that Cape Town is their destination in South Africa. The second reason is the 
use of social capital networks. Cape Town has been included into well-organised 
international networks within which migrants arrive in or leave from Cape Town to 
other destinations when necessary. The last four reasons are related to Johannesburg, 
which for many Francophone Africans is the first choice. Those reasons are the failure 
to settle economically and academically in Johannesburg, safety, police harassment 
and the fact that Johannesburg is perceived to be overpopulated by migrants, which 
affects chances of settlement and economic success. Those reasons explain the arrival 
of most extra-legals, refugees, some legal migrants and few students.  
 
Four hypotheses were selected when the three main questions were posed: 
 
1. French-speaking Africans leave their countries of origin due to political 
disturbance, economic difficulties and the collapse of social and academic 
systems. 
2. Their departure for South Africa is viewed as a second choice due to their 
inability to reach or live in some traditional destinations, France, Cote d’Ivoire 
and Gabon. This is because these countries had strengthened their migration 
policies. 
3. The choice of South Africa lies in the pull factors presented by the country, 
which are similar to those of European countries. 
4. Finally, the arrival of French-speaking African migrants in Cape Town is the 
consequence of failure of earlier settlements elsewhere within South Africa. 
 
This study has shown that the departure of Francophone Africans from their countries 
of origin is the result of the political disturbance, economic difficulties and the 
collapse of social and academic systems. However, if this hypothesis is true, it 
appears that additional reasons are behind the departure of Francophone Africans. 
More importantly, this study suggests that the motives for leaving depend on the 
categories of migrants.  
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It has been shown in this study that during the course of their history, due in particular 
to economic stringency, some traditional countries of destination have strengthened 
their migration policies to curb the flows of migrants. Various laws and measures in 
France, the policies of Ivoirité in Cote d’Ivoire and Gabonisation in Gabon are some 
examples. The implementation of such laws and measures has made it difficult for 
migrants to enter these countries and has played a pivotal role in the repatriation of 
thousands of others already established in the host nations. For many migrants, it is 
important to look for other destinations, including South Africa. The search for new 
destinations has been enhanced by the challenges presented by globalisation such as 
the ability to adapt to a global labour market.  
 
To some extent, the choice of South Africa as country of destination is dictated by the 
pull factors comparable to those in European, American and some Asian countries. If 
one considers students for instance, their choice of South Africa is made because the 
country can offer academic infrastructure better than those in the sending ones and 
similar to those in Europe. However, for some refugees, the choice of South Africa 
responds to the geographical proximity.  
 
With regard to the choice of city as destination in South Africa, Johannesburg appears 
to be the first choice because it is the best-known South African city in Francophone 
Africa. This study has also demonstrated that some migrants are unable to settle in 
Johannesburg economically or for safety and academic reasons. Therefore, Cape 
Town is among the other cities that migrants consider as second or third choice. But, 
this does not apply to all migrants, especially some legal migrants and students, who 
regard Cape Town as their first destination at their arrival in the country.  
 
In the introduction, the question regarding the continuation of a Francophone identity 
among migrants in Cape Town was posed. Upon arrival, migrants find their common 
knowledge of French a significant bond. As migrants settle and attempt to integrate, 
knowledge of French remains an important shared asset among legal migrants and 
students. For most other migrants, its importance diminishes as they learn and use 
other languages such as English and isiXhosa. 
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This thesis illustrates the dualism of the integration of Francophone Africans into the 
Cape Town’s society. On the one hand, some attempts to integrate are made by 
migrants through marriages to South Africa nationals, the incorporation into religious 
organisations and the learning of local languages, particularly isiXhosa. The study 
demonstrated that the current arrivals and attempts at integration of migrants in 
general, including from Francophone Africa, participate in the changing dynamics of 
the city. On the other hand, migrants keep strong links with their countries of origin. 
The sending of remittances and the activities of networks such as the transfer of goods 
or information to potential migrants in Francophone Africa illustrate their 
transnationalism.  
 
The process of Francophone African migration to Cape Town may be thought to end 
with the integration of migrants into the society. Yet, that integration is hampered by 
xenophobia (which migrants themselves explain as a lack of knowledge about the rest 
of the continent among South Africans and by the spread of poverty). Integration is 
also influenced by the gender of migrants. Since there are numerous women among 
Congolese migrants, new female migrants are provided with accommodation as well 
as casual work upon their arrival. There are other such examples. The success of the 
Francophone African migration to Cape Town determines the future of the 
respondents. There are some who still consider Cape Town as a stopover, although 
they have already extended their sojourn in the city several times. Another group of 
respondents admit to being satisfied with the city.  
 
In conclusion, migration of Francophone Africans to Cape Town can be viewed as 
part of new patterns of movement of people taking place worldwide. Indeed, the 
arrival of French-speaking Africans in South Africa is determined by the advantages 
and complexities of globalization. These processes are likely to continue to push 
people from various regions and to attract people to new regions, despite different 
language backgrounds. 
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Appendix: Estimating the numbers of Francophone African migrants in Cape 
Town 
 
1.1 Aim  
“Determining recent trends in the migrant stock in African countries is often a matter 
of guesswork” (The United Nations, 2004: 55). Although relevant figures are often 
contradictory and always open to debate, especially with the current flows of 
thousands of Zimbabweans arriving in South Africa, I felt it necessary to develop 
guesstimates of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town, at the end of the first 
decade following the demise of the apartheid. This will be done in three steps. 
 
1.2 Method 
Since the categories used in research done within the body of this thesis are (i) legal 
migrants, (ii) refugees, (iii) students, and (iv) extra-legal migrants, the methods used 
for developing a guesstimate in each of these four categories will be first spelled out 
separately. I will also identify the method then used for developing a guesstimate of 
the number of Francophone migrants in Cape Town, some ten years after the demise 
of apartheid. The second step is the application of these methods to each of the four 
migrant categories. Thirdly, the calculation of a guesstimate of the number of 
Francophone African migrants in Cape Town will bring the appendix to close.  
 
1.2.1 Legal migrants 
I scanned and found data from academic and the South African Department of Home 
Affairs sources on Francophone legal Africans in South Africa and in Cape Town. 
Since data is available for both South Africa and in Cape Town in 2001, the 
proportion of Francophone Africans in Cape Town in 2001 is used to calculate 
Francophone African migrants in Cape Town in 2005. 
 
1.2.2 Refugees 
I scanned and collected data on refugees in South Africa and on African refugees in 
Cape Town, from various sources. Personal communication from Home Affairs 
provided the figure of 22% of all legal African migrants in Cape Town for the year 
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2001 were Francophone. I have applied this 22% to the African refugee community in 
Cape Town in the same year. 
 
1.2.3 Students 
The four universities in the Greater Cape Town were approached and after a series of 
referrals between universities administrative departments, figures of Francophone 
African students were obtained.  
 
1.2.4 Extra-legals 
I scanned sources on data of extra-legal African migration to South Africa. I used 
most reliable sources drawn from the work of established specialists on migration, 
such as Hough and Minaar (1996), Reitz (1997) Crush and McDonald (1999) or 
Crush and Williams (2001). However, results remain unreliable with major 
differences between high and low estimates. For this reason this data have not been 
used. 
 
For Cape Town, the following method has been applied:  
(i) An academic estimate for the total foreign African population of the Western Cape 
in 2002 was taken as the point of departure18. (ii) Using data assembled for the other 
three categories, namely legal migrants, refugees and students; an estimate of the 
other category (that is, extra-legal foreign Africans) was calculated for 2002. (iii) 
Subsequently, 22% of this figure was calculated to generate an estimate of the number 
of extra-legal Francophone African migrants in the Western Cape in 2002. (iv) The 
rate of increase of legal migrants to Cape Town from 2002 to 2005 was then applied 
to extra-legal Francophone Africans in Cape Town to obtain a 2005 estimate. (v) The 
resulting range was taken to reflect the size of this population in Cape Town.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Dorrington, quoted by Boaden, B. 2002. Migration Study in the Western Cape: Foreign African 
Migrants in the Western Cape. Cape Town: UCT. p 8. 
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1.3 Guesstimates by categories 
 
1.3.1 Francophone African legal migrants 
 
Table A.1 Legal Francophone African migrants 
 South Africa Cape Town 
1996  36419 
2001 20 00020 2 45221 
2004 250 00022 30 650 
2005 110 00023 13 486 
 
- Data for Francophone African migrants in South Africa for the years 2001, 2004 and 
2005 were obtained from academic sources. 
- Data for Francophone African migrants in Cape Town for the years 1996 and 2001 
were obtained through personal communication with Home Affairs. 
- The proportion of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town was 12. 26% in 
2001. When this proportion is applied to the national figure in 2005, a guesstimate of 
13 486 Francophone African migrants in Cape Town is obtained. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Personal communication with Home Affairs, 26 March 2005. 
20
 Bouillon, A. and Morris, A. (eds). 2001. African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone 
Migration of the 1990s. Pretoria: Protea. p. 32.  
21
 Personal communication with Home Affairs 
22
 Fall, P. D. 2004. Les Sénégalais au KwaZulu-Natal (Afrique du Sud) ou les Naufragés de la 
Migration Internationale. Paper presented at the International Congress of African Studies. Barcelona, 
12-15 January. 
23
 Colette, E. 2005. «Francophonie à la Hausse» Jeune Afrique l’Intelligent. N° 2314, 15 May. p. 36. 
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1.3.2 Refugees  
 
Table A.2 Refugees in South Africa 
Selected years Numbers 
1996 3 00024 
1997 4 00025 
1998 8 00026 
1999 14 53027 
14 90428 
11 73429 
2002 25 00030 
69 00031 
27 00032 
2005 28 50033 
 
Figures developed in this table represent all refugees in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 www.refugees.org 
25
 idem 
26
 ibidem 
27
 ibid. 
28
 Joseph, G. B. 2001. “Asylum or Abuse? The Refugee Regime in South Africa”, in Majodina, Z. 
(ed.). The Challenge of Forced Migration in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 
p. 141. 
29
 Matlou, P. 2001. “The Creation of Refugee Law: The South African Experience”, in Majodina, Z. 
(ed.). The Challenge of Forced Migration in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 
p. 127. 
30
 www.refugees.org 
31
 Cape Town Refugee Centre, quoted by Boaden, B. 2002. Migration Study in the Western Cape: 
Foreign African Migrants in the Western Cape. Cape Town: UCT. p.17. 
32
 Gotz, G. and Landau, L. B. 2004. “Introduction”, in Landau, L. B. (ed.). Forced Migrants in the New 
Johannesburg: Towards a Local Government Response. Johannesburg: University of the 
Witwatersrand. p.18. 
33
 www.refugees.org 
 273 
Table A.3 Refugees in Cape Town 
Years African refugees Francophone refugees 
1999 11 90034 2 618 
2002 19 00035 4 180 
2005 15 68536 3 451 
 
-Data for refugees in South Africa come from many sources and are less than reliable. 
-For Cape Town, one academic source for 1999 and 2002 and one state source for 
2005 appear reasonable, as it is clear from the different figures since other figures 
appear to contradict national data. 
The 22% proportion is applied to calculate Francophone African refugees. This is 
clearly a guesstimate. The figure obtained for 2005 is 3 451 Francophone African 
refugees in Cape Town.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Boaden, B. 2002. Migration Study in the Western Cape: Foreign African Migrants in the Western 
Cape. Cape Town: UCT. p. 9. 
35
 Idem. 
36
 Personal communication with Home Affairs, 26 March 2005. 
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1.3.3 Registered Francophone African Students 
Table A.4 Registered Francophone African students 
 1994 1996 1998 2001 2002 2004 
CPUT37 1 1 3 58 115 236 
US38 4 3 11 67 96 154 
UCT39 179 17 193 227 268 285 
UWC40  2 10 34 35 83 
The figure obtained for 2004 is 758 Francophone African students.  
 
1.3.4 Francophone Extra-legal migrants 
A guesstimate of Francophone extra-legal migrants in Cape Town is obtained 
following these steps: 
(i) By obtaining the number of extra-legal African migrants: 
Dorrington estimate of foreign African migrants in the Western Cape41 (2002):  
                                                                                                             60 000 – 80 000 
 
Estimated number of legal migrants (2001):                                             11 14542 
                                   refugees (2002):                                                      19 00043 
                                   students (2001):                                                        1 75444    
                                                                                              Total:            31 899 
 
Estimate (2001/2002) of extra-legal African migrants in Western Cape:  
                                                                                                           28 101 – 48 10145 
 
Estimate (2001/2002) of Francophone extra-legal African migrants in Western Cape  
(22% of the extra legal African migrants): 6 182 – 10 582 
                                                 
37
 Planning Department , CPUT, 31 January 2007 
38
 International Office, University of Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005 
39
 Planning Department, UCT, 14 July 2005 
40
 Planning Department, UWC, 25 February 2007 
41
 Boaden, B. op. cit. ,p.9. 
42
 11 145 is obtained from 2 452 (the number of Francophone legal African migrants in Cape Town in 
2001, who represent 22% of the African population in Cape Town according to Home Affairs). 
43
 The number of African refugees in Cape Town, according to Boaden, op.cit. 
44
 1 754 is obtained from 386 by assuming that the proportion of Francophone African students in the 
foreign african students population is the same as the proportion (22 %) of Francophone africans 
among all Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town. (see Table B. 4) 
45
 This number was obtained by subtracting 31 899 (the sum of the other three categories) from the 
estimate given by Dorrington. 
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(ii) By obtaining the number the annual increase of Francophone legal migrants 2001 
and 2005 
Number of Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town in 2001 = 2 452 
                                                                                                     in 2005 = 13 486 
That is, an increase of 11 034 over four years, which translates into an annual increase 
of 450 % for these four years period. 
When this annual increase is applied to the estimates above, over a three year period 
(2002-2005), the following range is obtained: 
Francophone African extra-legal migrants in the Western Cape (2005):  
                                                                                                              27 819 – 47 619 
As pointed by Boaden (2002: ii), most of these migrants live in Cape Town. One 
therefore can apply these numbers to Cape Town. 
 
1.4 Estimation of the numbers of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town 
(2004/2005) 
 
Table A.5 Estimation of the numbers of Francophone African migrants in Cape 
Town (2004/2005) 
Years Categories of migrants Numbers 
2005 Legals migrants 13 486 
2005 Refugees 3 451 
2004 Students 758 
2004/2005 Extra-legals 20 940 – 37 714 
2004/2005 Total 38 635 – 55 409 
 
In conclusion, it would appear that there were between 39 000 and 55 000 
Francophone African migrants in Cape Town in 2005. This guesstimate however 
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should be used with extreme caution since it is based on a number of assumptions that 
may be questioned.  
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